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2Abstract
The discourse of the war on terrorism of the George W. Bush administration is used as a case study and 
a platform to assess the ideas of Michel Foucault on discourse analysis and power. Foucauldian notions 
prove to be useful tools for highlighting several aspects of the discourse, such as the link between 
knowledge and power, the construction of the concept of the terrorist, the role of identity in regards to 
security practices, or biopolitics as the management of life in the context of the war on terrorism. 
However, a number of specificities in regards to power relations and discursive practices escape a 
Foucauldian approach. These are revealed by stressing the importance of agency, facts and events for 
discourse analysis; and by complementing a Foucauldian perspective with the perspectives of 
alternative authors, such as Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Giorgio Agamben or Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, among others.
The process of assessing Foucauldian discourse analysis allows to simultaneously accomplish a 
secondary objective of analyzing the discourse of the war on terrorism itself.
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8Introduction
The George W. Bush administration, which now approaches the end of its term, enjoyed the sympathy 
of the world population as a result of the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001. Since the events, 
however, the sympathy has increasingly eroded and turned to dislike and hatred. The rhetoric of Bush, 
his government officials and the supporting neocons that crafted the phrase “war on terror” could have 
been initially taken as hyperbolic, but had to be interpreted ever more literally after the months that led 
to the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly the latter was not welcomed by a large number of 
people and a considerable number of foreign governments, unhappy at the apparent contempt towards 
the United Nations and its laws, and the weak arguments for an invasion. Similarly, liberal and left 
wing sections of the United States population itself resented draconian laws and discourse. The 
unpopularity of the Bush administration reached its climax with the Abu Ghraib leaked photograph 
scandal, the increasing knowledge of the living conditions of occupied Iraq and the nature and practices 
of Guantanamo Bay.
Thus, the leap from what first appeared to be hyperboles to grim realities demanded an analysis by 
journalists, historians, social and political scientists.
For a critical examination of the discourse of the war on terrorism, the work of Michel Foucault seemed 
like a promising platform for its critical stance and its remarkable focus in power and historical 
circumstances. The parallels between his observations on the subject of the social alienation of 
minorities such as madmen or homosexuals – the ways in which social conditions became identity –
and the current construction around the notion of the terrorist were already apparent without a detailed 
comparison. His contribution in highlighting disciplinary practices in Western societies suggested a 
9relationship with similar practices of the war on terrorism within the US and in the prisons in 
Guantanamo and Iraq.
For these reasons, this project began as an attempt to make use of Foucauldian theory on discourse 
analysis to examine the US discourse of the war on terrorism. As the project proceeded, my 
understanding of the subtleties in Foucault's work increased and so did my appraisal of the overall 
process of the generation of the discourse of the war on terrorism. While the perspective from Foucault 
proved to be very useful to understand some key points – such as the construction of the very concept 
of terrorism and the terrorist, or the genealogy of the American mindset of security and their role in the 
world – I was dissatisfied with how little I could find in Foucault that could explain certain 
characteristics of the subject that seemed to me to be of great significance. These were very specific 
practices related to specific groups of people and the way they talked about concrete events. It seemed 
to me that Foucauldian concepts such as genealogy, governmentality or biopolitics helped a great deal 
but were insufficient to describe, let alone explain, that which has given the war on terrorism its 
uniqueness; or to put it in Foucauldian terms, that which has marked it as a discontinuity.
It may be that I found myself within a problem of research observed by Colin Wight:
As a result of the contemporary fascination with epistemology, students are encouraged to adopt 
a theory as they move through their intellectual career. These theories then become identities 
that determine what research is deemed important, and how it is to be conducted. At times, this 
is not a problem and often the best research is conducted by a researcher totally committed to, 
and immersed within, a particular theoretical perspective. The problem occurs when it is 
forgotten that this is only one way to look at the issue, or that only a minute part of a complex 
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object has been examined. When this happens, the researcher is apt to think they have arrived at 
a complete and overarching account of the world that is applicable to all outcomes. Once this 
occurs, grand theory quickly follows and with it outlandish claims to universality, parsimony 
and overarching frameworks of explanation.1
I could not make a coherent and parsimonious whole out of my analysis through the use of Foucault 
alone – much less a universal whole. As a result I found myself struggling more with Foucault than 
with the original task at hand. Upon rereading my own work, I realized that in some points I followed 
Foucault closely, but in others I became so critical and in fact departed so much from him that 
eventually the question emerged of why I was using his work in the first place, and if there wouldn't be 
any other approach which could more effectively achieve my original goal. Still, I was reluctant to 
discard him completely; I found other theories, such as Marxism, even less satisfying or even simplistic 
in their understanding of power, and not very easy to incorporate as a coherent complement to 
Foucault. There were a few exceptions, for example: Giorgio Agamben's notion of bare life and the 
homo sacer2, which I read as a reasonable expansion of Foucault and original enough in its own right; 
and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's idea of a hegemonic discourse.3 Agamben, however, was 
useful to describe only a certain number of practices related to the war on terrorism, such as the 
management of human lives through torture in the context of exceptional spaces or circumstances, but 
did not have much to add to my own concerns on power and discourse. Likewise, Laclau and Mouffe 
                                                
1 Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006): 295
2 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)
3 James Martin, ‘The political logic of discourse: a neo-Gramscian view’, History of European Ideas 28 (2002): 24, 
25; Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics
(London: Verso, 1985)
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described a few aspects of interest to me about the limits of a discourse and its confrontation with other 
alternatives, but were still not satisfying enough when dealing with problems concerning truth and its 
production in discourse.
Having expressed these issues to my supervisors and after their useful feedback I realized that the 
dialogue that I was having with Foucault was in itself interesting enough to make it the central subject 
of the thesis. Thus, it was decided that the discourse of the war on terrorism would not be discarded, 
but instead of being the prime subject of the analysis, it would serve as the case study upon which 
Foucault could be tested. The main focus of the project became then an assessment of Foucauldian 
theory as a tool for discourse analysis, while the former objective of reaching a better understanding of 
the war on terrorism became a secondary goal.
The pursuit of two goals in one thesis is justified because of their interconnectedness. The first one is 
not an assessment of Foucault in general, but of its relevance and usefulness to a particular case study; 
therefore I do not discard the possibility that Foucault may provide a better or worse tool of analysis for 
cases of a different nature. Similarly, the second objective is achieved with the help of Foucauldian 
theory where appropriate, and complemented by other theories and works that can be read as 
developments from or commentaries on Foucault, as well as my personal reflections.
The main points where I depart from Foucault are the following:
Power
Foucault insisted that in order to examine power we must give up previous understandings of class 
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struggle that focused on ruling classes or systems, and replace them with an examination of power as it 
is manifested at its capillary extremes. A broad understanding of power structures was to be replaced 
by what he called a microphysics of power.4 This is what he meant with his call to 'cut the king's head 
off'.5 Furthermore, power was to be understood in more dynamic and ubiquitous terms, like a currency 
exchanging hands through a complex social system, not the exclusive property of a class or group of 
people.
Power is relevant in this project because it is intrinsically related to discourse, knowledge and their 
production. Therefore, the question of who or what holds power, or how it is manifested in the context 
of the discourse of the war on terrorism within the US, is an essential departing point. In principle, it 
could be the case that no particular agent holds any more power than any other and that the discourse 
emerges as the product of the whole of social and historical interactions. This is true to some extent, but 
only in as much as the discourse of the war on terrorism borrows from previous American discourses of 
identity and security, such as those related to Cold war, immigration or the war on drugs.6 It is not true, 
however, as long as we accept that certain specific groups of people, with particular ways of 
understanding the world and the place of the US within it, currently hold a disproportionate amount of 
power as compared to others within the country. What I see as the most direct producer of the discourse 
of the war on terrorism is a loose network of power with neoconservatism at its centre.7 It is not a class 
                                                
4 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980): 96
5 Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR’, International 
Relations, 21 (2007): 329
6 David Campbell, Writing Security, United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998)
7 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004)
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in Marxist terms, nor is it a monolithic group controlled by one or a few masterminds. It is true –
following Foucault – that their power is variable and dynamic, and subject to change with historical 
circumstances. But it is a network of power after all, one which has contributed significantly to the 
specific shape of the discourse. This group is equivalent to the head of the king, and – contrary to 
Foucault – I do not believe that an analysis would be complete if we were to cut it off.
Chapter 2 argues in favor of an adequate description and understanding of this network of power and 
its ideology. In as much as Foucault was not interested in ideology, this represents another movement 
away from him.
Truth and events
According to Foucault, power produces knowledge and they directly imply each other,8 and therefore it 
is ultimately truth itself that is produced in relation to power. This is an assertion that requires 
explanation as it is counterintuitive to classical understandings of epistemology that truth can be 
produced, instead of learned or discovered, and it is the same for knowledge, which should be acquired. 
At first sight, it appears that Foucault's statement suggests that there is no distinction between truth and 
falsehood, and no way to decide between opposing statements, and therefore that he is advocating an 
extreme form of relativism where 'anything goes'. However, this would not really do justice to 
Foucault, as a deeper understanding reveals that what he is really arguing is that the world as we 
understand it – and therefore our understanding of the objects within it – is dependent on assumptions, 
                                                
8 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1977): 27; Michael 
Gold-Biss, The Discourse on Terrorism, Political Violence and the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 1981-1986 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1994): 17
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frameworks and discourses determined by and interrelated to power. In other words, that which we 
come to regard as 'truth' for all intents and purposes is accepted as such because of its extension into 
social interactions of power.
This is indeed the case when we are dealing with complex or abstract concepts and notions (especially 
in a political context), such as 'democracy', 'independence', 'freedom' or 'terrorism'. Indeed, the fact that 
the 'truth' about terrorism is determined by social discourses which are assumed and accepted by large 
segments of Western societies because of and in regards to relations of power, while we wrongly 
believe it to be based on science or simple knowledge in good faith, is quite relevant and useful for an 
understanding of the discourse of the war on terrorism. The realization that there is no 'terrorism' as 
such – that is, there is no object in the world that is intrinsically terroristic, but rather interpreted events 
or constructed objects in such a way by large segments of society – is a solid platform on which to 
understand our post 9/11 world.
However, when dealing with simple events, things or concrete verifiable facts about the world, it is not 
true that what is said of them constitutes 'truth' or knowledge only in relation to the social structures of 
power. Bombs explode, people die, crimes are committed, words are spoken, weapons are smuggled –
or they are not. Thus, it would be a mistake to read too much into Foucault and conclude that even 
specific events are constructed, rather than constituting in themselves verifiable objects of the world, or 
that they are not important.
The above should be obvious, and it should also be clear that it was not Foucault's intention to take 
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things that far. His own historical works do not suggest such a thing.9 So why is it relevant to even spell 
out the observation here? Because when examining specific examples of how the discourse of the war 
on terrorism is constructed or manifested by the personalities that compose the network of power 
relations, we find that they do not feel constrained by concrete events, and often misrepresent them if 
they need those facts to match their assumptions. This is a surprising discovery; it is common 
knowledge that people in positions of power 'spin' the facts in order to give them a convenient 
interpretation, but it is something else altogether to misrepresent them to the point that they bear little 
to no relationship to the original events. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was based on the argument that 
Saddam Hussein held weapons of mass destruction that represented an immediate threat to the world, 
and that he was in alliance with al-Qaeda. Both turned out to be wrong. 
It is my belief that the questions of who and how are relevant to the discourse. In other words, if the
specific network of power and their misrepresentations of facts had not been at the heart of the war on 
terrorism, the way it was conducted by others would have probably shared similar characteristics, but 
they would have not been taken to some of the extremes that we have witnessed. Some sort of strong 
response or retaliation against an identifiable enemy would have probably been necessary to satisfy the 
historical American identity; perhaps it was inevitable that Afghanistan would be invaded. But the form 
that the retaliation took and a further invasion of Iraq sustained on such arguments seem to have come 
directly from the neoconservative way of thinking; an ideology already interested in Iraq as a target, in 
US global supremacy among its goals, and which was apparently influenced to some extent by the 
Straussian notion of 'noble lies' and the creation of myths as legitimate strategies of government. The 
use of lies and myths, and therefore the identification of some of the possible ideological origins of 
                                                
9 See for example  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison
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neoconservatism, would not be revealed if we did not stress the fact that specific and objective events 
do happen in the world, and that they can be misrepresented.
Furthermore, the role of lies and myths in the production of the discourse and their contrast with facts 
reveals the degree of disproportionality10 of the discourse and again stresses the character of agency of 
the members of the network of power; two elements which enrich our understanding of discourse.
There is also a moral implication of the acceptance of the importance of simple verifiable facts and 
events apart from their meaning. When and if they are misrepresented, exposing the mismatch between 
words and facts provides a route for resistance to power in its modality of domination.11 If we are to 
have hope of living in a reasonably fair and just modern society, then we cannot ignore the 
misrepresentation of the most basic facts. Resistance is actually in accordance with Foucauldian 
aspirations. In Foucault “a personal ethics of agency and refusal exists, which is separate from some 
obligatory link with political, economic or social structures. Foucault says that he is more interested in 
“politics as an ethics” than politics.”12 Highlighting the existing gap between discourse and empirical 
facts may be the most promising possibility for refusal and resistance of the abuse of power.
The subject of truth, its production, the issue of empirical facts and the themes of the discourse is 
covered in chapter 3.
                                                
10 The notion of disproportionality in the context of social analysis was proposed by Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-
Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994): 36
11 Foucault identified domination as a particular modality of power in which asymmetrical relationships left little 
room for manoeuvre for subordinated persons because their margin of liberty is extremely limited. See Barry Hindess, 
Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996): 102
12 Frank Pignatelli, ‘Dangers, Possibilites: Ethico-Political Choices in the Work of Michel Foucault’, Philosophy of 
Education (1993)
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Socio-historical and political specificities
Foucault was much concerned with the specifics of society and history. By using an empirical method, 
he analyzed specific historical procedures, institutions, techniques and strategies of power. In contrast, I 
believe that specificities should also refer to concrete people and groups of power, their geopolitical 
and ideological agendas, their concrete actions and use of language, and the contrast with the actual 
facts to which they make reference. This is a theme that runs throughout the whole thesis, particularly 
in chapters 2 and 3.
When Foucault was reproached for not presenting an overall theory he replied that such a task would 
be both “abstract and limiting” and that his desire was rather “to open up problems that are as concrete
and general as possible”.13 Like Foucault, my analysis has no desire to propose a theory, but rather to 
examine a concrete problem. Unlike him, I seek to highlight specifics rather than generalities; the 
reason being that otherwise the uniqueness of the discourse of the war on terrorism would be lost. As 
Jan Selby has written in an enlightening article on the use of Foucault within the discipline of 
International Relations: “[T]he critique or deconstruction of ideological categories need not rule out all 
analysis of structural socio-historical specificities – and it is in this sense that there exists an ontological 
specificity and irreducibility to the international”.14 In this case, the specifics are directly related to the 
network of power in which we find the neoconservative group at its core.
                                                
13 Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Habermas and Foucault: thinkers for civil society?’, British Journal of Sociology 49-2 (June 1998)
14 Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’: 338
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Biopolitics
Foucault proposed to analyze the management of human life in Western societies. He observed that 
human beings have been understood as biological entities which need to be administered massively in 
terms of health, population, birth rates, immigration, movement, and so on. The practice of managing 
human life is read by Foucault as a historical step further from previous practices of discipline, which  
managed human bodies in specific contexts, such as hospitals, schools, prisons, workplaces or the 
army, and which involved among other things the practice of surveillance as a method for discipline, 
following Jeremy Bentham's model of the Panopticon.15
All these remarks have turned out to be very useful to highlight aspects of modern Western societies 
that would otherwise be still partially understood if the social sciences had stuck in Marxist or classical
models of power. They have also confirmed and highlighted that power is indeed at work even in 
peaceful and democratic societies. But what happens when societies – democratic or otherwise – adopt 
discourses of war and danger? In Society Must Be Defended Foucault discussed this issue to some 
extent, by proposing the argument that Nazi Germany predicated the extermination of a different race –
the Jews – upon the idea of biological survival, which constitutes the rationale of biopolitics taken to 
the extreme.16 Again, these are very valuable insights, but I believe that the work of Giorgio Agamben 
is more to the point, while still being fairly logically compatible with Foucault.
Perhaps it could be said that the point of incompatibility comes when Agamben characterizes the power 
                                                
15 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 200-202
16 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976 (New York: Picador): 
241-244, 255
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of the sovereign as its ability to render bare life. It would be incompatible with Foucault because, again, 
Foucault is reluctant to make an analysis of sovereignty, i.e. the king's head. But it is not a logical 
contradiction. What Agamben argues is that the essence of sovereign power is that it can declare states 
of emergency and spaces of exception where human life is stripped of its social qualities and its rights 
as individual political entities, thus becoming nothing more than bare life, biological entities with as 
much value as any other, and therefore potential subjects of death. From this it follows that torture or 
injury can and is often used on human beings who find themselves in these states of emergency or 
spaces of exception, such as concentration camps.17
From this brief summary of Agamben we can already see how much it is relevant to some of the most 
scandalous manifestations of the war on terrorism – manifestations which can easily be understood as 
material and practical elements of the discourse, as I believe they should. Consider the practices of 
torture by US authorities in the Iraqi prison of Abu Ghraib and the camp of Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
These subjects are covered mainly in chapter 4.
Social Antagonism in discourses
As already noted above, Foucault's understanding of discourse as a conglomerate of assumptions and 
interpretations that are taken for granted to the point that they are considered science or self-evident 
truths, which determine even our perception of complex objects and concepts (such as 'terrorism' or 
'democracy') is an outstanding contribution which provides a solid platform from which to begin to 
                                                
17 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer
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approach the discourse of the war on terrorism.
However, I do not believe that this idea should be taken to the extreme in the context of political 
science, as we would then find ourselves without any possibility of even thinking critically about any 
particular discourse. Even Foucault's observations would be determined by it, thus preventing any 
reasonable analysis. From a philosophical perspective, it is possible that there is a meta-discourse that 
predetermines everything and anything that human beings can ever conceive of; but for the purpose of 
political analysis we are safe to admit that there are several opposing discourses to be explored. The 
war on terrorism, after all, has been widely criticized both from within and outside the US, and I find 
this opposition both fascinating and productive. I believe that a comparison of the discourse of the war 
on terrorism with opposing discourses can shed some valuable insights on the discourse itself. 
Although I am not sympathetic towards the discourse of the war on terrorism, my purpose here is not to 
endorse alternative discourses, but rather to explore some of the ways in which the dominant discourse 
reacts to and characterizes the opposition, in order to understand how it pretends to characterize itself. 
This is not a project that Foucault ever carried out, although some of his observations hint at the 
possibility of examining discourses in their opposition. Rather, it is in the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe that we find a theory that provides a useful platform for analysis: that of hegemonic 
discourse, the constitutive outside and social antagonism.18 As with the case of Agamben, I believe that 
the basic ideas of Laclau and Mouffe can be read as a logical expansion of Foucault, for they share 
some of the main starting points about the social interpretation of reality that constitutes discourse. The 
issue of what can be learned of the hegemonic discourse by examining the social antagonism is covered 
                                                
18 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics
(London: Verso, 1985); Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek (Blackwell, 1999): 99-101
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in chapter 5.
These five major points of departure roughly correspond to chapters 2 to 5 of the thesis. This is where 
the arguments are developed, as the first chapter is simply a review of Foucauldian theory with an 
emphasis on power and discourse.
It should be made clear here that while there are major points of departure from Foucault, I remain an 
admirer of his work and in a great number of points I still follow him closely. Thus, this project is not a 
rejection of Foucault’s work as a whole. Nor is it an attempt to weld classical political views with 
Foucault into one coherent general theory or method. Rather, it is an assessment of the usefulness of 
Foucauldian tools in the case of the war on terrorism point by point. In most cases Foucault’s notions 
are not discarded, but expanded and complemented with views focusing on aspects of power and 
discourse that may not have been of particular interest to Foucault, but which do not constitute any 
logical contradiction with his work.
Finally, I make no secret of the fact that I undertake the secondary objective of this thesis – the analysis 
of the discourse of the war on terrorism – motivated by a personal concern at the way it has been 
conducted and the catastrophic consequences it has had for people in the Middle East, Asia and the US, 
as well as in other countries indirectly. Frank Pignatelli observes that several commentators read 
Foucault's analysis as a deep critique which discourages hope and denies the possibility of a 
progressive politics. Foucault responded that his position “leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism.” His cautious skepticism with regard to utopian politics does not prevent his 
desire “to preserve the possibility of agency and choosing to be otherwise, of moving against a life 
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constructed through, and regulated by, a normalizing mode of discourse-practice.”19 In this sense I 
remain Foucauldian.
The war on terror as an object of study
Before we proceed with a review of the work of Michel Foucault and the arguments that are to be 
developed in the subsequent chapters, a clarifying note on the limits of the war on terror as an object of 
study is required.
The first thing that needs to be understood is that the war on terror is an artificial construction which 
has been defined only vaguely through the discourse and its related practices, and is therefore subject to 
multiple interpretations. The themes of the war on terror resonate to different degrees on military 
operations on the mountains of Afghanistan as they do through American popular culture or security 
measures concerning bottles and liquids in passenger airplanes across the globe.
Because the limits of the war on terror as an object of study are by their nature indefinable, there are a 
number of possibilities open for research. The scope and rationale will be artificial as well; this is 
necessary in order to make the research intelligible. Perhaps the main research alternative is between 
bottom-up and up-to-bottom approaches. Should the discourse of the war on terror be approached by 
privileging its discursive manifestations among the population and the media, or should we focus 
primarily on those who make and carry out policies that in turn affect the population? Although there is 
no particular reason why a researcher could not choose the first option to highlight relevant aspects of 
                                                
19 Frank Pignatelli, ‘Dangers, Possibilities’
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the social phenomenon, the discourse of the war on terror as a whole has identifiable historical points 
of origin at the level of decision-making, as I will argue in chapter 2 – a fact that demands a first break 
with a traditional Foucauldian approach. Furthermore, many of the manifestations of the war on terror 
at the level of popular culture divert in different measures from the rationale behind official discourse 
and policy, to the point that in some instances we may wonder if what we witness are really expansions 
and reinterpretations of the discourse or rather critiques or different discourses altogether. For example, 
while we may find traces of the discourse of the war on terror in TV shows and movies like Battlestar 
Galactica or Cloverfield, we could reasonably argue that these elements relate just as much to classical 
science-fiction, disaster movies or apocalyptic religiosity – perhaps even more – and that if any 
elements of the war on terror remain, they are critical in nature and destabilizing to the discourse. This 
is not to say, of course, that popular culture cannot exert an influence on the discourse of policy-
makers; merely that as an identifiable phenomenon, this discourse finds its clearest roots at the level of 
political power.
The war on terror has been characterized by its discourse as a global confrontation, and indeed we can 
find examples of its manifestations in many regions of the world. It is therefore pertinent to ask for its 
limits as an object of study in regional terms. Again we find that the contemporary version of the war 
on terror as a whole has been produced in a first instance in the US; thus the decision of focusing the 
research on this country, while not denying that the discourse is re-produced in others. Indeed, the 
preeminence of the US on this matter is confirmed by the fact that other countries that have resonated 
most strongly with the specific themes of the discourse are close allies, such as the United Kingdom 
and Israel, notwithstanding the fact that they have a history of discourses of counter-terrorism of their 
own.
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Chapter 1 
Foucault, Power and Discourse
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize and review the notions of power and discourse as 
understood by Michel Foucault, since they are at the centre of the two objectives of the thesis: the 
assessment of a Foucauldian approach as applied to the US war on terrorism, and an analysis of the 
discourse of the war on terrorism itself. Since this chapter serves only as an introductory platform, and 
the actual engagement with Foucauldian discourse analysis is to take place in subsequent chapters 
through the analysis of the war on terrorism, for the most part I avoid arguing with Foucault here, 
except for one general point about the limits of positive knowledge.20
Because it is more fundamental in Foucault, I begin with the idea of power rather than discourse.
1. Foucauldian power
As a brief introductory summary, Foucault's understanding of power is characterized by the following:
Instead of examining who possesses power, the aim is to determine how it is exercised. Therefore, 
the focus is not on the sovereign state, social classes or groups in power, but rather on the 
effects of power in everyday life at the micro levels of society.
                                                
20 See point 2.1 further below: ‘Discourse in science’.
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Power does not need to be exercised in a fundamentally repressive manner. For example: Power can 
produce identity, knowledge and discourse; discipline is often positive in that it seeks to 
constitute specific individuals and their behaviour.
Government is defined as “conduct of conduct” and is a form of power that aims “to structure the 
possible field of actions of others”.
Biopolitics is the activity of government characterized “by regulating a population by its biological 
processes”, such as birthrates, mortality, etc. Thus, power becomes intrinsically linked to life.
Rationalities of government are practical rather than theoretical or discursive. There is a focus on 
the technologies of power.21
Foucault's understanding of power comes about as a theoretical reaction to structural theories (such as 
Marxism), which view power as the relationship between the elements within a division of society 
where well defined great structures may be found, such as the state, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. 
Foucault’s intention is clearly to approach the problem from a more flexible perspective, closer to 
individual agents, or rather, the practicalities of power. The result is a prioritization of micro 
manifestations of power – micro in comparison with the traditional grand structures. An analysis of 
power, Foucault says, “should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, 
with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and 
                                                
21 Christian Borch, ‘Crime Prevention as Totalitarian Biopolitics’, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology 
and Crime Prevention 6 (2005): 93. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on the subject of biopolitics.
27
institutions”.22
One of the consequences of taking distance from structuralism is that power becomes something which 
circulates and which functions in the form of a chain rather than a pyramid. Having mobility, similar to 
the blood flowing in the smallest veins, it is never localised in a certain place, “never in anybody’s 
hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised 
through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are 
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power”.23
While Foucault places the centre of gravity of power on the microlevel of everyday life and away from 
formalism and structuralism, his contention seems to be more of a methodological than an ontological 
nature, as in principle he does not entirely dismiss the importance of the State:
                                                
22 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980): 96
23 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 98. The focus on capillary power ought to be considered a great contribution 
to the social and political sciences, yet we cannot refrain from recognizing its weaknesses. As Edward Said has noted, even 
if one fully agrees with Foucault’s view that the microphysics of power is exercised rather than possessed, notions such as 
class and class struggle, the forcible taking of state power, economic domination, imperialist war, dependency relationships, 
and resistances to power cannot be reduced “to the status of superannuated nineteenth-century conceptions of political 
economy… In short, power can be made analogous neither to a spider’s web without the spider nor to a smoothly 
functioning flow diagram; a great deal of power remains in such coarse items as the relationships and tensions between 
rulers and ruled, wealth and privilege, monopolies of coercion, and the central state apparatus”. Indeed, power relations 
within societies are better explained by a combination of both structuralism and capillary power than either by themselves. 
Said recognizes that Foucault’s work is an important alternative to the ahistorical formalism with which he has been 
conducting an implicit debate, “but all that is quite another thing from accepting Foucault’s view in History of Sexuality that 
“power is everywhere” along with all that such a vastly simplified view entails. For one, as I have said, Foucault’s eagerness 
not to fall into Marxist economism causes him to obliterate the role of classes, the role of economics, the role of insurgency 
and rebellion in the societies he discusses”.  (Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (London-Boston: Faber and 
Faber, 1983-1984): 221, 244) For a further discussion on the limits of capillary power, see chapter 2.
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I don’t claim at all that the State apparatus is unimportant, but it seems to me that among all the 
conditions for avoiding a repetition of the Soviet experience and preventing the revolutionary 
process from running into the ground, one of the first things that has to be understood is that 
power isn’t localised in the State apparatus and that nothing in society will be changed if the 
mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a 
much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed.24
From the excerpt above we distinguish Foucault’s reason for paying attention to the level of the micro 
and ignoring to some extent the importance of the State and related power structures: a concern for the 
possibility of change in society from the most basic level up, and a disbelief that movements inspired 
by Marxism can achieve this.
Following his desire to work from a different perspective, he proposes a political analysis that should 
not attempt to consider power from its internal point of view and that should refrain from posing the 
“labyrinthine and unanswerable question: ‘Who then has power and what has he in mind? What is the 
aim of someone who possesses power?’ Instead, it is a case of studying power at the point where its 
intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices.”25
                                                
24 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 60
25 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 97. I do not endorse Foucault’s position on this point. The question of the 
aim of people in power is impossible to answer without a doubt since we cannot read people’s minds; yet it seems to me that 
renouncing to it would have the effect of limiting our understanding of politics. I would prefer us to forget about our 
pretension of achieving absolute certainty on such a matter, and replace it with degrees of probability sustained by the 
available evidence. The question of the goal of power can be then answered based on the observable effective practices. It is
not unreasonable to assume, for example, that a government is planning a war when an inordinate amount of resources is 
being invested on weapons and army. Yet it is true that we would never find enough evidence to prove that such is the goal.
A final criticism from Said is that Foucault’s thinking on power is marked by an underestimation of historical 
forces such as profit, ambitions, ideas, or the sheer love of power. Furthermore, Foucault, with all his opposition to 
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1.1 Discipline
The idea of the microphysics of power highlights the importance of discipline; much of Foucault’s 
work explores the history of its practice. He observes that from the nineteenth century up to our own 
day, modern Western societies have been characterised by a legislation, a discourse, and an 
organisation based on public right, whose principle of articulation is the social body and the delegative 
status of each citizen; but also “by a closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is in 
fact to assure the cohesion of this same social body.”26
We find an example of Foucault’s focus on discipline on his comments on war. It is said that war as 
strategy is a continuation of politics, and while Foucault doesn’t deny this, he argues that ‘politics’ was 
conceived as a continuation of the military model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. 
From this perspective, politics would be a strategy that makes it possible to understand the army as a 
principle for maintaining the absence of warfare in civil society. The classical age gave birth to the 
great political and military strategy by which nations confronted each other’s forces; but it also saw the 
birth of careful military and political tactics – i.e. discipline – by which the control of bodies and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
traditional thought, remains bound to Euro centrism, according to Said. “He seems unaware of the extent to which the ideas 
of discourse and discipline are assertively European and how, along with the use of discipline to employ masses of detail 
(and human beings), discipline was used also to administer, study, and reconstruct – then subsequently to occupy, rule, and 
exploit – almost the whole of the non-European world.” (Edward Said, The World, the Text, the Critic: 222)
Said’s arguments continue: European intellectuals of the XIXth and XXth centuries have employed the word 
“Oriental” to designate a variety of regions, “despite the enormous ideological and political differences between them. The 
principal reason for this was the constitution of a geographical entity called the Orient, and its study called Orientalism, that 
realized a very important component of the European will to domination over the non-European world, and it made it 
possible to create not only an orderly discipline of study but a set of institutions, a latent vocabulary… a subject matter, and 
finally… subject races. The parallel between Foucault’s carceral system and Orientalism is striking.”
26 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 106
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individual forces was exercised within states.27
With his particular scepticism of ahistorical ideals and origins, Foucault says:
Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and 
jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental 
reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, 
not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to 
indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic docility.28
As with all forms of power, disciplines are the bearers of a discourse. But this is not the discourse of 
right, law, rule, or sovereign will. The disciplines may well be the carriers of a discourse that speaks of 
a rule, but this is not the juridical rule deriving from sovereignty, but a norm. Therefore, the code they 
come to define is not that of law but of normalisation. Foucault believes that the reference of these 
disciplines is to a theoretical horizon which has nothing in common with the construction or right; 
rather it is human science which constitutes their domain, and “clinical knowledge their 
jurisprudence”.29
It is true that if disciplinary measures have developed to such varied extents and into so many different 
areas of social life, such as bureaucracy, hospitals, schools and prisons, it has been thanks to human 
sciences. However we must not forget that Foucault’s analyses on both discourses and disciplines has 
                                                
27 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1977): 168
28 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 169
29 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 106, 107
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been built on specific manifestations directly or closely linked to the scientific sphere. In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault admits he has privileged discourses that define the ‘sciences of 
man’, but the analysis of discursive events is in no way limited to such a field.30
At least three characteristics of mechanisms of discipline may be distinguished from Discipline and 
Punish:
1. The functional inversion of the disciplines. Disciplinary measures started as a way to neutralize 
dangers, to fix useless or disturbed populations, or to avoid the inconveniences of large groups of 
people. Later on, the same mechanisms were being used to play a positive role and to increase the 
possible utility of individuals.31 This point is relevant for the present research, since the evidence 
suggests that disciplinary mechanisms and practices in the US that started as reactions to perceived 
terrorist acts may have surpassed their original function and meaning. This issue is further discussed in 
chapter 4.
2. The swarming of disciplinary mechanisms. Disciplinary mechanisms have a certain tendency to 
become ‘de-institutionalized’. They emerge from the closed environments in which they once 
functioned and circulate in a ‘free’ state; the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into 
flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted.32 Perhaps the swarming disciplines 
                                                
30 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972): 30. It is fair to ask if the 
analysis would change, at least in part, if it were to be applied to situations not evidently related to scientific knowledge. I 
believe that we should be cautious not to overemphasize the link to science when analyzing other examples of political 
power. This does not mean that the role of science will disappear completely.
31 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 210
32 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 211
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escape not only from the walls of a hospital or a prison, but they also shift the human group which 
constitutes the point of application.33
3. The state-control of the mechanisms of discipline. In England, it was private religious groups that for 
a long time carried out the functions of social discipline. In France, although a part of this role 
remained in the hands of parish guilds or charity associations, another part, the most important, was 
very soon taken over by the police apparatus. In taking over a number of pre-existing functions, such as 
the search for criminals, urban surveillance, or economic and political supervision, the police 
magistratures and the magistrature-general that presided over them in Paris transposed them into a 
single, strict, administrative machine.
The resulting police apparatus had to be coextensive with the entire social body in its details and not 
only by the extreme limits that it embraces. 
Police power must bear ‘over everything’: it is not however the totality of the state nor of the 
kingdom as visible and invisible body of the monarch; it is the dust of events, actions, 
behaviour, opinions – ‘everything that happens’; the police are concerned with ‘those things of 
every moment’, those ‘unimportant things’ of which Catherine II spoke in her Great Instruction 
[…]34
Perhaps the most interesting of Foucault’s comments on the functions of police is what he calls “useful 
                                                
33 In terms of the current war on terrorism, those who we would think of being legitimately suspect of such crimes 
are not the only ones to pay for them, for disciplinary mechanisms seem to be affecting entire races, members of a religious 
faith or countries. See chapter 3 for a further discussion on the discursive division between 'us' and 'them'.
34 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 213
33
delinquency”. Police power manages to supervise the existence of legal prohibitions that creates around 
it a field of illegal practices, while extracting illegal profits through elements, also illegal, but rendered 
manipulable. Arms or drug trafficking perform such a function or a similar one. Other examples in the 
political sphere, in use well before the nineteenth century, are informers and agents provocateurs. With 
the secret agents it procures, but also with the generalized policing that it authorizes, delinquency 
constitutes a means of perpetual surveillance of the population.35
This delinquency, with its specificity, is a result of the system; but it also becomes a part and 
instrument of it. So that one should speak of an ensemble whose three terms (police-prison-
delinquency) support one another and form a circuit that is never interrupted. Police 
surveillance provides the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, 
the targets and auxiliaries of police supervisions, which regularly send back a certain number of 
them to prison. The magistrates can say what they like; penal justice, with all its theatrical 
apparatus, is intended to respond to the daily demand of an apparatus of supervision half 
submerged in the darkness in which police and delinquency are brought together. Judges are the 
scarcely resisting employees of this apparatus. They assist as far as they can in the constitution 
of delinquency, that is to say, in the differentiation of illegalities, in the supervision, 
colonization and use of certain of these illegalities by the illegality of the dominant class.36
Indeed, what opportunity would the police force have to increase its capabilities of surveillance and 
control without delinquency? What need of force would society have without a threat? At the end of the 
eighteenth century people hoped for a society without crime, “and then the dream evaporated. Crime 
                                                
35 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 280-281
36 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 282
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was too useful for them to dream of anything as crazy – or ultimately as dangerous as a society without 
crime. No crime means no police. What makes the presence and control of the police tolerable for the 
population, if not fear of the criminal? The institution of the police, which is so recent and so 
oppressive, is only justified by that of fear”.37 In this dynamic, Foucault adds, prisons play the role of 
“factories for producing delinquency, and delinquency is the raw material for disciplinary 
discourses.”38
In the context of this research the above comments present a tempting opportunity to make a parallel 
dynamic: that of military force-war-terrorism. As the research develops we may certainly find 
similarities; particularly in the discursive theme of terrorism as an unprecedented threat.
1.2 Biopolitics
Foucault’s analysis of techniques for “governing” individuals and “guiding their conduct” that appeared 
since the seventeenth century in domains such as the school, the army and the workshop, does gravitate 
around the law or myth of power, but concerns itself with the complex and multiple practices of a 
“governmentality” which presupposes “rational forms of technical procedures, instrumentations 
through which to operate and... strategic games which subject the power relations they are supposed to 
guarantee to instability and reversal.”39
                                                
37 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 47, in Michael Gold-Biss, The Discourse on Terrorism, Political Violence 
and the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 1981-1986 (New York: Peter Lang, 1994): 163
38 Edward Said, The World, The text, and the Critic (London-Boston: Faber and Faber, 1983-1984): 244
39 Michel Foucault, ‘Preface to the History of Sexuality, Volume II’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader
(New York: Pantheon, 1984): 338
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An important aspect of governmentality is related to the notion of biopolitics. As a historian, Foucault 
is interested in developing what he calls “effective history”, as opposed to theological or rationalistic 
historical traditions interested in teleological or natural processes.40 One of the characteristics of 
effective history is that it focuses in things nearest to it, such as “the body, the nervous system, 
nutrition, digestion, and energies”.41 Following this perspective, the historian discovers a 
transformation of the power of the sovereign in the West. Traditionally, the sovereign’s right of life was 
manifested through the exercise of his right to kill or by refraining from killing, but eventually it came 
to be complemented by its counterpart: the power that exerts a positive influence on life and 
administers, optimizes and multiplies it, subjecting it to controls and regulations.42
Foucault identifies the seventeenth century as the starting point of this power over life in two basic 
forms. The first one is discipline – the optimization of the capabilities of the human body, the increase 
of its usefulness and docility and its integration as parts of economic systems – while the second, 
developed somewhat later, focuses
on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanisms of life and serving as the basis of 
the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy 
and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their suspension was effected 
through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the 
population.43
                                                
40 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzche, Genealogy, History’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York: 
Pantheon, 1984): 88
41 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzche, Genealogy, History’: 89
42 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990): 135, 136
43 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: 139
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Bio-power was necessary for the development of capitalism. While the development of the instruments 
of the state, the institutions of power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, discipline 
(anatomo-politics) and bio-politics as techniques of power to be found at every level of society and 
used in every institutional context, also operated in economic processes and their development. 44 As 
such, governmentality, discipline and biopolitics have been embedded in liberalism, which for Foucault 
is not of interest as a theory or an ideology, but as a practice, a method of rationalizing the exercise of 
government and a rationalization that obeys “the internal rule of maximum economy”.45 Indeed, 
biopolitics employs specifically liberal methods of governance by also operating through the self-
governing capabilities of individuals, spaces and categories. It emphasizes indirect forms of rule 
through state agencies that govern ‘at a distance’ through various regulatory protocols.46
2. Power, truth, knowledge and discourse
Foucault assumes that “power produces knowledge” and they directly imply each other.47 Edward Said 
deems it Foucault’s greatest intellectual contribution: the understanding of how the exercise of control 
in a society and its history disguises, rarefies and wraps itself systematically in a language of truth, 
discipline, rationality and knowledge. This language, in its naturalness, authority, professionalism and 
assertiveness is what Foucault has called discourse. “The power of discourse is that it is at once the 
object of struggle and the tool by which the object is conducted… The goal of discourse is to maintain 
                                                
44 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: 140, 141. The notion of biopolitics will be examined in more 
detail in chapter 5.
45 Michel Foucault, ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (eds.), The Essential Foucault, 
Selections from The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, (New York-London: The New Press, 1994, 2003): 202
46 Colleen Bell, ‘Surveillance Strategies and Populations at Risk: Biopolitical Governance in Canada’s National 
Security Policy’, Security Dialogue, 37-2 (2006): 151
47 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 27; Michael Gold-Biss, The Discourse on Terrorism: 17
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itself and, more important, to manufacture its material continually”.48 Consider the example of prisons 
mentioned above, where the discourse has a material consequence in criminality.
Foucault is interested in solving this problem: 
…what rules of right are implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses 
of truth? Or alternatively, what type of power is susceptible of producing discourses of truth that 
in a society such as ours are endowed with such potent effects? What I mean is this: in a society 
such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, 
characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation 
and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain 
economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We 
are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth.49
What allows power to be accepted is the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us a force that denies, but 
that it traverses and produces things: pleasures, knowledge and discourse.50 “We must cease once and 
for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms”, suggests Foucault; it is not that power 
‘excludes’, ‘represses’, ‘censors’, ‘abstracts’, ‘masks’ or ‘conceals’. Rather, for him power “produces 
                                                
48 Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic: 216
49 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 93
50 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: 119
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reality… domains of objects and rituals of truth”.51 The point is illustrated in Foucault’s examination of 
the history of sexuality, where he purposefully searches for instances of discursive production of power 
and the propagation of knowledge.52 Western man, Foucault says, has been drawn to the task of telling 
everything concerning sex through analytical discourse. Contrary to what is commonly thought of the 
Victorian age, the boundaries of what one could say about sex were enlarged, and so the deployment of 
discourse cannot be adequately explained merely by prohibition. “A censorship of sex?” Foucault 
wonders; “There was installed rather an apparatus for producing an ever greater quantity of discourse 
about sex, capable of functioning and taking effect in its very economy”.53 Rather than a concern to 
hide sex, the last three centuries have been characterised by a variety of devices invented to speak 
about it. This was an “incitement to discourse”, Foucault says.54 We can already make a parallel with 
the current discourse on terrorism as an amplifier of all things terrorist.
The material conditions of possibility of the production of truth through discourse are the multiple 
institutional supports and various social structures and practices underlying the production of truth.55
Said also emphasizes the importance of re-relating discourse to a greater network of power-relations 
when he notes that Foucault’s method is done “by making it assume its affiliations with institutions, 
                                                
51 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: 194. Furthermore, while Foucault underlines ‘production’ as opposed to 
exclusion and repression, I believe it is more accurate to say that both processes imply each other. Power produces a 
discourse, a selective discourse which excludes whatever lies outside of it. Taking once again the example of the prison 
system, if the discourse that surrounds it is able to 'produce' criminals, it is in part as a consequence of ignoring the 
contradictions of the law enforcement apparatus. In the same way, today’s war on terrorism 'produces' threats and fears 
while ignoring its contradictions.
52 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: 12
53 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: 23
54 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: 34
55 Derek Hook, ‘Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History: Foucault and Discourse Analysis’, Theory & 
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agencies, classes, academies, corporations, groups, ideologically defined parties and professions.”56
Social groups and organisations shape a society through – and are shaped by – its
régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; and the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true.57
This generated social ‘truth’ is not to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the 
production and circulation of statements. This ‘truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of 
power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend the 
‘régime’ of truth.58
The idea of the “production of truth” requires an important clarification here: when Foucault speaks of 
truth he does not mean “‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’, but rather 
‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of 
power attached to the true’,…”59 Foucault is not discussing an essential or objective reality, but rather 
the generation of social and discursive ‘objects’ which we take to be real in accordance to the rules of 
our specific society.60
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It is also in this light that we must read that “all knowledge rests upon injustice (that there is no right, 
not even in the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth) and that the instinct for knowledge is 
malicious (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind)”.61 Clearly the ‘knowledge’ 
referred to here is not the ‘acquisition of objective truth’, but rather a domination of the ‘truth’ which is 
an “ensemble of rules” so intrinsically bonded to power. 
To understand what the ‘truth’ means for Foucault, consider that in following his views language is the 
means through which the world is “knowable”. The search for this “truth” becomes conditional not 
upon the “facts”, but rather the constitution of a “historical a priori”. Foucault understands knowledge 
constituted at various times by different, constantly changing “conditions of possibility”.62
Some commentators have read this particular use of the terms ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘language’ as an 
epistemological and ontological position that rejects the existence of a positive, objective reality and 
accepts the existence of a reality that is socially constructed, where language plays a determinant role.63
Contrary to this interpretation, Foucault’s position does not seem to imply a 'relativity of the truth' as is 
usually understood, given the stability and security of historical circumstances. Derek Hook explains:
What is being called for is not some naïve debunking of the ‘truthful’ for its own sake. Indeed, 
to realize that truth is a function of discourse is to realize that the conditions of truth are 
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precisely rather than relatively contingent on current forms of discourse. It is in this way 
ludicrous to read Foucault as suggesting that truth is ‘relative’, in the open sense of the term, 
where all possible truth-conditions are equal, depending merely on context or interpretative 
perspective. Foucault views truth-conditions as extremely stable and secure, as situated in a 
highly specific and idiosyncratic matrix of historical and socio-political circumstances, which 
give rise to, and are part of, the order of discourse.64
More to the point is Michael Gold-Biss’ observation that the physical constitution of objects is not 
denied by Foucault; rather, his contention is that ‘facts’ only become so when they are located in 
thought and practice. “Intentionality is uniquely human and integral to knowledge”.65
2.1 Discourse in science
The insistence on making reference to historical and socio-political circumstances that create the 
conditions of possibility for discourse would suggest a certain interest in truth as traditionally 
understood; the truth of the positivist historian and the social scientist. However, what needs to be 
done, Foucault says
is to dispense with ‘things’… To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to 
discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To define these 
objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the 
body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the 
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conditions of their historical appearance.66
Thus, if history, politics or society are of any help in understanding discourse, Foucault’s emphasis is 
on the discovery of the rules of its formation and not on 'things', facts or events that are generally 
considered as a given. This is why to engage critically with discourse one does not need interpretative 
approaches; rather, Foucault’s method is to map discourse: “to trace its outline and its relations of force 
across a variety of discursive forms and objects”.67 But how to understand the assertion that things and 
objects emerge only in discourse? The ‘things’ discussed above are not simple objects, but rather those 
that constitute the object of a discourse, such as madness or terrorism, and which “does not pre-exist 
itself”. It exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations “established between 
institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types 
of classification, modes of characterization”.68 In other words, constructed objects of power relations. 
As Gold-Biss explains, hidden behind the appearance of objectivity and impartiality for which 
positivist science is known some degree of voluntarism can be found.69
The claim, then, is that through discourse and its related practices power produces truth and knowledge, 
just as power is itself extended by the success of its truth and knowledge claims. Naturally, Foucault is 
offering an alternative understanding of 'truth' and 'knowledge' from that of classical positivism. 
However, the proposal is not that any given statement is as valid as any other, nor that 'things', facts and 
events do not exist in the world. Instead, the suggestion is that it is not possible to speak of the world 
without assumptions that are taken as (and have the effect of) truth by conditioning our interpretation of 
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reality. Succinctly put, “what is denied is not that... objects exist externally to thought, but the rather 
different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition 
of emergence.”70 Indeed, a common misunderstanding regarding the nature of discourse is “that the 
construction of every object as an object of discourse involves dispensing with the realist claim 
concerning the existence of a world external of thought... For example, a stone can be discursively 
constructed as a projectile or as an object of aesthetic contemplation, but it is still the same physical 
object.”71
When following Foucault’s examination of discourse we must bear in mind that what is analysed is not 
simply that which is thought or said, but all the conditioning rules and categories that are assumed as 
essential parts of discourse.72 Discursive practices determined by rules and categories have the effect of 
making it almost impossible to think outside of them; “to be outside of them is, by definition, to be 
mad, to be beyond comprehension and therefore reason”.73 Thus, discourse is that which constrains and 
enables writing, speaking and thinking.74
To Foucault's credit, it is true that the act of interpretation occurs sooner than we expect and frequently 
without our awareness. By not realizing our discursive assumptions we tend to confuse prediscursive 
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events with their interpretation (their constitution as objects with sense and place within the discourse). 
Thus, it may be impossible to recognize events without objectifying them and establishing their 
meaning as part of a discourse. The act of recognition of an event as meaningful may well be one and 
the same with the act of discursive integration. Let us take Foucault’s postulate that the deepest truth 
that “the genealogist has to reveal ‘is the secret that [things] have no essence… or that their essence 
was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’”. If interpretation is an unending task, he says, 
it is because there is nothing primary to interpret because, “when all is said and done, underneath it all 
everything is already interpretation”. 75
However, I would like to propose that what is at stake here is not the possibility of positive knowledge, 
but rather its limits. If discourse is unavoidable, then I believe that the most honest approach for 
scientists would require recognizing the discursive condition that has revealed to us a universe of 
objects, in the hope of gradually and constantly adjusting and expanding our interpretation of reality to 
have it simultaneously explain as many dissimilar events and objects as possible. It may be impossible 
to escape speaking from within a discourse; even the recognition of specific events or phenomena is not 
exempt from a degree of interpretation, and thus not truly neutral as is often pretended. The reason is 
that when recognizing or reporting data we have no option but to engage in an operation of selectivity: 
we prefer a certain piece of information above another. The choice is greatly determined by our 
assumptions and interests. This is a common situation in the profession of journalism: editors and 
reporters decide on a daily basis what is important and in what hierarchy it should be organised and 
presented. Even if they keep their reports as free from opinion as possible, the choice of events reported 
contributes to the construction of, and is determined by, a discourse. For this reason, the present 
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analysis accepts that selectivity is at work in any discourse, including that of honest science. But that 
does not mean that science is invalid or useless, nor that absolute relativism prevails and all discourses 
are equal. 
Rather than explicitly considering the limited but real and positive possibilities of the advancement of 
science, Foucault's contention is that far from being aware of their limitations and assumptions, 
discourses tend to present themselves as solid science, unquestionable truth and knowledge, for they 
are intimately linked to power, discipline and control. Foucault's point on science and discourses of 
truth is as follows:
When viewed from the level of a proposition, on the inside of a discourse, the division between 
true and false is neither arbitrary nor modifiable nor institutional nor violent. But when we view 
things on a different scale, when we ask the question of what this will to truth has been and 
constantly is, across our discourses, this will to truth which has crossed so many centuries of 
our history; what is, in its very general form, the type of division which governs our will to 
know (notre volonte de savoir), then what we see taking shape is perhaps something like a 
system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system.76
While I accept Foucault's criticism towards the lack of self-criticism of the practice of science and 
other discourses of truth, as well as their institutional exclusion of alternatives, I propose that there is 
still a possibility of speaking about a level of objective truth and facts. Objectivity does not mean 
absolute certainty nor fixed and ultimate explanations of reality; in a general sense it is indeed possible 
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to know aspects of reality as long as we are aware of what remains unknown and uncertain. More 
specifically to the purposes of this thesis, and as I will argue in more detail in chapter 3, it is possible 
and indeed relevant to maintain a sense of objectivity of basic facts and events for the purpose of 
discourse analysis.
When discussing the discourse of biology, for example, Foucault observes that Mendel, who was first 
rejected by the scientific community, but was later proven right, “spoke the truth, but he was not 
‘within the true’ of the biological discourse of his time… Mendel was a true monster, which meant that 
science could not speak of him”.77 He was a monster because he was not speaking from within the 
historical ‘truth’, yet it will be hard to disagree with his empirical findings, i.e. the truth in the common 
sense of the word. 
Foucault does accept the possibility of speaking “the truth in the space of a wild exteriority, but one is 
‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of 
one’s discourses.”78 Although Foucault does not elaborate much, his is an interesting remark, not only 
because of the opportunities it opens for recovering a degree of basic objectivity, but also because the 
“wild exteriority” may be useful for discourse analysis: “we must also give our attention to those that 
are criticized, discussed, and judged, as well as those that are rejected or excluded”.79
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2.2 Discourse in politics
Leaving the possibilities for science apart, Foucault's observation applies accurately to the central 
discursive object of analysis of this thesis: terrorism. While terrorists and terrorist acts are often treated 
as independent objects and events to be simply empirically known and theoretically understood, 
terrorism “is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies 
and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore… Use of the 
term implies moral judgement”.80 That is why, to a considerable extent, it has been a term of 
propaganda, and not description.81 Further proof that we are dealing with interpretations is the fact that 
there are over a 100 different scholarly definitions of the term, some which exclude or contradict each 
other.82 The word was originally used by Edmund Burke in 1790 in his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France to refer to the revolutionary French democratic movements.83 The irony of the term being 
created to condemn an ideology that is today considered as its opposite should be enough to prevent us 
from ascribing a pre-discursive essence to it. Thus, there is no terrorism as such; only specific violent 
events from which we construct, perhaps inevitably, different interpretations which condition and are 
conditioned by our moral postures and intellectual assumptions, with implications for the struggle of 
power. However, the tendency in politics is to speak of terrorism as a self-evident and uncontroversial 
reality.
We find a clue of the construction of the object terrorism in its intrinsic negative value. Value laden 
                                                
80 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Victor Gollancz): 31
81 Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, (London: Pluto Press, 1999): 
101
82 Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al, Political Terrorism, (Amsterdam: SWIDOC,  1984)
83 Annamarie Oliverio, The State of Terror, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998): 28
48
objects, so common in politics, fall within the same category: 'extremism', 'freedom' or 'democracy' are 
examples of objects without essence, for they are already interpretation. In the political realm, defined 
by the struggle of power, even words and concepts with a seemingly neutral definition take a positive 
or negative value when considered within its discursive context and under the light of the implied 
ideas. The notions of the 'state' or a 'nation', for instance, may be neutral in abstraction, but have always 
a value capable of provoking strong emotions when they appear in the context of political struggle. 
Furthermore, any given nation or state may be defined as an 'imagined community' which sustains its 
identity by virtue of its opposition to 'otherness'84, a dichotomy which once again implies a moral 
stance.
The relation between discourse and power was most concisely and clearly discussed in ‘The Order of 
Discourse’, where the hypothesis is “that in every society the production of discourse is at once 
controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to 
ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, 
formidable materiality”.85 Discourse is so overwhelming that it resembles a live creature or a natural 
force that must be tamed through certain procedures. Discourse in this passage means what is written 
and spoken, where writing or speaking are ways of “disguising the awesome materiality of so tightly 
controlled and managed a production” of ‘truth’.86
Once the importance of discourse is realized, social domination results from the successful struggles 
for power in which the terms of political discourse of one of many contending sets of ideas come to 
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eclipse alternative sets of ideas.87 Foucault declares that “discourse should be viewed as neither 
exclusively effect nor instrument of power: ‘discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or 
systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle’.”88 Considering his 
emphasis on materiality, we must interpret the latter idea as a consequence of an understanding of 
discourse in a broader sense than language; we ought to consider the idea that discourse may have quite 
concrete and material manifestations, for what would be the benefit of fighting for a discourse made 
only of words and abstractions without any solid effects? Perhaps that is exactly what Foucault meant 
when he proposed a guiding principle of exteriority (from the text), and to “throw off the sovereignty of 
the signifier”. 89
Discipline and Punish studies interesting historical examples illustrating the pressure of discourse on 
the material life of human beings. When the techniques of punishment shifted from public 
demonstrations to other methods sustained by new ideologies, for example, the discourse of the 
Idéologues “provided… a sort of general recipe for the exercise of power over men: the ‘mind’ as a 
surface of inscription for power, with semiology as its tool; the submission of bodies through the 
control of ideas” which proved more effective than the rituals of torture and execution. The thought of 
the Ideologues was not only a theory of society; it developed as a subtle technology of efficiency and 
economy, in opposition to the previous sumptuous expenditure of the power of the sovereign.90
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2.3 Discourse as dispersion
Rather than a unified and coherent ensemble of texts and rules, Foucault characterizes discourse for its 
dispersion. As a consequence he is reluctant to discuss discourse in terms of ideology or science: 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, 
whenever, between objects, types of statements, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a 
regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for 
the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation – thus avoiding words 
that are already overladen with conditions and consequences, and in any case inadequate to the 
task of designating such a dispersion, such as ‘science’, ‘ideology’, ‘theory’, or ‘domain of 
subjectivity’. The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of 
statements, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The 
rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, 
modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division.91
If a system of dispersion is not a monolithic unit, but rather an expanding and flexible system, 
contradictions and inconsistencies arise naturally. Indeed, the fundamental contradiction is revealed by 
the analysis as the “organizing principle” of discourse: the bringing into play of incompatible 
postulates, irreconcilable influences, the economic and political conflict within a society. It is not an 
appearance of accident, but “the very law of its existence” that is the foundation and model of all minor 
contradictions; and it is on its basis that discourse emerges. “Discourse is the path from one 
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contradiction to another”. For Foucault’s “archaeological” analysis, contradictions are neither 
appearances to be overcome, nor secret principles to be uncovered, but objects to be described for 
themselves, “without any attempt being made to discover from what point of view they can be 
dissipated, or at what level they can be radicalized and effects become causes”. Foucault’s archaeology 
“does not discover a point of conciliation” in contradictions, neither does it “transfer it to a more 
fundamental level”.92 Foucault appears concerned that not giving contradictions their proper 
recognition will permit attempts to salvage the discourse, or the assumption of an idealized underlying 
reason or truth.
2.4 Principles of exclusion
The rules of formation mentioned above condition objects; types of authority; concepts and themes 
(theoretical strategies); and sets of rules that claim to provide standards of validity for knowledge. For 
example, the rules of formation with respect to objects are the institutional sites (or the “surface of 
emergence”) where they appear; the major ‘authorities of delimitation’ in these sites, such as 
professionals (the identity of the qualified speakers); and the modes of interrogation. The rules of 
formation can most usefully be thought of as ways in which the production and functioning of 
discursive formations come about.93
One discursive formation may be replaced by another, which according to Foucault is to say that a 
general transformation of relations has occurred, but that does not necessarily alter all the elements; it 
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is to say that statements are governed by new rules of formation, it is not to say that all objects or 
concepts, all enunciations or all theoretical choices disappear. Under such consideration, we may be 
able to explore if a discursive formation performing the political function of rendering an enemy, such 
as the discourse on communism during the Cold War in the US, has been replaced by another one 
running in a parallel direction, i.e. the current discourse on terrorism.94
Any continuity in political discourse cannot be read as simply an immanent unfolding, or the increasing 
sophistication of the discourse. Rather it will be an effect of the available repertoire from it of elements 
which happen to work with dominant aspects of the extra-discursive relations.95 If, as suspected, the 
discourse on terrorism represents a sort of continuity of the discourse on communism, it was not a 
natural, linear or inevitable consequence; instead, it was a product of the contemporary power relations 
that took advantage of some of the useful elements available from a previous discourse. How this took 
place and what is the resulting discourse are subjects to be explored in the two chapters that follow.
If we wish to follow Foucault’s principles of discourse analysis we must bear in mind with R. Young 
that what is analysed is not simply that which is thought or said, but all the rules and categories that 
were assumed as essential parts of discourse. Discursive practices have the effect to make it almost 
impossible to think outside of them; “to be outside of them is, by definition, to be mad, to be beyond 
comprehension and therefore reason”.96 Discourse is that which constrains and enables writing, 
speaking and thinking.97
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2.4.1 External principles of exclusion
The first principle of exclusion in discourse, and perhaps the most obvious as well, is prohibition. We 
all know, Foucault says, that we do not have the right to say everything and that we cannot speak of just 
anything in any circumstances whatever. Take, for example, sexuality and politics. It does not matter 
that their discourse appears to be of little account, because the prohibitions that surround them very 
soon reveal their link with desire and power.98 Although Foucault prioritized the positive and 
productive aspect of discourse, here we see that he also recognized its negative capability.
The second principle of exclusion is the opposition between reason and madness. Since the Middle 
Ages, “the madman has been the one whose discourse cannot have the same currency as others. His 
word may be considered null and void, having neither truth nor importance”. However, “strange 
powers may be attributed to the madman’s speech: the power of uttering a hidden truth, of telling the 
future, of seeing in all naivety what the other’s wisdom cannot perceive.”99
For the understanding of our present day society and subject we should expand the concept of 
‘madness’ to include everything that is disqualified for being in radical opposition to the dominant 
discourse; we should think of madness in a figurative sense, and recognize exchangeable terms such as 
‘fringe’, ‘unreasonable’, ‘fanatic’ or simply ‘ignorant’. In contrast with the Middle Ages, nowadays few 
people attribute “strange powers” to those speaking from the far exteriority of the discourse, yet they 
may still attract a limited number of listeners.
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The third system of exclusion is the opposition between true and false. When things are seen from a 
grand scale, above the level of propositions, the “will to know” becomes an institutionally constraining 
system. Like the other systems of exclusion, the will to truth rests on an institutional support: 
pedagogy, the system of books, publishing, libraries, learned societies and laboratories. It also tends to 
exert “a sort of pressure and something like a power constraint” on other discourses. For example: the 
penal system sought its justification in a theory of justice, and in sociological, psychological and 
medical knowledge.100
2.4.2 Internal principles of exclusion
The aforementioned first three systems of exclusion are external, but there are also procedures which 
are internal to the discourse. The first one of these is the commentary. It refers to those narratives which 
are recounted and repeated; sets of discourses which are recited in well defined circumstances; “things 
said once and preserved because it is suspected that behind them there is a secret or a treasure”.101
Derek Hook explains that in this point Foucault is speaking of discourses based upon the major 
foundational narratives of a society, such as religious, juridical or scientific texts, and the interchange 
between these primary and secondary cultural texts, i.e. commentaries. One implication is that we over-
play the importance of originality and freedom in everyday discourse when in fact much of what is 
spoken is really the product of repetition and recirculation.102 These discourses “ever and above their 
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formulation, are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again”.103 Again, the US discourse on 
terrorism may be read as a commentary of earlier discourses on security and threats; an idea that is 
explored in more detail in chapter 3.
The hierarchy between primary and secondary allows the endless construction of new discourses. The 
commentary’s role “is to say at least what was silently articulated ‘beyond’, in the text”.104
Another internal principle of “rarefaction” of discourse is the author. An author is not to be understood 
in a simple and limited sense of the speaking individual who pronounced or wrote a text, but in the 
sense of a principle of grouping of discourses, which originates and unites their meanings and focuses 
their coherence. This principle limits the chance-element in discourse by playing “an identity which has 
the form of individuality and the self”. In the Middle Ages the author was considered an index of 
truthfulness.105 So it is today, though perhaps on a subtler level, cloaked by virtue of qualifications and 
of positions of authority considered as hard earned and deserved. But since it is a principle and not 
necessarily an individual, the power of the author may be shared by groups of people, institutions or 
advocates of an ideology.
For the veracity of certain statements (those that we would not be willing to accept at first sight), the 
principle of the author is a crucial grounding point. The author is asked to authentify the hidden 
meanings underlying the texts carrying his name. Foucault suggests that instead of asking about what is 
revealed about authors in their texts, we ask about “what subject-positions are made possible within 
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such texts”.106
Who is speaking and who is qualified to do so? Foucault explains: we must describe the institutional 
sites from which a speaker (an expert, a politician or a religious leader) makes his discourse; for 
example, the hospital, the laboratory or the library. The positions of the subject are also defined by the 
situation that it is possible for him to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups of objects. If, 
in clinical discourse, the ‘doctor’ as author is the sovereign, questioner and observer, “it is because a 
whole group of relations is involved”.107 Indeed, once we become aware of the position of power of an 
author, we cannot avoid noticing the web of power relations within which she – whether as a unifying 
principle or an actual individual – occupies her privileged position.
The notion of dispersion, already mentioned above, applies not only to the discursive formation per se, 
but to the speaking subject as well. In Foucault’s proposed analysis, instead of referring to the unifying 
and synthetic functions of a subject, we should refer to the various enunciative modalities, statuses, 
sites and positions that he can occupy that manifest his dispersion. The planes from which he speaks 
are in discontinuity, and if these planes are linked by a system of relations, this system is not 
established by the activity of an unchangeable consciousness, but by the specificity of a discursive 
practice.108 It is by virtue of these discontinuities that a political leader may appear at the same time as 
a common man under the rule of law like any other and as the origin of law like no other; in some 
instances as an average member of society (“one of us”), and in others as an extraordinary being, 
unique in his kind.
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Disciplines are also a principle of limitation. Here we are not talking about the disciplinary measures 
imposed on society discussed above. In this context, 
A discipline is defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions 
considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments: all this 
constitutes a sort of anonymous system at the disposal of anyone who wants to or is able to use 
it, without their meaning or validity being linked to the one who happened to be their 
inventor.109
Botany and medicine are examples of disciplines. That they have methods and techniques does not in 
any way guarantee the infallibility of their ‘truths’. On the contrary, disciplines are made up of errors as 
well as truths, errors which have “positive functions, a historical efficacity, and a role that is often 
indissociable from that of the truths”. In order to be a discipline, a proposition has to be able to be 
inscribed on a certain type of theory.110 A valid disciplinary statement is contingent upon the 
appropriate domain of objects, theories, methods, propositions, rules, definitions, techniques and 
instruments. In this sense, statements made from within a discipline need to fulfil certain conditions 
more complex than those of simple truth. The risk that the discipline takes is that truthful statements 
may be heard beyond its domain, “in the spaces of a wild exteriority”.111
While Foucault was discussing mostly scientific disciplines, I would like to propose that these limiting 
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principles apply also to the field of politics; even if the rules of validity seem to be somehow different, 
to the point that in some cases the need of fulfilment of conditions may become more relaxed than 
those required for scientific disciplines. A point in case is the politician who contradicts his own 
statements within a timeframe of a couple of months; yet his authority as the embodiment of the 
principle of the author remains untouched as a consequence of a discourse of democracy in democratic 
societies (i.e. the belief that citizens have effectively, willing and consciously invested the politician 
with power), or as a consequence of tradition or force in other forms of governments. The principle of 
discipline is also at work throughout the methods, techniques and instruments of the rationale and ‘art’ 
of government, including the interpretation of law and its enforcement, as well as the administrations of 
the economy and institutions and organs of the state; a ‘science’ about which common citizens are 
assumed to be uninformed.
In relation to commentary and discipline, Foucault argues “that everything stated in a field like literary 
discourse or medical discourse is produced only with the most selective method, with little regard for 
individual genius.” The chances that individual authors can make individual statements are unlikely. 
Over every opportunity for saying something stands the regularizing collectivity that Foucault has 
called a discourse.112
Since discourse constitutes such a limitation over what may be said or not, discourse analysis should 
busy itself not only with the search for “a plenitude of meaning, but also with a search for the scarcity 
of meaning, with what cannot be said, with what is impossible or unreasonable within certain 
discursive locations.” What we are seeing here is the possibility of disrupting and destabilizing the 
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boundaries of the discursive powers of the discipline “for strategic purposes”.113 I reflect in more detail 
about what lies outside the discourse in chapter 5.
2.4.3 Principles of rarefaction of speaking subjects
Following Foucault’s classification, a third group of procedures which permit the control of discourses 
refers to the speaking subjects. Generally speaking, no one may enter the order of discourse if he does 
not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not qualified to do so. And if he does, not all the regions of 
discourse are equally accessible.
The most superficial and visible of these systems of restriction is constituted by the ritual, which 
defines the qualification which must be possessed by individuals who speak and who must occupy 
certain positions and formulate certain types of statements, also defines the gestures, behaviour, 
circumstances and the whole set of signs which must accompany discourse. As a consequence it fixes 
the imposed efficacity of the words, their effect on those to whom they are addressed, and the limits of 
their constraining value.114 Needless to say, there is no modern nor ancient society for which rituals 
have not been particularly significant for the political discursive practices. Always in accordance to the 
specific national idiosyncrasy, politicians invoke deities or values, wear military uniforms or perform 
rituals that will evoke empathy on the average citizen.
The system of societies of discourse produces and preserves discourses that circulate in a closed 
environment, distributing them according to strict rules, and without the holders being dispossessed by 
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this distribution.115
It is easy to picture a society of discourse in the field of science, where not only the requirements of 
knowledge, but also recognized qualifications and degrees conferred by prestigious institutions and the 
scientific argot serve the purpose of closing the discourse to the uninitiated. Once again, I believe we 
may find some differences with the field of politics. In the latter, the knowledge of the ‘art of 
government’ is not such an important principle as much as it is the imposed secrecy which 
characterizes any struggle for power. It is not only that civilians are presumed to not fully understand 
the motives of the state, but that reasons are offered to deny detailed explanations of government 
actions in the name of the ‘common good’ and, above all, security. The most illustrative examples are 
the secret and intelligence services, which are presumed to be, by their very nature, exempt of 
providing explanations and on occasions even of telling the truth if forced to give an explanation at all. 
This is perhaps one of the most unfortunate contradictions of democratic societies: the lack of 
transparency gives certain groups within the ruling class an incommensurable amount of power above 
civil society, which may open the door to corruption and abuse.
As opposed to ‘societies of discourse’, the doctrine tends to be diffused. It is by the holding in common 
of the same discourse ensemble that individuals define their doctrinal reciprocal allegiance. Doctrines 
are different from ‘disciplines’, which control the form and content of statements, in that “doctrinal 
allegiance puts in question both the statement and the speaking subject, the one by the other”. Heresy 
and orthodoxy stem from the doctrine; not from a fanatical exaggeration of its mechanisms, but rather 
they belong fundamentally to them.
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Foucault recognizes that it is “very abstract to separate speech-rituals, societies of discourse, doctrinal 
groups and social appropriations, as I have just done. Most of the time they are linked to each other and 
constitute kinds of great edifices which ensure the distribution of speaking subjects into the different 
types of discourse and the appropriation of discourses to certain categories of subject.”116 Some of 
these abstract categories may even juxtapose to become one and the same in certain situations; for 
example, in a discourse within a convention of a political party, the doctrine may be indistinguishable 
from the society of discourse, i.e., only those that share the ideology would be allowed to speak in such 
a forum, and probably only they would be expected to receive the message in the same way and with 
the same degree of interest.
2.5 Philosophical themes that reinforce means of exclusion
Foucault believes that the following philosophical ideas underlie the systems of exclusion:
- The Heideggerian idea of the founding subject who directly “animates the empty forms of 
language with his/her aims”, and that has at his or her disposal all sorts of signs, but does not 
need to pass “via the singular instance of discourse in order to manifest them”. 117 It is through 
the intuition of this subject that meaning is grasped.
- The theme of originating experience which supposes “that at the very basis of experience 
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there were prior significations, things already said, wandering around the world ‘arranging it 
around us and opening it up from the outset to a sort of primitive recognition’”. In this idealist 
conception the world is “occupied by ‘things… already murmuring meanings which our 
language has only to pick up’”.118
- The notion of universal mediation “indicates the presumption of an omnipresent logos 
elevating particularities to the status of concepts and allowing immediate consciousness to 
unfurl ultimately the whole rationality of the world”. Discourse becomes little more than “the 
gleaming of a truth in the process of being born to its own gaze” and “things themselves, and 
events… imperceptibly turn themselves into discourse as they unfold the secrets of their own 
essence”.119
It is on the basis of these three philosophical themes that discourse is reduced to a play of writing (in 
founding subject), a play of reading (originating experience) and a play of exchange (universal 
mediation). The point is that these activities never put anything at stake except signs; discourse as an 
event is reduced to the signifier. Therefore, “the analysis of discourse should not defer simply to a 
reading of textuality, to a study of powerful significations”. Foucault refuses analyses “couched in 
terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures”, and proposes as remedy “analyses 
in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics… The history which 
determines us has the form of a war rather than that of language: relations of power, not relations of 
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meaning.”120
This does not mean that we should ignore the text and its meaning, but rather to place it within the web 
of power relations that forms its true context.
3. Archaeology
Foucault admits he has privileged discourses that define the ‘sciences of man’ as the objects of his 
method. But the analysis of discursive events is not limited to this field.121 Embedded in the struggle 
for power by definition, politics is an obvious candidate. Understanding how it would be applied to this 
field requires a review of the epistemological implications of a Foucauldian approach.
Foucault’s “archaeological” method is supposed to reveal how discourse overrides society and governs 
the production of culture. The formation of discourses and the genealogy of ‘knowledge’ are not to be 
analysed in terms of types of consciousness, perception and ideology, “but in terms of tactics and 
strategies of power”.122
Because philosophical themes reinforce the limitations and exclusions by a denial of the specific reality 
of discourse in general, we must take the following steps: question our will to truth, restore to discourse 
its character as an event, and discard the sovereignty of the signifier.123
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How could these three recommendations be put into practice?
Questioning the will to truth would imply replacing what are usually considered ‘true’ explanations 
with a conditional approach that can show that what counts as ‘the truth’ is a product of discourse and 
power. Instead of analyzing the will to truth, one would be on the watch for the will to power.124 This 
would be a strategic distrust that supposes all interpretations and explanations above the level of simple 
statements as partially or completely produced by the motivation of power. It is evident that such a 
methodological requirement would have its best point of applicability on the political sphere.
However – and to further stress the possibilities and limits of knowledge – I propose that if we are to be 
completely honest in our scepticism of rationales, we should apply it to ourselves. We should avoid 
interpretations or explanations above the level of propositions, simple verifiable data and its logical 
consequences; and if we decide to engage in interpretation, we should give up any pretensions of 
absolute certainty (contrasting with dominant discourses that accept no doubts), and accept that the 
degree of probability diminishes the further we attempt to abstract from the basic facts available. In 
regards to the analysis of the war on terrorism carried out in this thesis I take such position: the 
dominant discourse will be openly approached with disbelief; while resisting the construction of grand 
theories above basic facts and events, and always retaining a sense of lack of absolute certainty. As 
argued above, this does not mean that we cannot make any contributions to science, but rather that they 
will be limited.
In order to decide if we are to “restore to discourse its character as an event”, we must make sure we 
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understand what Foucault means by this: to see discourse as an event is to identify it as a set of 
assumptions. Perhaps the main assumption historians make is that singular events are dissolved “into 
an ideal continuity – as a teleological movement or a natural process”.125 To counter this assumption, 
Foucault proposes an “effective” history dealing with events in its most unique characteristics, those 
which are not controlled by regulative mechanisms but rather respond to haphazard conflicts. 126
Extending this understanding to the notion of discourse, its character as an event means that we must 
rid it from the assumption of progress or teleology, while recognizing it as a unique conflict free of 
immutable necessities.
Eventualization also “means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of 
forces, strategies and so on which… count… as being self-evident, universal and necessary”. 
According to Hook, this enables us to isolate very different and multiple origins of discourse which 
will reveal its functions of exclusion. He reads Foucault as a proposal to follow a polymorphism of 
analysis; the more we do it, the more we will be able to tie discourse to the motives and operations of 
power-interests. Analysis hence would proceed by a progressive form of saturation of sources of origin 
and realization, to an increasing polymorphism of data sources.127
Foucault has argued that historically discourse became invisible. If it disappeared, “it did so for 
political reasons, the better for it to be used to practice a more insidious form of control over its 
material and its subjects. Thus the very effectiveness of modern discourse is linked to its invisibility 
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and to its rarity”.128 From this passage and others we may infer that re-establishing the character of 
event means, in summary, two things: to recognize its existence and consequences as opposed to 
assume it as self-evident, and to set it in its proper historical context of struggle for power. In the 
discourse analysis concerning this thesis I will follow this recommendation too.
A further observation is necessary. Foucault refers to Enlightenment as an event or set of events, but 
identifies Humanism as a theme or set of themes. As an event, Enlightenment includes elements of 
social transformation, types of political institution, forms of knowledge, projects of rationalization of 
knowledges and practices, as well as technological mutations. Humanism, on the other hand, is a set of 
themes that have reappeared on several occasions, always tied to value judgements, but varied greatly 
in their content, as well as in the values they have preserved.129 By making this difference, Foucault 
underscores the historical uniqueness of an event. Discourse is to be understood in this way, although it 
may contain elements of recurrent previous themes in different forms.
Indeed, in Foucault’s insistence on the contingencies of historical context as opposed to the necessity of 
metaphysics we find the essence of the archaeological method.
Archaeological – and not transcendental – in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal 
structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of 
discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will 
be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible 
for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, 
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the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think.130
Similarly, we must comprehend Foucault’s position in relation to the “sovereignty of the signifier”. 
Said explains that while Derrida’s theory brings criticism to bear on a signifier freed from any 
obligation to a transcendental signified, 
Foucault’s theories move criticism from a consideration of the signifier to a description of the 
signifier’s place, a place rarely innocent, dimensionless, or without the affirmative authority of 
discursive discipline. In other words, Foucault is concerned with describing the force by which 
the signifier occupies a place […] The value is that the signifier is historical, and that a signifier 
occupying a place is “an act of will with ascertainable political and intellectual consequences, 
and an act fulfilling a strategic desire to administer and comprehend a vast and detailed field of 
material.131
By throwing off the sovereignty of the signifier, a historical context made of power relations, together 
with the conditions of possibility and systems of exclusion it creates, and its material and external 
manifestations and contradictions, becomes as important as the message itself.
As Hook observes, we need to define discourse in a broad sense that is not limited to the analyses of 
texts.
[O]ne should approach discourse less as a language, or as textuality, than as an active 
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‘occurring’, as something that implements power and action, and that also is power and action. 
Rather than a mere vocabulary or language, a set of instruments that we animate, discourse is
the thing that is done, ‘the violence’, as Foucault puts it, ‘which we do to things’. In a similar 
vein, Said adds that the predominant goal of discourse is ‘to maintain itself and, more 
important, to manufacture its material continually’. Many of Foucault’s later works take this 
material level of discourse as their prime focus. Discipline and Punish (1979) is a case point, 
where Foucault maps, in rigorous detail, power’s various and developing investments in the 
body.132
Under this light, the practices of the discourse on terrorism with which this project is concerned may be 
considered as part of the discourse itself. Strictly speaking, however, Foucault would have rejected the 
idea of identifying discourse with practice.133
For the specific purpose of discourse analysis, this project will also consider both language and 
material practices as equally important elements of discourse.
3.1 Principles of Archaeology
The archaeological method is implicitly supported by the following principles.
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3.1.1 Principle of reversal: 
Where tradition sees the source of discourses, the principle of their swarming abundance and of 
their continuity, in those figures which seem to play a positive role, e.g., those of the author, the 
discipline, the will to truth, we must rather recognize the negative action of a cutting-up and a 
rarefaction of discourse.134
Here we find again the scepticism towards the alleged benefits of the will to know and its actual results. 
The belief in these positive figures only serves to its rarefaction, a metaphor which suggests that it 
becomes more difficult to identify and grasp.
3.1.2 Principle of discontinuity: 
The fact that there are systems of rarefaction does not mean that beneath them or beyond them 
there reigns a vast unlimited discourse, continuous and silent, which is quelled and repressed by 
them, and which we have the task of raising up by restoring the power of speech to it. We must 
not imagine that there is a great unsaid or a great unthought which runs throughout the world 
and intertwines with all its forms and all its events, and which we would have to articulate or to 
think at last. Discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are 
sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each 
other.135
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To fully understand the principle of discontinuity we must bear in mind the author’s mistrust with 
regard to cause-effect historical explanations. Foucault suggested that linear causality and narratives of 
progress and continuity “are not always the most profitable methodological tools of analysis.” He took 
great pains to distance himself from all traditional histories which portrayed the present as the outcome 
of a teleological evolution.136 The same mistrust that pertains to historical events is being applied to the 
historical transformation of discourse and ideas.
Foucault’s argument of The Archaeology of Knowledge is that traditional histories tend to rely on 
coherent and logical frames that order data while lacking a full understanding of the mechanisms taking 
place. In traditional history, the trajectory of the subject (humanity or consciousness) is underwritten by 
the notion of continuity, while the subject is the ‘author and guarantor of this continuity’. “It is against 
these two notions that make ‘historical analysis the discourse of the continuous’ and ‘human 
consciousness the original subject of all historical development’ that Foucault offers up the form of 
analysis he designates as archaeology.”137 Similarly, what Foucault calls ‘genealogy’ opposes 
evolutionary paths. An implication of the genealogical method is that the historian should not seek 
origins but the contingent, slow and unsteady emergence of conditions of possibility for an event to 
take place.138
We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; in that 
punctuality in which it appears, and in that temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated, 
known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased, and hidden, far from all view, in the dust of 
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books. Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and 
when it occurs.139
Genealogy “must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality” looking for them 
“in what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be 
sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the 
different scenes where they engaged in different roles.”140 The pursuit of the origin is challenged 
because “it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things”, while “if the genealogist refuses to 
extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history”, he does not discover a timeless and essential 
secret, “but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal 
fashion from alien forms”.141 The focus on the human body is a consequence of the genealogist’s 
search to ‘descend’ away from metaphysics. Its task is therefore “to expose a body totally imprinted by 
history and the process of history’s destruction of the body.” 142 It follows that what the genealogist 
finds is power at play rather than essence, as he “seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: 
not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations.”143
A clarifying note is pertinent here. Although archaeology and genealogy are often used 
interchangeably, there is a distinction of emphasis to be made. While archaeology is more concerned 
with discourse and structure, genealogy emphasizes historical power relations and technologies and 
practices of power that are focused on the body in particular.144
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Against continuity in the history of ideas, therefore, we must quit notions such as tradition, influence, 
development, evolution or ‘spirit’. Instead of attributing them “unqualified, spontaneous value”, we 
must admit that, “in the first instance, they concern only a population of dispersed events.”
However, we must be clear that the proposal is that while the forms of continuity should remain in 
suspense, “they must not be rejected definitively… but the tranquillity with which they are accepted 
must be disturbed.” 145 Indeed, discarding all forms of continuities would discard the logical principle 
of cause and effect. Foucault’s suggestion is simply that we do not take continuity for granted. 
However, more elaborate (and usually more optimistic) ideals of continuity, implying long term, 
linearity and straightforwardness, such as teleology or evolution, are abandoned entirely.
It is also important to understand that challenging the idea of a continuous history does not mean that 
we should ignore historical context; quite the opposite. Dreyfus and Rabinow make a distinction 
between a ‘history of the past’ and a ‘history of the present’. A ‘history of the past’ is essentially a work 
of the present, strongly attached to the current socio-political realm, with the purpose of understanding 
what happened in the past. By contrast, a ‘history of the present’ interrogates the present, its values, 
discourses and understandings with recourse to the past as a resource of destabilizing critical 
knowledge.146 The first one seeks to accommodate our understanding of the past to our understanding 
of the present without realizing how it is actually determined by dominant contemporary ideals. The 
second one is aware of the need to challenge these ideals. Therefore, history is not only important to 
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situate past events in their proper context, but to liberate ourselves from the restrictions of the present. 
As Hook notes, without the historical dimension we will be limited to “‘scratching the surface of 
discourse’; our results will remain loaded with contemporary values, more a product of contemporary 
discourse than critical analysis of it”.147 We should not forget that discourse is historically located. 
Discourse analysis needs to destabilize the contents of discourse by undermining their ‘ahistorical’ 
authority.148
The notion of discontinuity is also a reiteration of the dispersions of incompatible themes. Analyses 
describing them, Foucault writes, “would study forms of division… instead of reconstituting chains of 
inference (as one often does in the history of sciences or of philosophy), instead of drawing tables of 
differences (as the linguists do), it would describe systems of dispersion”.149 Not making inferred 
connections from one incompatible theme to another, but accepting them as series in dispersion.
This leads to the methodological opposition of series versus unity. Hook explains: Rather than assume 
a shared likeness, among the components of the analysis, the analyst of discourse must be prepared to 
search for similar functions across a variety of different forms (language, practices, material reality, 
institutions, subjectivity). And rather than following linear successions of development, the analyst 
must trace a laterality, mapping parallels of regularity.150 Discursive events must be treated as 
homogeneous series, yet discontinuous in relation to each other. Foucault’s conception of series warns 
us of the fact that discourse often works in contradictory ways.
I have interpreted Foucault’s suggestion of not imagining “a great unsaid or a great unthought… which 
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we would have to articulate or to think at last” as a denial of the continuous. However, it may also be 
read as a rejection of the idea of recovering meanings excluded, marginalized or ‘repressed’ by 
discourse in order to bring us to truth. Foucault believes that a silent discourse “quelled and repressed 
by various practices” does not exist, and subsequently it is not our task to “raise up the restored power 
of speech to it”.
As Hook correctly notes, this is a difficult point because it does seem that Foucault is trying to give 
voice to those de-legitimized sources disqualified from predominant discourse. “Whilst this may be the 
case”, Hook explains, “it is worth bearing in mind that this kind of genealogical recovery of subjugated 
voices does not occur under the auspices of confronting a great untruthfulness with the force of an 
indisputable truth. It occurs rather under the auspices of tracing discursive formations of power and 
control, by assembling a strategically organized ensemble of historical knowledges that will be capable 
of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of presiding discourse”. And so it follows that the 
analyst should be predominantly concerned with systematically exploiting and demonstrating the gaps, 
shortcomings, contradictions and discontinuities of a given discourse, as the weaknesses to be 
stressed.151
Hook's remarks aside, I believe that a strict application of Foucault's method goes too far if it dismisses 
the potentialities of the suppressed discourses. This is so for three reasons: First, because within these 
de-legitimized sources and at the level of simple propositions and facts we can indeed find objective 
truths which contradict the dominant discourse. Since these statements have no place within the 
dominant discourse, they may only be considered as part of the “unsaid”, whether they are just 
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fragmented data or they constitute the foundation of alternative discourses. Second, because the fact 
that we have no knowledge of grand explanations of greater truths, and the probability of ever having it 
may be quite small, does not imply that such a knowledge is impossible, and so it may remain as a 
“great unthought”. Third, because alternative discourses which have been suppressed or marginalized 
do exist.  I will explore this point in more detail in chapter 5.
3.1.3 Principle of specificity: 
We must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not imagine 
that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world 
is not the accomplice to our knowledge; there is no prediscourse providence which disposes the 
world in our favour. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any 
case as a practice which we impose on them; and it is in this practice that the events of 
discourse find the principle of their regularity.152
And from The Archaeology of Knowledge:
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive 
formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance 
or use in history might be indicated (and, if necessary, explained); it is made up of a limited 
number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined… it is, from 
beginning to an end, historical – a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, 
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posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its 
temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time… A 
‘discursive practice’ is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and 
space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical or 
linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative formation.153
It is in the language and practice of doing violence to things that a specific discourse will show us its 
regularity and meaning, as opposed to guiding the analysis through our assumptions of what the 
generalities of the discourse are. Hook explains that the principle of specificity opposes over-
generalizing forms of analysis that would resolve specific discursive forms into ‘a play of pre-existing 
significations’. A ‘general reading’ assumes that ‘the world turns towards us a legible face which we 
would have only to decipher’. But “it is not the case that there are inherent meanings in things, that 
varieties of discourse more or less closely approximate true or intrinsic meanings; by contrast, we come 
to know meanings and to distinguish truth-claims precisely on the basis of discourse.” 154 Foucault 
himself writes: whereas the regularity of a sentence is defined by the laws of language and that of 
proposition by the laws of logic, the regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation 
itself.155 Thus, we should not assume that the discursive formation implies homogeneity, continuity nor 
coherence, since the statements' logic is determined by the discourse itself. 
However, “to proclaim that ‘there is no prediscursive providence’ is not to subsume everything within 
the world into discourse”. Indeed, to suggest that our knowledge of the world and the scope of things 
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that we can reasonably say is governed by certain discursive formations is clearly different to saying 
that there is nothing beyond the text, and that everything that happens within the world is reducible to 
certain textual markers.156 This would be absurd and a logical error. And again, as commented above, 
this does not mean that simple objective truths at the level of the statement are impossible either.
In contrast to suggestions that discursive practices can be largely reduced to textuality, Foucault warns 
that we must “throw off the sovereignty of the signifier” and look further afield to identify a wider 
array of discursive effects. He demands that the analysis be fixed in the physicality of its effects and in 
the materiality of its practices. 
There is a regularity that links the textual to the material. While discussing the opposition between 
regularity and originality, Foucault argues that “similar discursive acts can occur in a multitude of 
different ways, in various different forms that stretch from what has typically been considered 
‘discursive’, that is, the textual, to the ‘extra-discursive’, the material level of discursive practices…157
Foucault’s conception of discourse is situated far more closely to knowledge, materiality and power 
than it is to language”.158
3.1.4 Principle of exteriority:
We must not go from discourse towards its interior, hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a 
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thought or a signification supposed to be manifested in it; but, on the basis of discourse itself, 
its appearance and its regularity, go towards its external conditions of possibility, towards what 
gives rise to aleatory series of these events, and fixes its limits.159
Thus the impossibility of reducing the complexity of a discursive formation to one simple notion or 
statement.
Foucault’s interest in textuality is to present the text without its “esoteric or hermetic elements”, and to 
do this by assuming the affiliation of the text with institutions, offices, agencies, classes, academies, 
corporations, groups, guilds, ideologically defined parties and professions. Foucault’s descriptions of a 
text or discourse attempt to resemanticise and redefine the particular interests that the text serves by the 
detail and subtlety of the description.160 Foucault’s priority is not that of textuality or signification, but 
rather that of materiality, conditions of possibility and historical circumstance and context. Hence 
Foucault’s analysis of discourse occurs fundamentally through the extra-discursive. Looking at what 
can be shown to be within the text is insufficient because alternative interpretations will always be 
possible. The analyst of discourse needs to appeal to certain stable reference points outside of the text. 
One needs to reference one’s analytical conclusions, wherever possible, to both the textual and the 
extra-textual dimensions, like those of space (geopolitics), time (history), and material forms of 
practice.161 Furthermore, the material dimension “is constitutive of the statement itself: a statement 
must have a substance, a support, a place, and a date. And when these requisites change, it too changes 
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identity.”162
In this chapter I have made an exegesis of Foucault's ideas on power and discourse as an introduction 
to his work. Given that my objective of assessing Foucault is to be carried out in the context of the 
analysis of the discourse of the war on terrorism and not in abstract, for the most part I have avoided 
arguing with the notions presented above, except for one general epistemological point: that Foucault’s 
observations about truth, discourse and knowledge do not actually discard the possibility of positive 
knowledge, but rather set limits to it. This point is further developed in chapter 3.
Both the exegesis and the point about the limits of knowledge serve as a platform to carry on with the 
objectives of the thesis. The following chapters will show that a great number of Foucault's 
propositions are indeed useful. Others are only relevant to a certain extent and require the 
complementary observations and works of other authors, with whom I do not believe there is any 
logical contradiction. Only a few of Foucault’s observations are in clear opposition with alternative 
approaches.
4. Previous approaches to the war on terrorism applying Foucauldian notions
Before we proceed, a review of previous contemporary analyses on the war on terrorism that follow 
Foucault is pertinent. As too great a number of thinkers have contributed to this area of analysis, the 
review that follows is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it is a representative sample meant to 
acknowledge the works that to a great extent sustain my own, by providing either useful insights, or by 
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holding positions that require a response, in as much as they might lack recognition of the limits of 
Foucault and the relevance of complementary theories. The review will also place my own contribution 
to the field in perspective and delineate its significance.
We will notice that a number of these authors focus on the practices of the war on terror as 
governmentality and biopolitics, and only occasionally seek to apply other Foucauldian notions. 
Indeed, what these works mostly represent is a tradition attempting to detect and explain technologies 
and strategies of power as manifested on every day life of liberal societies; as well as a preference for 
the analysis of the capillary level of power. This tradition has been partly influential for the present 
discussion, particularly in regards to the issues raised in chapter 4, where the discursive aspects of the 
practices of the war on terror are treated. 
The works that follow also represent positions seeking to blend, complement or contrast Foucault with 
thinkers dealing with similar issues, such as Giorgio Agamben or Gilles Deleuze. Their use of different 
complementing authors has also been influential to my own analysis, as I apply a degree of 
ecclecticism throughout the thesis. Again, a dialogue between the works of Foucault and Agamben 
appears in chapter 4.
Michael Dillon argues that the war on terror emerged “out of a generic biopolitics of contingency in the 
west, and is being conducted according to its political technologies and governmental rationalities”.163
He explicitly rejects the notion that the state of emergency of this century is as described by Carl 
Schmitt or Giorgio Agamben. Rather, he argues that biopolitics have adopted the contingent as their 
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principle of formation, where life is understood by Dillon as constant nonlinear adaptation and change. 
In this sense, he characterizes biopolitics as encompassing lifelike systems, thus blurring the line 
between the organic and the inorganic.164 In a later article co-authored with Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Dillon 
further explains:
[W]e pursue the biopolitical imagination in a different direction, asking what happens to 
regimes of governance that take life as their referent object when what it means to be a living 
thing is transformed by processes of molecularization and digitalization... Our interest 
specifically concerns how the molecularization of life compounds the contingency, circulation 
and complexity that already preoccupies the biopolitical imaginary of species-being, in 
particular for the purposes of continually adding value to species existence. Molecularized life 
is not more certain life. It is differently contingent life.165
While their expansion from a traditional notion of biopolitics is arguable, the approach is useful to 
explain certain practices of the war on terror, such as those related to technology or surveillance, but 
falls short for an analysis of torture. Indeed, torture as a display of overwhelming power (domination) 
begs for Agamben’s analysis on sovereignty and bare life, as I will attempt to show in chapter 5.
In contrast with the way the ‘war on terror’ has been widely regarded – i.e. as a return to a traditional 
form of imperialism in the international system by a reassertion of the sovereign power of nation-states 
and away from processes of globalisation – Julian Reid argues that the “integral logistical and 
normative roles that biopolitical forces continue to play in the organisation of power internationally 
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today”166 are neglected by such accounts, which place too much emphasis on the role and agency of 
government, as well as the discursive shift that has occurred within US foreign policy and in the 
articulation of its strategy. In the case of the war on Iraq, Reid continues, the Bush administration “went 
to inordinate lengths to secure the support of a range of different non-governmental and humanitarian 
actors in advance of the actual conduct of the war.” 167 It established an inter-agency group for the 
planning of the post-war relief and reconstruction in Iraq, and held meetings with NGOs to pre-plan the 
reconstruction. Financial aid was provided to enable the UN high Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and humanitarian agencies to pre-position humanitarian aid; warehouses spaces were paid 
for in Gulf states for humanitarian supplies; and practices of social reconstruction were integrated as 
fully as possible within the military operation. From these facts, Reid concludes that the war in Iraq 
was fought along biopolitical lines, in an important sense, and not simply by a naked expression of the 
sovereign power of the USA: “The invasion that took Iraq by storm in the spring of 2003 was a 
complex amalgam of forces combining the sovereign power of the USA with the biopower of a range 
of deterritorialised actors.”168 Reid solves the contradiction between sovereign and biopolitical forces 
by turning to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s theorisation of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation – forces which are inseparable and in a permanent state of antagonistic tension.169
Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster seek to distance their analysis from Ulrich Beck’s popular 
notion of the global risk society. While appearing to have been confirmed by the attacks of September 
11, 2001, Beck’s thesis views risk “within a macro-sociological narrative of modernity”170 from which 
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they depart by arguing for an understanding of governing terrorism through a Foucauldian account of 
governmentality. The authors conceptualize risk as a dispositif for governing social problems; a 
“heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material elements”171 that enables the location of a 
diversity of developments, such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the counter-terrorist targeting of 
Muslim communities or the indefinite detention of suspects in the UK.172
Aradau and Van Munster explicitly privilege constructivism over realism while recognizing that Beck 
describes himself as ontologically realist and epistemologically constructivist.173
Covering the wider terrain of security policy by assuming Foucault’s postulation of the privileging of 
the management of biological life, Colleen Bell examines the case of Canada’s 2004 national security 
policy and its surveillance strategies. While she makes use of Agamben’s work to clarify how 
biopolitics structures strategies of sovereignty – and how a biopolitical project may become 
thanatopolitical, i.e. politics of death, as it seeks the purification of races174 – she does not offer it as a 
competing account to Foucault.175 The connection between biopolitics and security occurs “as the 
business of managing affairs of the state is channelled through mechanisms of national security in the 
name of protecting biological life.”176 Bell also identifies the panoptic gaze identified by Foucault with 
the rise of the surveillance society.177
In a similar fashion, Louise Amoore develops the concept of biometric border in the war on terror; that 
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is, the use of digital technologies, data integration and managerial expertise in border control, together 
with the exercise of biopower.178 Biometric borders extend the governing of mobility regulating 
multiple aspects of daily life. According to Amoore, “the biometric border is the portable border par 
excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very same time as it is deployed to divide bodies at 
international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the 
neighbourhood.” 179 Following Foucault, Amoore reflects on the US VISIT program, in which the 
subject becomes objectivised through dividing practices which break it up into risk factors, both within 
herself (‘student’, ‘muslim’, ‘woman’) and in relation to others (‘alien’, ‘immigrant’, ‘illegal’).180
Also reflecting on contemporary management of borders, including the case of the US government’s 
campaign against global terrorism, William Walters complements a Foucauldian political sociology 
committed to understanding power in terms of its multiple tactics and functionings, with Deleuze’s idea 
of the control society. Walters is correct in identifying the latter within the same tradition as the former. 
One of Walters’ merits is that he is ready to expand Foucault’s understanding of disciplinary societies 
into a one in which power has become more fluid, less centred and operating in fluctuating networks of 
production and consumption.181
One of the key transformations of the control society is a shift in the spatiality of power: “from forms 
of governance which privilege particular institutional sites of confinement to open networks of power 
which operate through variable combinations and productions of desire, lifestyle, anxiety and fear, and 
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which have the market as their paradigm.”182 In these terms, Walters detects a ‘delocalization’ of the 
border in instances such as the US Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, which 
represents a greater effort to schedule policing and identification functions well before the traveller 
arrives at the border, but also, in certain cases, after they arrive on US soil.183
A parallel argument has been advanced by Benjamin J. Muller who contends that what he calls the 
‘biometric state’ is motivated by an obsession with technologies of risk and practices of risk 
management, and is defined by the prevalence of virtual borders and reliance on biometric 
identifiers.184 Like Walters, Muller compares Foucault with Deleuze and Guattari; in this case the 
Foucauldian dispositif with Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage and the ‘war machine’. The biometric 
state of the post-9/11 world, writes Muller, makes some attempt to bring together the dispositifs of 
biopolitics and the geopolitics of security.185
Didier Bigo adopts a Foucauldian capillary view of power by rejecting its analysis “through legitimate 
and steady forms – that it is not coming from the top and going downward... but on the contrary where 
it is in direct relationship with its targets, where it moves, where, at its extremities, power goes beyond 
the Law, where the techniques and tactics of domination can be analyzed”.186 As a consequence, he 
attributes the securitization of immigration to the development of technologies of control and 
surveillance, as opposed to a causal relation in the opposite direction. In an extension of Foucault’s 
work, Bigo suggests that the securitization of immigration and the strengthening of an “internal 
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security state”
constitute signs of a more general transformation in which a form of governmentality based on 
misgiving and unrest is substituted for a reassuring and protective pastoral power. The form of 
governmentality of postmodern societies is not a panopticon in which global surveillance is 
placed upon the shoulders of everybody, but a form of ban-opticon in which the technologies of 
surveillance sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, 
because of his profile.187
Not all analyses based on Foucault have been confined to issues of governmentality and biopolitics. 
Michael J. Shapiro offers a sophisticated account of what he calls ‘violent cartographies’, i.e. 
“historically developed, socially embedded interpretations of identity and space that constitute the 
frames within which enmities give rise to war-as-policy”.188 He refers to these cartographies as 
imaginaries, justified by openly adopting Foucault’s principle: ‘We must not imagine that the world 
turns toward us a legible face which we would have only to decipher’; how we have the world, he 
explains, “is a matter of the shape we impose on it, given the ideational commitments and institutional 
practices through which spatiotemporal models of identity-difference are created.”189 Thus, ‘objective 
truth’ is of no concern here, but how it is constructed through institutional practices and issues of 
identity.
Shapiro then draws a parallel between Foucault’s archaeological investigation of medical perception 
and the war on terror by applying his notion of the spatialization of disease to the spatialization of 
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terrorism. Three kinds of spatialization are discerned by Foucault in medical practices and applied by 
Shapiro to terrorism: at the levels of classification, the space of the body and the administrative 
structure.190
Using the cases of abuse at Guantanamo as a starting point, Andrew W. Neal writes in favour of a 
Foucauldian “archaeology of the exception” 191, and against the discourses of exceptionalism of Carl 
Schmitt, Agamben and securitization theory. The problem, Neal explains, is that these discourses 
privilege a sovereign centre and by doing so “exceptionalism is successively reduced to, borrowing 
terms from Foucault (2002a: 226), a ‘single system of differences’ and to ‘absolute axes of 
reference’”192, such as the friend and enemy, the norm and the exception, bare life and political life, and 
politics and security. This dualism pursues the delimitation of unities, identities, categories and 
jurisdictions; limits which either attempt to mark off the domain of sovereign power, or the decision 
over their shape and location is accorded to sovereign power.193
Neal argues that following Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge reveals that these theoretical 
approaches themselves “perpetuate the ‘sovereign’ structures of discourses” 194  by reifying a certain 
vision of sovereignty. In contrast, Neal is faithful to Foucault’s recommendation of cutting the king’s 
head195: “It is as if the discourse of exceptionalism contains a ‘hidden discourse’, a return of the ‘same’, 
a ‘transcendental act that gives them origin’ (Foucault, 2002a: 226). Foucault directly opposes all of 
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this.”196 Neal rejects overdetermined figures that pretend to carry transcendental, ontological, 
philosophical or metaphysical qualities, and instead defends an archaeological description of discursive 
formations in terms of appearance alone; a description which is historical, rather than formal or 
ideal.197 In the case of the war on terror, “one should not identify a formal, unified and underlying 
exceptionalism as distinguished from the norm, as do Schmitt, Agamben and securitization theory, but 
only an array of dispersed appearances.” 198
While much can be learned from the works cited above, there is one main point that distinguishes them 
from my own analysis. These and other authors within the same tradition rarely challenge Foucault’s 
basic epistemological principles – and indeed the principles of poststructuralism and constructivism in 
general. As critiques of Foucault are to be found almost exclusively in largely incompatible traditions, 
there is a lack of researches that place value in a Foucauldian framework while openly identifying its 
limitations and actively seeking notions that can compensate for the shortcomings. This is where I try 
to fill a void.
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Chapter 2
The Network of Power and Societies of discourse: Neoconservatism, the Israel lobby and other 
groups of influence
The discourse of the war on terrorism cannot be understood without the context in which it emerged. A 
series of power relations of specific groups of people with similar ideologies and points of view have 
converged at a point in time, allowing the appearance of this discourse. These actors are most directly 
responsible for its production – even if some of the themes of the discourses echo earlier American 
discourses of threat and insecurity. As noted in chapter 1, Foucault's method assumes “affiliations with 
institutions, agencies, classes, academies, corporations, groups, ideologically defined parties and 
professions.”199 Social groups, classes and categories shape a society with its “régime of truth, its 
‘general politics’ of truth”.200 All of these concepts suggest the idea of a network of power. But in order 
to understand the nature of the network of power in the war on terrorism, a few critical remarks must be 
made about the notion of power as proposed by Foucault.
1. Capillary power and the need to recover the King's head
Foucault approached the subject of power firstly by proposing a deep connection between power and 
knowledge; and secondly, by his overall aim to produce a 'micro-physics of power'. His concern “was 
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with 'structural relationships, institutions, strategies and techniques' rather than with 'concrete policies 
and the actual people they involve'.”201 While we are in debt to Foucault for highlighting the 
importance of the former, I do not believe that we can fully understand power without any reference to 
the specifics of the latter. As we shall see in this and the next chapter, it is impossible to understand the 
discourse of the war on terrorism without pointing out concrete policies, as well as language and 
practices, and the people involved.202
Foucault is concerned primarily with spatial technologies and procedures at the micro-level of power, 
while rejecting analyses that focus primarily on the state and state sovereignty. In his words:
I would say that we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the juridical 
edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but 
towards domination and the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the 
inflections and utilisations of their localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We 
must eschew the model of the Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from the limited 
field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on 
the study of the techniques and tactics of domination. [Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 102]203
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Foucault centred his analyses on “local sites of social discipline, regulation and normalisation; as well 
as on those administrative mechanisms... through which populations are governed as formally free 
subjects, and constituted 'at a distance'.”204 He argued that his analytics of power could be constituted 
only if it freed completely from the representation of power that he called “juridico-discursive”, a 
certain image of power-law and power-sovereignty.205 Instead, Foucault proposed a prioritization of 
micro manifestations of power – micro in comparison with the traditional grand structures. An analysis 
of power, Foucault says, “should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate 
destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms 
and institutions”.206 One of the consequences of his approach is that power becomes something which 
circulates and which functions in the form of a chain rather than a pyramid. Having mobility, similar to 
the blood flowing in the smallest veins, it is never localised in a certain place, “never in anybody’s 
hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised 
through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are 
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power”.207
Foucault's request to 'cut off the King's head' is to reject power-sovereignty. When he made it, it was a 
refreshing and liberating departure from traditional approaches to power, such as Marxism. We should 
welcome what appears to be his concern to radically escape the assumption of legitimacy in regards to 
sovereignty. Indeed, his concern with what he believed was an obsession of political theory being 
obsessed with the person of the sovereign is ultimately a concern with political consent as the basis of 
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the legitimacy of the sovereign. Barry Hindess explains: “In fact, the problem to which [Foucault’s 
claim] alludes is symptomatic of a more general modern obsession with the idea of the person as 
autonomous agent, and consequently, with the idea that a community of such persons can, and should, 
be governed by the consent of its members.”208
However, we should notice that Foucault’s was not an ontological assertion in the sense that there is no 
power at the higher levels of society, nor an absolute denial of the freedom of action of individuals209; 
rather, it was a methodological proposal which he deemed more productive to understand power. It 
follows that complementing his analytics of power with traditional theories would not be logically
incorrect – even with Marxism. I agree with Jan Selby, who recognizes that there are keen points of 
disagreement between Foucault and Marx, especially in philosophical matters, but who contends that 
putting these differences to one side, “there are also powerful parallels and convergences between 
Foucauldian and Marxist thought”. He adds that some of the differences can be approached as 
complementary rather than antagonistic. Foucault was an analyst of the 'how' of power, while Marxist 
theory focuses on the 'why' of power within capitalist systems, which would make them mutually 
enriching.210
As Edward Said has noted, even if one fully agrees with Foucault’s view that the microphysics of 
power is exercised rather than possessed, notions such as class and class struggle, the forcible taking of 
state power, economic domination, imperialist war, dependency relationships, and resistances to power 
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cannot be reduced “to the status of superannuated nineteenth-century conceptions of political 
economy… a great deal of power remains in such coarse items as the relationships and tensions 
between rulers and ruled, wealth and privilege, monopolies of coercion, and the central state 
apparatus”.211 Said recognizes that Foucault’s work is an important alternative to the ahistorical 
formalism with which he has been conducting an implicit debate, 
but all that is quite another thing from accepting Foucault’s view in History of Sexuality that 
“power is everywhere” along with all that such a vastly simplified view entails. For one, as I 
have said, Foucault’s eagerness not to fall into Marxist economism causes him to obliterate the 
role of classes, the role of economics, the role of insurgency and rebellion in the societies he 
discusses.212
Said further argues that Foucault’s thinking on power is marked by an underestimation of historical 
forces such as profit, ambitions, ideas, or the sheer love of power.213 Indeed, in spite of Foucault's 
interest in history, empiricism and apparently agency, he misses central elements of power with his 
insistence on renouncing the “labyrinthine and unanswerable question” of who has power and what is 
his aim.214
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To take Foucault's request to the extreme and renounce the analysis of sovereignty, law, ideology and 
related elements of power would turn out to be a limitation. In the case of the war on terrorism, a 
specific network of power sharing certain ideological themes requires that we do not focus exclusively 
on techniques of domination at the capillary level. While the network cannot be totally identified with a 
class or with judicial sovereignty, in its privileged position in the higher levels of society from which to 
wage power on a macro-level, it can function as such. Furthermore, power and discourse find their way 
into, and are exercised through, law and sovereignty, as we will see in this and the following chapters.
As the reader may already see, a parallel debate implicit here is that of agency versus structure. We 
may gain useful insights from a brief comparison. In a volume dedicated to the agency-structure 
debate, Colin Wight observes that continental structuralists believed that societies, myths, works of 
literature and so on have the 'structure of language', while poststructuralists have taken this further by 
arguing that language is a meta-structure that structures all the others. Both “take the structure of one 
human domain as the model for other domains.”215 Similarly, Roxanne Lynn Doty proposes that 
poststructuralism can lead to a radical way of conceptualising the agent-structure issue in which the 
ontology of agents and structures is replaced by an ontology of indeterminate practices. Her solution to 
the agent-structure problem is that agents and structures are effects of practices.216 If we were to 
translate Foucault into a position that addresses the agent-structure debate, we would probably end up 
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with something similar to a poststructural position or Doty's argument, except that 'practices' and the 
'structure of language' would extend to include knowledge, discourses, institutions, discipline and 
technologies of power. These added elements would have primacy over both agents and structure. 
While it has been a remarkable contribution to point out the importance of practices, language, 
knowledge and discourses, they do not replace nor explain away agents and structure. Wight writes:
[I]n constructing an account of structure derived from linguistics and applying this to all 
domains of social activity, postructuralists are unable [to] link together the various domains of 
social life. Indeed, all social life is to be read as a text, and the underlying ontology is flat, one-
dimensional and reductionist. This seriously underplays the specifics of the differential  planes 
of social life. Moreover, where agents do play a role it is only in terms of the structural 
imperatives of the structures. Indeed, in many poststructuralist accounts agency is located in 
structures. Despite the repeated references to the construction of social life and the construction 
of social principles, it is not agents who do this construction but the structural logics of relations 
of difference, even if this logic is indeterminate. Agents, or selves, are mere ciphers for the 
universal principles of language. They are not even, as should be clear, positivities. Indeed, 
agents, much like the structurality of structure, are actually an illusion.217
Foucault was “an empirically grounded theorist of historical shifts in the relations between knowledge, 
institutions and the constitution of subjects,”218 and as such he could not be accused of reducing the 
ontology of society to language. However, the essence of Wight's criticism applies to him as well. The 
problem is that specific groups of power with specific objectives and modus operandi are neither 
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knowledge, institutions nor the constitution of subjects – although they are indeed related and 
immersed in these. If Foucault’s emphasis is on power being everywhere and manifesting through 
knowledge, institutions, discourse, strategies and practices, there is little to no room left for analyzing
agents and the effect of their specific actions and use of language. This is not to suggest that all 
speakers are of equal authority. Nor that those with the most authority are entirely free from discourse 
and can therefore shape it at will. Rather, that in spite of the structural qualities of power and discourse, 
agency is still possible and we need to acknowledge it if the case study at hand suggests so. Therefore, 
detecting which are the specific social groups and actors that may produce the discourse on the war on 
terrorism is one task of this chapter. 
The production of discourse is not a direct cause and effect relationship in the sense that no one of the 
agents or groups involved is solely responsible for its consequences, but all have had parts to play with 
different degrees of success. Rather, the ideals, objectives and language of these groups resonate with 
each other, constituting a loose network of power that as a whole has produced the discourse. This 
network is neither a monolithic nor a well defined unit. It does not have a permanent hold of power and 
it suffers transformations: its members occupy different positions throughout time and there is no 
guarantee that those who are most prominent will be so in the near future, or that the network as a 
whole will continue to have the influence it holds at the moment. The way in which power circulates 
among the members of this elite – more like a currency than a permanent privilege – is in some 
measure similar to Foucault's notion of capillary power, with the difference that the 'small blood veins' 
in question are to be found in the higher levels of society and not the lower.
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2. Societies of Discourse and Doctrines
While Foucault emphasizes strategies of power rather than ideologies, I do not believe that the latter 
should be entirely dismissed. In fact, Foucault's own notions of the discursive principles of exclusion of 
societies of discourse and doctrine suggest the relevance of ideologies. While societies of discourse
produce discourse and preserve it within its own closed environment under strict rules, the doctrine
echoes in the open environment of public debate with the possibility of affecting society at large. The 
principle of a society of discourse is at work in the US network of government, military and 
intelligence communities, since the discourse is produced under strict rules and largely in a closed 
space. However, think tanks, research institutions, ideological organizations and lobby groups offer a 
clearer example of such societies in their role of producing and preserving doctrines, given their clearly 
ideological character. By contrast, the 'truths' produced by government authorities are often presented 
as having no ideal other than the common good in the forms of 'democracy', 'freedom', 'security' or any 
other widely shared contemporary values.
This is not to say that government authorities and ideological groups are independent from each other. 
Our examination of the network of power relations will mention the most prominent of these think 
tanks, institutions and organizations that have a significant role in the discourse of the war on terror, 
and it will be observed that these often overlapped with the government. Bureaucrats with life-long 
careers, such as Dick Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld, are members of the Project for the New American 
Century, an institution with explicitly ideological objectives. Their Statement of Principles calls for 
“American global leadership” through “military strength and moral clarity”.219
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It is from the doctrine shared by these societies of discourse, intertwined with their power relations, 
that the themes and elements of the discourse of the war on terrorism emerged in the way we have 
known them since 2001. It could be said that the discourse of the war on terrorism is a specific 
incarnation of the doctrine shared by these societies of discourse.
It is the principle of doctrine that links these organizations and individuals together. Though the stated 
goals of the different ideological groups are not necessarily the same, they are often close to each other 
and complementary in their work allowing for the same people – the adepts of the doctrine – to 
contribute to or be members of more than one group. Neoconservative Irving Kristol, also a member of 
the Israel lobby, is a senior fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, which declares as its purpose 
“to defend the principles and improve the institutions of American freedom and democratic capitalism 
– limited government, private enterprise, individual liberty and responsibility, vigilant and effective 
defense and foreign policies, political accountability, and open debate.”220 This appears as a summary 
of the version of the doctrine as understood by the members of the AEI. Elsewhere, the emphasis may 
be not on “American freedom and democratic capitalism”, but on strategic cooperation with the state of 
Israel, considered the only true democracy in the Middle East (e.g. JINSA221 or AIPAC222), or on US 
military supremacy (PNAC).
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We observe that the different themes that concern the members of this network do not necessarily 
follow each other as logical consequences. The defence of freedom and democratic capitalism does not 
automatically imply support for Israel or militarism. Thus, we find that the doctrine is not so much a 
unifying principle but one which manifests through discontinuities and dispersion – in accordance with 
Foucault – and that in its dispersion it morphs into the discursive formation that deals with post-9/11 
terrorism.
2.1 Resonance
Rather than identifying neoconservatism as the single and ultimate cause of the discourse of the war on 
terrorism, it is be better to characterize it as the most influential of the groups of a network that resonate 
with each other. The idea of resonance has been explained by William E. Connolly:
[I]n politics diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing into a moving complex –
Causation as resonance between elements that become fused together to a considerable degree. 
Here causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized 
complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or 
loosely associated elements fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a 
qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation.223
Therefore, it would not be entirely accurate to suggest a linear cause-effect relationship between power 
and discourse, where one or a few masterminds have consciously decided everything that is to be said 
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and how for a clear and specific purpose. Each group within the network affects the others inter-
dynamically and to different degrees in terms of both ideology and power, even if their ideologies do 
not necessarily conform to each other as a coherent whole. While some characters play major roles, 
none of them has complete control of the resulting discourse;224 nor is their influence exempt from 
change or termination. In this sense the discourse – a complex set of discontinuous proposals and 
assumptions which morph through time and which are not entirely controlled by anyone in particular –
gains a life of its own by growing out of a network of power which is more than the sum of its parts.
3. Neoconservatism
Before examining the complexities of the themes of the discourse itself we need to contextualize it 
within a description of the network of power most directly responsible for its production. However, 
what follows is not only intended as a platform to understand the discourse, but also as a way of 
showing that the ideological specificities of groups of power in privileged levels of society have a 
major role to play in the production of a discourse, highlighting in this way a limitation of a 
Foucauldian approach. That these groups and their ideologies are directly related to the themes of the 
discourse will become clearer in chapter 3, where I examine the themes themselves.
A note of clarification is necessary here. In this section I refer to neoconservative ideological thinking; 
but ideology should not be necessary equated with discourse as Foucault understands it. Foucault was 
reluctant to use the term ‘ideology’ because he thought it always stood in virtual opposition to 
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something else which was supposed to count as truth.225 For this reason, he preferred the more neutral 
and generic term ‘discourse’. This word also lacks the implication of intent that ‘ideology’ carries and 
which is not implied by Foucauldian discourse analysis. However, I have chosen to refer to ‘ideology’ 
because it best describes the well defined set of aspirational, and thus intentional, ideas of 
neoconservatism. As the cluster of rules of what can be articulated or not, discourse is a wider 
encompassing phenomenon; it runs deeper through historical and social categories; it manifests through 
spoken words, text and practices; it finds its embodiment in science and institutions. In contrast, an 
ideology is a system of ideas that aspires to explain the world and to change it. The word ‘ideology’ 
was first introduced by A.L.C. Destutt at the time of the French Revolution, and it was partly inspired 
by Francis Bacon’s belief that science should improve the life of men and not just expand knowledge. 
Destutt’s ideology as a ‘science of ideas’ was a science with a mission.226 If we are to introduce the 
term ‘ideology’ to designate a system of ideas with a social or political aim, we must identify it as a 
particular manifestation of discourse, while avoiding the automatic identification of the two terms.
It will be noted that in the description that follows the outgoing president of the US, George W. Bush, is 
not mentioned as often as other less known characters. One of the reasons is that Bush was new to 
foreign policy when he became president in 2000, and, as he has insisted himself, his decisions have 
been nurtured by a group of advisers with a long experience in the subject, both in the academy and 
policy making.227 Another is that it is possible to identify the influence that the men and women 
holding positions of power have had, to such an extent that Bush’s words and actions have followed 
previous documents prepared by these people almost exactly. If his personality had any particular 
bearing on the production of the discourse apart from the network that surrounds him, it is not apparent 
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what it was.
It is widely believed that a specific group of influence known as neoconservatism has been of 
paramount influence on the war on terrorism. Even self proclaimed conservatives such as Stefan Halper 
and Jonathan Clarke judge that the current brand of US policy against terrorism that allowed the war on 
Iraq “closely reflected the established neo-conservative position and neo-conservative interventions in 
the policy process.” 228
The most appropriate way to view neoconservatism is as a “special interest” or “faction”. Special 
interests are associations “representing the interests of their members to secure for themselves a 
privileged seat at the national decision-making table”.229 MIT professor Gene Grossman defines them 
as “any minority group of voters that shares identifiable characteristics and similar concerns”.230
Historically, the neoconservative faction has consisted of intellectuals and elitists who tend to be of 
Jewish or Catholic background, many of whom seem to have lapsed to secular humanism.231 The group 
has also been identified as “unipolarism”, “democratic globalism”, “neo-Manifest Destinarianism”, 
“neo-imperialism”, “Pax Americanism”, “neo-Reaganism”, and “liberal imperialism”.232
This special interest includes individuals who hold or have held positions in government, such as Chief 
of Staff to Vice-President Dick Cheney, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, until his resignation in late 2005 
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after the investigation on the Valerie Plame affair resulted in charges against him; Special Advisor to 
President Bush, Elliott Abrams; Deputy Secretary of Defence with the Bush Administration, Paul D. 
Wolfowitz, later appointed head of the World Bank; and State Department officials John R. Bolton, 
later appointed US ambassador the UN, and David Wurmser. On governmental advisory bodies Eliot A. 
Cohen occupies a position on the Defence Policy Board, a position that was also held by Richard Perle 
until recently.
Perhaps most important are Vice-President Dick Cheney and former Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, who would be better described as American nationalists than as neoconservatives, but whose 
careers and views, such as those concerning American exceptionalism and unilateralism, have run 
closely to those of neoconservatism. Both their signatures can be found on a key neoconservative 
document, the 1997 Statement of Principles by the Project for the New American Century.
Neoconservatives can also be found in the academy: for example Yale professor Donald Kagan, 
Princeton professors Bernard Lewis and Aaron Friedberg; in the media, Weekly Standard editor William 
Kristol, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer, and most foreign policy editorialists on the 
Wall Street Journal and the Fox News Channel; in business, former CIA Director James Woolsey; and 
in research institutions, Max Boot at the Council on Foreign Relations, Norman Podhoretz and Meyrav 
Wursmer at the Hudson Institute, any member of the Project for the New American Century, and most 
foreign or Defence studies scholars at the American Enterprise Institute.233 This list is not all-inclusive, 
but it should serve to illustrate the range of positions held by neoconservatives.
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It would be difficult to fully characterize or explain the relevance and details of a faction such as this 
one under strictly Foucauldian terms. As noted above, the notions of society of discourse and doctrine
provide a platform in terms of shared discursive or ideological understandings; however, they miss the 
elitist aspect of the political power of a faction. 
Additionally, for a Foucauldian approach the impossibility of making sense of the world without a 
discursive standpoint suggests that the members of the faction do not find themselves outside of a 
discourse. This is correct, but it raises the problem that it could lead some to conclude – incorrectly in 
my view – that the members of the faction are not able to influence the production of the discourse in 
any significant way, and thus the specificities of their beliefs and positions of influence, i.e. their 
capabilities as agents, are ultimately irrelevant. I hope to show in this chapter and the following that 
these specificities have indeed had an important influence on the discourse of the war on terrorism.
3.1 An Introduction to Neoconservative Doctrine
Neoconservatives have a tendency to see or depict the world of international politics in black and 
white: a struggle between good and evil. It is a doctrine which finds its origins and early development 
specifically in the context of the relation between Moscow and Washington in the late twentieth 
century;234 and between the US as the centre of democratic societies and rogue nations in the early 
twenty-first. As we will see in chapter 3, one of the central themes of the discourse of the war on 
terrorism is a global dichotomy where the US stands for democratic values and has as its mission to 
confront tyranny abroad.
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According to neoconservative Irving Kristol, there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning 
foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience that can be summarized in four 
"theses": first, patriotism should be encouraged; second, international institutions should be regarded 
“with the deepest suspicion”; third, statesmen should make a clear distinction between friends and 
enemies, since it was a mistake for some to not count the Soviet Union as an enemy; and finally, for a 
great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, but also an ideological one. Therefore, 
Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a 
democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal. That is why it 
was in our national interest to come to the defence of France and Britain in World War II. That 
is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No 
complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.235
This Wilsonian notion of the spread of democracy is not pure idealism; it is also based on the 
supposition that if democracy and the rule of law are established in troubled countries around the 
world, they will cease to be threats. The promotion of democracy is not left to economic development 
and political engagement; if necessary, it is provided through military force. Some think-tank 
“fundamentalists” – as G. John Ikenberry identifies them – such as Tom Donnelly and Max Boot, go 
even further and argue for formal quasi-imperial control over strategically valuable failed states, 
backed up by new American bases and an imperial civil service.236
We could add to those theses the following common themes: a belief that the human condition is 
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defined as a choice between good and evil and that the former (themselves) should have the political 
character to confront the latter; a willingness to use military power; and a primary focus on the Middle 
East and global Islam as the principal theatre for American overseas interests. The parallels with the 
themes of the war on terrorism are again apparent, since the discourse proposes that we live in an era of 
unprecedented danger, and that the solution is to be found in the moral leadership and military 
supremacy of the US who asks its citizens and the rest of the world to accept exceptional measures.
In putting their ideas into practice neoconservatives analyse international issues in absolute moral 
categories; focus on the “unipolar” power of the US, seeing the use of force as the first, not the last 
option of foreign policy; disdain of conventional diplomatic agencies such as the State Department and 
conventional country-specific, realist, and pragmatic analysis; and are hostile toward nonmilitary 
multilateral institutions and instinctively antagonistic toward international treaties and agreements.237 If 
there is any good to multilateralism it is as a tool of American power. As Robert Kagan has famously 
put it, “multilateralism is a weapon of the weak”. Or in Max Boot’s words: “Power breeds 
unilateralism. It is as simple as that”.238
Based on the above beliefs and approaches neoconservatives tend to find themselves in confrontational 
postures with the Muslim world, with some US allies, with the need for cooperation in the United 
Nations, and with those within their country who disagree with them and their objectives.239 The 
discourse of the war on terrorism echoes the confrontational postures through a theme of ‘us vs them’, 
where the other is ‘the other’ is a vaguely defined terrorist enemy, sometimes identified with Muslim or 
                                                
237 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: 11
238 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment’: 15
239 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: 12
107
Arab societies and others with an 'axis of evil' of 'rogue states'.
3.1.1 Emphasis on Military Might and US Exceptionalism
Robert Kagan and William Kristol’s book of 2000, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunities in 
American Foreign and Defence Policy, which includes a wide range of contributions from fellow 
neoconservatives, provides something close to their canon. Kagan and Kristol speak of establishing the 
“standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own 
advantage,” and decry a narrow definition of the US’ “vital interests” arguing that “America's moral 
purposes and national interests are identical.”240
Their introductory chapter proposes to create 
a strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect on important 
regions of the world. [An America which would act] as if instability in important regions of the 
world, and the flouting of civilised rules of conduct in those regions, were threats that affected 
us with almost the same immediacy, [and which] conceives of itself as at once a European 
power, an Asian power, a Middle Eastern power and, of course, a Western Hemisphere power.
A principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in 
hostile nations – in Baghdad and Belgrade, in Pyongyang and Beijing and wherever tyrannical 
governments acquire the military power to threaten their neighbours, our allies and the United 
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States.
[W]hen it comes to dealing with tyrannical regimes... the United States should seek not 
coexistence but transformation.241
It is easy to identify this projection of neoconservative global intent as a blueprint for what was to 
become later known as the Bush Doctrine.242
The unipolarists emphasize that the US is not like other nations but also maintain that other nations 
should be more like it, without a doubt supported in the long imagined idea that their country is an 
exception to history.243 In turn, exceptionalism supports the argument that military power must be 
returned to the centre of American foreign policy. For early neoconservatives of the 1970s, foreign 
policy in the post-Vietnam era had become too liberal and soft, and unwilling to confront Soviet 
expansionism. Years later they argued that during the Clinton era the US was not taken seriously as a 
global military power because of Clinton’s reluctance to use real force in Iraq; and when enemies stop 
fearing the US, they are emboldened to strike.244
The promotion of force has also a certain degree of admiration and fascination with the capabilities of 
the US military, as Irving Kristol’s words reveal:
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Behind all [the neoconservative convictions about foreign policy there] is a fact: the incredible 
military superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the nations of the rest of the world, in any 
imaginable combination. [...] With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether 
welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will 
find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.245
Max Boot looks forward to a new era when the US, like the British Empire, will always be fighting 
some war, somewhere in the globe.246 Likewise, Professor Eliot Cohen of the Defence Policy Board 
and former CIA Director James Woolsey have suggested that the US is now “on the march” in “World 
War IV”.247 It should come as no surprise, then, that for neoconservatives, the applicability of force is 
the default measure against terrorism. David Frum and Richard Perle's book An End to Evil, sets out at 
full length the remedy for terror and tyranny that underlies the Bush foreign policy: using military force 
to overthrow noncooperative governments in troubled areas.248 Compare these ideas with international 
events that took place in the context of the war on terrorism, i.e. the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
and their rationale, which were predicated on the basis of confronting and pre-empting terrorism and 
tyranny.
3.1.2 The Middle East and Israel
Both Kagan and Kristol’s book and Frum and Perle’s are mostly dedicated to the Middle East, the need 
for a strong military, and Islamic-inspired terrorism as the only foreign policy challenge to the US. 
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Similarly, scholars at the Project for the New American Century pour most of their energies into the 
Middle East and members of Americans for Victory over Terrorism do so completely. Their views are 
very specific and tend to be hostile towards the peace process and Islam.
Since the 1970s neoconservative publications have focused on defence of US policies concerning 
Israel. For example, the neoconservative Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs was established 
following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, “partially at the prompting of the Pentagon for a counterbalance 
to liberal sniping at Defence spending.”249 Podhoretz provided a pro-Israeli voice in what many 
neoconservatives of the time thought of as an intellectual community lacking in support for Israel as the 
only genuine democracy in the Middle East. He also maintained that anti-Zionism was simply a mask 
of anti-Semitism and that it was often found among anti-American and radicals. Thus, commitment to 
Israel's security and right to exist and a patriotic support of US values were inextricably linked for 
many neoconservatives. 
During the Cold War, intellectuals such as Midge Decter, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Podhoretz 
argued that the UN, Communism, and much of the Third World was anti-Semitic, along with large 
portions of the US intellectual community; therefore the US and Israel shared a common ideological 
struggle against common enemies.250
The historical neoconservative commitment to Israel has been so pronounced that even traditional 
conservatives like Russell Kirk have charged them with mistaking “Tel Aviv for the capital of the 
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United States”.251 Similarly, Patrick Buchanan, who had been sceptical of the need for war with Iraq 
and challenged George Bush for the 1992 Republican presidential nomination, commented that 
neoconservative “tactics – including the smearing of opponents as racists, nativists, fascists, and anti-
Semites – left many conservatives wondering if we hadn't made a terrible mistake when we brought 
these ideological vagrants in off the street and gave them a place by the fire.”252 These comments 
sparked a debate over whether or not Buchanan was anti-Semitic.253
Notice that the support for Israel above any other countries is not a theme that can be explained as a 
consequence of a manifestation or affirmation of an overall socio-historical discourse of American 
identity. This suggests the relevance of the specific world-views of actors within neoconservatism. As 
we will see below and in chapter 3, there are examples of manifestations of discourse within the war on 
terrorism that confirm the importance of this idea, mostly shown through the open and strong support 
of the US government to Israel as well as a certain confrontational attitude towards Islam and Arabs. 
The point is that this connection highlights the influence of elite factions with particular ideologies in 
the formation of the discourse.
3.2 Philosophical and ideological origins
3.2.1 Leo Strauss
If we only read the above summary of neoconservative ideas we could be excused for believing with 
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John Samples that neoconservatism has been “as much about politics as principles. ...They believed 
that the striving for national greatness would appeal to American idealism and create a new Republican 
majority.”254 Even if we do not share those ideals, we would be forced to conclude that it is a form of 
idealism, and indeed, several commentators do so. Nonetheless, there is an alternative interpretation of 
one of the possible philosophical origins of neoconservatism which must be mentioned, for it would 
disclose the connection between the will to power and the will to truth that Foucault identified.
While some political analysts think of the University of Chicago professor Leo Strauss as the 
intellectual inspiration for neoconservatives (some studied with him or with lecturers that followed his 
ideas in the 1960s),255 others claim that his influence is exaggerated and that there is no direct link 
between him and positions of power in Washington.256 According to James Mann,257 among the 
intellectual heirs of Strauss we find William Kristol, William Bennett, Francis Fukuyama, Harvard 
University Professor Harvey Mansfield and a few officials in the Pentagon and national security 
community; while Paul Wolfowitz thought of Strauss as a unique and irreplaceable figure. In 2002, the 
former ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick remarked in an interview that “Wolfowitz is still a 
leading Straussian”,258 although Wolfowitz himself disliked “the label [Straussian], because I don’t like 
labels all that much”.259 Modern neoconservatives generally write in good terms about Strauss, but they 
also deny that they owe any debt to him, and some even say they are not familiar with his work.
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However, while his importance may indeed be overstated, we can find parallels between his 
perspectives and those of neoconservatives, and thus the link should be considered as a possible 
influence or background. This is not to suggest neither that all neoconservatives are following Strauss, 
nor that those who do are following him consistently nor methodically, but to recognize that some 
influential neoconservatives in and with links to the Bush administration have connections to 
Straussianism in their published works, statements, attitudes and policy perspectives.260
Strauss used classical texts – not only the Greek, but also Christian, Jewish and Muslim sacred writings 
– to comment on modern tyrannies, which he thought were the product of modernity's rejection of the 
values of classical societies that were hierarchically ordered and supported in religiosity. Strauss 
believed democracy could not enforce its own paradigm if it could not confront tyranny, which he 
believed was inherently expansionist. He argued that the European emphasis on human reason deriving 
from the Enlightenment represented a decline in religion-based values and not an advance, deploring a 
secular political order for its “movement away from the recognition of a superhuman authority –
whether of revelation based on Divine will or a natural order – to a recognition of the exclusively 
human based authority of the State.”261 James Mann identifies as one of Strauss’ core ideas “a 
denunciation of the spirit of moral tolerance that, he argued, had come to dominate intellectual life in 
Europe and the United States”. He points out that Strauss was worried about relativism and liberalism 
because they could degenerate into “the easygoing belief that all points of view are equal (hence, none 
really worth passionate argument, deep analysis or stalwart defense) and then into the strident belief 
that anyone who argues for the superiority of a distinctive moral insight, way of life, or human type is 
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somehow elitist or antidemocratic – and hence immoral”.262
As with neoconservatism, such a position reveals a concern for principles and moral values. 
Nevertheless, the significance of these values seems to be exclusively pragmatic – even nihilistic. In a 
more sophisticated interpretation of Strauss, Jim George argues that to the emphasis on national and 
cultural unity and the simple religious and philosophical morality, we would have to add as part of 
Strauss’s legacy to neoconservatism a “war culture” as the basis for that unity, along with the notion 
that “elite rule is crucial” and the belief that “the neoconservative elite has the right and indeed the 
obligation to lie to the masses in order that the ‘right’ political and strategic decisions be made and 
implemented. Hence, the use of the so-called ‘noble lie’.”263
According to George, Strauss was not the conventional conservative philosopher that he appears to be; 
instead, he was a philosophical nihilist influenced by Carl Schmitt, Heidegger and a particular reading 
of Nietzsche. For Strauss,
the fundamental truth of the Western philosophical tradition is a nihilist truth: that all morality, 
all notions of justice, all distinctions between good and evil are actually matters of power and 
interpretation and political ideology – not metaphysical or theological irreducibility... 
Consequently, in the most natural and most just regimes the cleverest and strongest should rule 
the weak, for the good of society as a whole. [The ancient scholars guarded and concealed this 
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knowledge], hence their reliance on esoteric deception as a way of protecting themselves.264
[Emphasis added]
If George is correct, it is here where the will to power is being made explicit within this particular form 
of political philosophical. What is of interest for us is the possibility that the misrepresentations of facts 
that can be detected in the war on terrorism might be to some extent an application of the idea of ‘noble 
lies’, rather than mere crude lies. It is now generally regarded as part of the historical record that the 
case for the war on Iraq was built on false connections to the 11 September attacks and unreliable 
evidence of weapons of mass destruction.265
This interpretation would explain why Strauss thought that the development of a new breed of ruling 
intellectuals – modern “philosopher kings” – was vital. They would project a hidden (“esoteric”) truth 
based on simple moral precepts for modern societies to be able to face tyranny. The elite would be a 
necessity, since in his view, democracy:
had become little more than a vulgar and futile attempt to create equality in a naturally unequal 
world... This clearly troubled Strauss, to the extent that, among many other things, he shared 
with Nietzsche the belief that ‘the history of western civilization has led to the triumph of the 
inferior’. A prospect that terrified them both.266
Therefore, the intellectual elite would need to tell “noble lies” not only to people but also to powerful 
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politicians. George observes that in 2000 William Kristol implicitly recognized this when he explained 
that a major teaching of Strauss was that no political position was really based on the truth.267
Strauss also advocated a reawakening of “a reverence for myth and transcendental illusion among the 
masses.” Again, George’s argument seems to find confirmation by another Kristol – Irving – who 
acknowledged that the neoconservative movement had taken up the Straussian strategy of “explicit and 
strong support for religion – even if such support contradicted one's own atheism”. Thus, according to 
Kristol, “neoconservatives are pro-religion even though they themselves may not be believers”; a 
position that has been described as “noble hypocrisy” by Ronald Bailey.268
Another commentator of Strauss, Shadia Drury, shares George’s interpretation and argues that Strauss 
admired the ancients because in his view, “they believed that society needs an elite of philosophers or 
intellectuals to manufacture "noble lies" for the consumption of the masses.”269 She also notes that like 
Marx, Strauss believed that religion was the opium of the masses, but unlike him, Strauss believed that 
masses needed opium.270 Drury elaborates:
Strauss’s elitism is among the most radical that has ever been encountered in the history of 
Western thought. Woven throughout Strauss’s philosophy is the theme of the dramatic gap 
between the wise and the vulgar. The wise are those who are capable of experiencing the truth 
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in peace, whereas the vulgar are destroyed by it. The wise are capable of living happily in the 
face of the naked truth, whereas the vulgar need noble delusions. The wise are those who 
fabricate the noble lies, the vulgar are those who consume them.271
In the interpretation espoused by George and Drury, another form of myth that would need to be 
created for the sake of the unity of the populace is that of an enemy to fight, “so that they can be 
reminded of the meaningfulness and precariousness of their culture and polity.”272 Here we see further 
parallels with the current discourse of the war on terrorism, a ‘war’ that from this interpretation of 
Strauss is not only waged against the external, but also against the domestic forces of individualism, 
historicism and relativism.273
An argument could be made for a third possible interpretation: that Strauss did believe in the intrinsic 
value of truth and morality, but that they faced such a threat from tyrannical forces in politics and 
relativism in political science, that the intellectual elite had no option but to make use of any means, 
even those that the ‘vulgar’ would not approve of, such as lying. Ultimately, what makes the difference 
in the various interpretations of Strauss is whether his primary concern was the elite retaining its 
privileges or the well-being of society in general. However, in terms of the practical application of his 
thought the end result would be the same; an enlightened elite would still be required to take any 
necessary steps to lead the population to the desired goal, including the presentation of morals/myths or 
lies for a ‘noble’ purpose.
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The above discussion begs for another clarification: the distinction between Foucauldian discourse and 
myth. In its general common connotation, a myth is a symbolic religious narrative of gods or 
superhuman beings; by extension, the word can also have a looser sense to refer to an ideological belief 
which is pursued with quasireligious faith.274 It is apparent that the latter is the usage that Strauss was 
making of the word, which contrasts with the wider implications of discourse as the rules of formation 
that determine what becomes ‘truth’. Like ideologies, myths are particular manifestations of discourse, 
and as such are both instruments and objects of power.275
3.2.2 The analytical and ethical relevance of lies for the discourse of the war on terrorism
That a network of power engages in misrepresentation of facts, creation of myths and the use of lies 
(whether crude or ‘noble’) is not something foreseen as part of the process of the production of a 
discourse within Foucauldian thought. Foucault was not interested in either the truth of statements or 
their meaning, but rather in the rules of formation that determine the objects, concepts, operations and 
options of a particular discourse.276 While Foucault was likely aware of deceit and lying as factors in 
political power in its form of domination, if we remain within the limits of his proposed method we 
find no place for a discussion of lies and their role in discourse. But we cannot ignore them as historical 
                                                
274 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropedia, Knowledge in Depth, (15th Edition, 2002, Volume 24): 715
275 An interesting avenue of reflection on possible further implications of myth for ideology and discourse may be 
provided by the work of Roland Barthes, who contended that myth in a bourgeois society is “depoliticized speech”. By 
‘political’, Barthes meant the whole of human relations in their real social structure and “power of making the world”. 
Thus, the function of the myth is to rid things of the contingent and historical and make them innocent while providing a 
natural and eternal justification. Roland Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, in John Storey (ed.), Cultural Theory and Popular 
Culture: A Reader, (UK: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006): 301
276 Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986 [1982]: 49-50, quoted in Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe 
and Zizek (UK: Blackwell, 1999): 90
119
elements in the production of the discourse of the war on terrorism; as well as the possible influence of 
Strauss’ notion of the ‘noble lie’. The subject of lies suggests itself repeatedly while searching for the 
specificities of the discourse, thus stressing again the importance of agency, plus the disproportionality 
of the discourse in relation to facts. These are points that I argue in more detail in chapter 3.
Furthermore, there is an ethico-political implication of stressing the appearance of lies. Even in 
Foucault there is a personal ethics of agency and refusal concerning everyday matters and mundane 
governing practices; a possibility of freedom on an individual level by changing the way we think of 
ourselves and our lives. Foucault said that he was more interested in “politics as an ethics” than politics 
itself.  Following Foucault, one may be more suspicious about more things, but one also has more 
opportunities to practice freedom, to exercise one's inventiveness, to assert possibilities and, therefore, 
to change oneself.277 His norms are expressed in a desire to challenge possible abuses of power; any 
form of government “must be subject to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated, 
voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable.”278
It is clear then that repeatedly pointing out the instances in which the abuse of power takes place 
through the intentional use of lies would fulfil a Foucauldian ethic. Perhaps Foucault never considered
this strategy as a form of resistance to domination, but the repeating practice of lying within the context 
of the war on terror requires it.
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3.3 Neoconservatism in Historical Perspective
Earlier in this chapter I have argued that the network of power is neither monolithic nor well defined; 
that it does not have a permanent hold of power and it suffers transformations as its members occupy 
different positions throughout time; and that in this sense power functions within the network like a 
currency exchanging hands without stability or guarantee – a point of view that  somehow resembles 
Foucault’s notion of capillary power, with the difference that here I am referring to a specific political 
elite. By reviewing the history of neoconservatism I intend to show that the power of this network has 
indeed fluctuated and has been marked by discontinuities as a result of historical contingency.
A second objective for the narrative that follows is to highlight again the ideas that have made echo in 
the discourse of the war on terrorism, thus stressing the role of agency of a network of power capable 
of intervening in the production of the discourse, even if only partially.
Finally, by describing the groups that compose the network – groups identified as part of 
neoconservatism, the Bush administration, the Israel lobby or Christian conservatives – and their 
connections, I hope to show how their ideas resonate with each other. 
3.3.1 Origins
Social and political difficulties forced some liberal intellectuals to reconsider their positions by 
rejecting what they considered to be excesses of radicalism and hubris from reformists. This resulted in 
a split in US liberalism at the beginning of the 1970s. The parting intellectuals confounded their 
colleagues on the left who accused them of turning to the right, and at first were called “new 
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conservatives”, changing later into “neoconservatives”. 279
The break came in large part because they saw a threat in mounting social disorders and what they 
thought of as wishful thinking in foreign affairs, isolating themselves within the Democratic Party. 
Most of the New York liberal community was Jewish, and so they were also disturbed by what they 
saw as a sharp increase in anti-Semitism from the black community – even when hard evidence to back 
up this claim was scarce. They also believed that criticism from the New Left of the 1967 war Israeli 
victory and accusations of oppression of Arabs were another form of anti-Semitism.280
The leading neoconservatives – Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and 
Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, Midge Decter, Michael Novak, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Peter Berger and 
others – were veterans of the so-called vital centre of anti-Communist ideology. They rejected détente 
as a failure to stand against the evils of communism,281 argued that the defeat in Vietnam had led the 
Democratic party to go soft on national security, and endorsed Ronald Reagan because he promised to 
renew efforts in the struggle with the Soviets. 282
3.3.2 The Committee on the Present Danger and Team B
In March 1976, Republican and Democratic hardliners established the Committee on the Present 
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Danger (CPD). It was led by Richard Allen, William Casey, Max Kampelman, Paul Nitze, Richard 
Perle, Norman Podhoretz, Eugene Rostow, and Elmo Zumwalt, and it included Paul Wolfowitz, Donald 
Rumsfeld, Kenneth Adelman and Richard Pipes. It supported the Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and 
Ronald Reagan warning that coexistence with the Soviet Union as promoted by Henry Kissinger had 
dangerously turned the US into a weaker power than the Soviet Union. Its purpose was to destroy 
détente and the Jimmy Carter administration, and ‘sell’ the Soviet threat scenario as presented by Team 
B, an alternative hard-line group of outside experts to the CIA appointed that year by the agency’s new 
director, George H. W. Bush.
The thesis of both CPD and Team B was that the US must reject all ‘appeasement’ strategies, abandon 
arms control and engage in military build up to overwhelm all threats in any foreseeable future.283
Team B consisted of three groups: one analyzed Soviet low-altitude air defence capabilities, another 
studied Soviet ICBM accuracy, and the last one focused on Soviet strategic objectives. It was the last 
one, chaired by Pipes and including Wolfowitz as one of its members, which triggered controversy, 
earning the name Team B exclusively. This group believed that the Soviets had built their forces to 
fight and win a nuclear war – not to deter one – by gaining a strategic superiority that would deny the 
US any effective retaliatory options. This was the chief argument in their report, issued a month after 
Carter won the presidency; an argument that was promulgated as a factual imperative by the CPD.284
Notice that the belief in the USSR preparing for nuclear war instead of deterrence, as well as the name 
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of the committee itself, have been reproduced in the theme of the discourse of the war on terrorism 
about an era of unprecedented danger.
3.3.3 The Reagan Administration
A sign of how much Ronald Reagan valued the work of the Committee on the Present Danger was the 
fact that no less than thirty of its members received appointments to his administration in 1980, twenty 
of them in national security posts.285
Reagan entered office sharing their belief that previous administrations had neglected the nation’s 
defences and been too passive in the face of Soviet expansionism.286 Likewise, the neoconservatives 
believed that they had a president who shared their view of the world, and whose victory proved that 
US citizens had come to share their views of the present danger.287
Jean Kirkpatrick was appointed ambassador to the UN because of her articles published at 
Commentary. Elliott Abrams, Daniel Patrick Moynihan's former assistant, was made assistant secretary 
of state for international organizations. Richard Perle became assistant secretary of Defence for 
international security policy, and played one of the most skilful and influential roles among 
neoconservative policy-makers. Max Kampelman, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger 
remained head of the American delegation to the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe, an appointment he had received from Carter in 1980.288
For two years Paul Wolfowitz ran the State Department's policy planning staff in the administration, 
working out the department’s long-term goals. His staff included Francis Fukuyama, Alan Keyes, 
Zalmay Khalilzad, and James Roche. Later, Wolfowitz became Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs.289
Through their declarations, neoconservatives contributed to the initial image of Reagan in the way he 
was regarded outside the US. They came rapidly to be seen, especially by outsiders, as the foreign 
policy specialists of Reagan, largely because other members of the right wing were oriented to 
domestic issues.290 From her position in the UN, Kirkpatrick consistently supported Israel in the 
Security Council and the General Assembly against “an ongoing process whose goals are to 
delegitimize... [Israel and] to deny it the right to self-Defence, to secure borders, to survival.” After the 
invasion of Grenada Kirkpatrick told the Security Council that “the [UN] charter does not require that 
people submit supinely to terror, nor that their neighbours be indifferent to their terrorization.” She 
applied the argument in other situations. “We do not think it is moral to leave small countries and 
helpless people defenceless against conquest by violent minorities”, she said of El Salvador in 1984. 
Following Kirkpatrick’s lead, Abrams portrayed Communism as the greatest threat to human rights.291
From their point of view for reasons of Soviet structure and politics, the conflict between Moscow and 
Washington was not susceptible of mitigation, but had to end with the death or transformation of one or 
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other of the two countries.292
For the first three years the declarations coming from Reagan were what the neoconservatives would 
have wished. Reagan asserted that Soviet leaders were masters of an “evil empire” prepared “to commit 
any crime, to lie, to cheat” in order to achieve a Communist world. In a display of Anti-Communism, 
Reagan rejected détente and claimed that an expansionist USSR “underlies all the unrest that is going 
on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world.” He 
identified the Soviets as the source of Third World disorders and he committed the US to the active 
support of anti-Communist movements around the world, such as the contras in Nicaragua and the 
Afghan rebels.293 However, Reagan’s declarations disguised the fact that his actions did not match his 
words. This may explain in part why differences between some neoconservatives and Reagan 
developed in the later years.294
The reason for the gap between words and actions is most probably that anti-Communism and threat 
exaggeration serve as vehicles for forging US unity at home – and identity – particularly in times of 
domestic crisis. Thomas G. Patterson notes that
Given these characteristics [of creation of unity], leaders who have developed views of a 
malevolent Communism that preys upon a vulnerable world may not shift their views, even in 
the face of abundant evidence that Communism is not the omnipresent force they imagine. 
Because leaders work to maintain consistency in their ideas, they will often ignore 
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contradictions, cling to exaggerations, and become intransigent.295
What is interesting about this observation is the parallel that may be drawn with today’s 
neoconservative exaggerations of the threat of global terrorism; other commentators, like John 
Samples, have already noticed the similarities.296 Both ‘wars’ also remind us of Strauss’s idea of the 
creation of myths to encourage social unity and purpose.
Neoconservatives who were unhappy with Reagan, such as Norman Podhoretz, Frank Gaffney, and 
Michael Ledeen outflanked him to the right. From the early years of Reagan’s presidency Podhoretz 
bitterly complained that Reagan, despite his rhetoric, huge military expenditures, and appointment of 
neoconservatives, capitulated to the Soviets.297 He became progressively more disillusioned as he 
realized that Reagan was not consumed with defeating Communism but instead was acting cautiously. 
In Podhoretz’s view, anything less than total victory was equivalent to defeat and he bitterly denounced 
Reagan for his compromises.298 In 1981 Irving Kristol complained that no new, stronger measures had 
taken the place of the grain embargo imposed on the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan; he 
worried that the administration's declared commitment to preventing a leftist revolution in El Salvador 
was not being matched by actions; and that arms sales to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, respectively, were 
not helping the Afghans and were a threat to Israel.
Other neoconservatives resisted the attacks, relieving Reagan of responsibility and blaming a series of 
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his officials for the shortcomings.299 In spite of Podhoretz and others, most neoconservatives retain an 
admiration of Reagan nowadays, considering him the exemplar of all the virtues they defend.300 The 
Reagan legacy is clearly present in the outgoing Bush administration. Dick Cheney has said that “it was 
the vision and the will of Ronald Reagan that gave hope to the oppressed, shamed the oppressors and 
ended an evil empire,”301 while Edwin Feulner, president of the far-right Heritage Foundation happily 
described the Bush Jr. administration as “more Reaganite than the Reagan administration”.302
Ikenberry writes:
New fundamentalists are inspired by a particular view of how the Cold War was won – and it is 
their lessons from their great victory that guide their strategy today. It was not engagement, 
détente, 'paper' agreements and mutual interest that brought the Soviet Union down, but the 
Reagan administration's hard-line policy of confrontation, military build up and ideological 
warfare. Reagan raised the stakes in the struggle with the Soviet Union by boosting military 
spending and putting ideological pressure on the 'evil empire'. This [flawed] historical narrative 
provides the ultimate defence for hard-line fundamentalist policies.303
After their overall successes with Reagan, neoconservatives also began a generational transition from 
liberalism to mainstream conservatism, while maintaining an identity apart from that traditional 
                                                
299 Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: 12
300 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: 11
301 Cited in John Samples, The Rise and Fall of conservative Reform in the United States: 97
302 Joel D. Aberbach, ‘The Political Significance of the George W. Bush Administration’, Social Policy & 
Administration, 39-2 (April 2005): 135
303 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment’: 16, 17
128
southern and midwestern US conservatism. Younger neoconservatives and analysts like Abrams, 
William Kristol and Charles Krauthammer began to assume the leadership positions long held by 
Irving Kristol, Podhoretz, and Kirkpatrick.304 The second generation of neoconservatives, which also 
included Alan Keys, Francis Fukuyama, Gary Schmitt, Abram Shulsky and Wolfowitz, was much more 
explicitly indebted to Strauss.305
3.3.4 The Bush Sr. Administration and the First Gulf War
After serving as vice president with Reagan, George H. W. Bush became president himself. Various 
members of his staff would later serve again under his son’s administration in 2000. Colin Powell, for 
example, was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Bush Sr. while Dick Cheney was secretary of 
Defence.306 The latter was the only hardline cold warrior in the administration’s top rank. While most 
of his colleagues believed in Gorbachev, Cheney thought that the Soviet Union was still a mortal 
enemy and that glasnost was a trick to disarm the US. He cultivated a team of hardliners in the 
Pentagon's policy directorate, led by Paul Wolfowitz.
Powell, the former national security advisor with Reagan, was committed no less than Cheney to 
maintaining and strengthening America’s global military dominance. However, unlike Cheney, he 
believed that the Cold War was over, and wanted the American military to have maximum flexibility in 
order to focus on regional trouble spots. For him, the US had to be “the world’s global police force.” 
                                                
304 John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: 173, 174, 185
305 Jim George, ‘Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy’: 185
306 Larry Berman and Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘Bush and the Post-Cold-War World: New Challenges for American 
Leadership’, in Colin Campbell, S.J. and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals (N.J.: Chatham 
House Publishers, c1991.): 102
129
Part of his plan included military expenditure cuts. While Cheney and Wolfowitz did not agree with 
Powell on the reduction in military spending, the three of them designed a military policy based on 
responding to regional contingencies instead of a global war with the Soviet Union.  However, the 
presentation of the new policy coincided with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, pushing the plan to the 
background.307
The Bush administration had pushed a resolution through the UN Security Council setting a 15 January 
1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and authorizing any member state to use “all 
necessary means” after the date. Bush claimed that with the UN resolution in hand and on the basis of 
his constitutional authority he could go to war after the deadline without a formal declaration of war by 
the Congress, and so the first attacks on Baghdad came on January 16.
During the six months of US deployments in the Gulf, several different justifications were given by the 
administration at different points; among them, getting rid of “a mad dictator”,  defending the “oil-
lifeline threatened”; the protection of freedom, liberty, national security, and jobs; the restoration of 
“rulers to Kuwait”, and defence against Saddam Hussein’s “nuclear threat”.308 The justifications given 
by the son for the Second Gulf War echo the father’s. Just as Bush Jr.’s discourse spoke of the war 
within the context of a global war, i.e. the war on terrorism, Bush Sr.’s had also a vision for the world. 
It was with the First Gulf War that Bush Sr. began to speak of a “new world order”: 
What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea – a new world order where 
diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of 
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mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.309
And: 
[The war was waged] to defend civilized values around the world... a world where the rule of 
law supplants the rule of the jungle... I've had a lot of time to think about the situation in the 
Middle East, I've reconciled all the moral issues. It's black versus white, good versus evil.
In another speech he added a religious dimension by declaring that the Gulf War coalition was “on the 
side of God”.310 Likewise, the language of the discourse of the war on terrorism is often loaded with 
religious connotations and portrays the situation in ‘black and white’ terms. Recall Bush Jr.’s 
declaration in the sense that every nation had to choose to be either with the terrorists or with the US.311
Charles Krauthammer took the US led response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a reminder that 
Western security still depended on Washington’s lead. “Where the United States does not tread, the 
alliance does not follow,” he wrote. He estimated that a new and major problem would be that 
advanced weapons technologies would enable “relatively small, peripheral, and backward states... to 
emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional but to world security,” so the US would have to be 
prepared “to act alone [against these threats], backed by as many of its allies as will join”. Similarly, 
Elliott Abrams advocated a US role centred on using its preponderance of power to enforce 
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international norms of conduct, much as Great Britain’s during the nineteenth century.312
Norman Podhoretz welcomed the Gulf War as an opportunity for the US to ‘remoralize’ itself after the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the loss of a necessary ‘foreign demon’ as a focus of national unity and 
moral commitment.313 His concern with morality for the purposes of national strength in the face of an 
alien threat reminds us again of the political theory of Strauss.
However, Bush’s failure to end the war with the removal of Saddam Hussein became a regular 
complaint in neoconservative publications such as Commentary; we get an insight of what they wished 
for the Middle East a decade before it would materialize.314 Indeed, it appears that the US invasion of 
Iraq of 2003, which occurred in the context of the discourse of the war on terrorism, was at least in part 
motivated by the desire to finally fulfil the objective of removing Hussein from power.
Another cause of neoconservative discontent with the Bush administration was its policies toward 
Israel. In 1992, the Bush administration demanded from Tel Aviv that a $10 billion in US loan 
guarantees to Israel not be used in the building of settlements in the occupied territories. Jean 
Kirkpatrick suggested that this marked a point of departure from traditional US support for Israel. 
Frustrated by the Israelis as well as their political allies in the US, Secretary of State James A. Baker 
lost his temper, “Fuck the Jews. They didn't vote for us,” he said in a private remark which was leaked 
to the press. In this atmosphere, some neoconservatives would later find Bill Clinton an attractive 
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alternative presidential candidate.315
To stress the point again, the continuous examples of unconditional support for Israel suggest that the 
network of power has unique ideological characteristics which are not necessarily shared by a wider 
discourse of American identity.
3.3.5 The 1992 Defence Planning Guidance
The document that is generally taken to be the basis for the so-called Bush (Jr.) Doctrine guiding the 
post September 11, 2001 war on terrorism is the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) of 1992, ordered 
by Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney, supervised by Pentagon Undersecretary for Policy Paul 
Wolfowitz and prepared by his team. It had the input of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, 
Andrew Marshall, Richard Perle, Eric Edelman and Albert Wohlstetter. The DPG was a military plan 
for fiscal years 1994 through 1999. It was never officially finalized, but it was leaked to the Washington 
Post and the New York Times. 
The strategy declared the US’ right to wage preemptive wars – the word “preempt” was actually 
included – to avoid attacks with weapons of mass destruction or to punish aggressors. It called for a 
global missile defence system and a “U.S.-led system for collective security”. It opposed the 
development of nuclear programs in other countries while asserting the US’ need to maintain a strong 
nuclear arsenal. The DPG warned the US might have to take “military steps to prevent the development 
or use of weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and India. It warned that 
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allowing Japan or South Korea to grow into regional powers would be destabilizing in East Asia, and 
judged that the US needed to thwart Germany’s aspirations for leadership in Europe and restrain India’s 
“hegemonic aspirations” in South Asia. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the overall objective 
was “to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to 
the region's oil.” It also cautioned that a Russian relapse was a dangerous possibility. 
In short, the US had to become so powerful militarily that no other power or coalition of powers could 
any longer prevent it shaping the world in its own image.316
Since the report was leaked, Bush Sr. and Cheney were forced to distance themselves from it, but it was 
later published as the Regional Defence Strategy of 1993. Its promotion of preemptive military action 
in Iraq suggests that it became policy in 2002, although Wolfowitz acknowledges that he personally 
started worrying about Iraq in 1979.317 Again, the parallels with some of the themes of the discourse of 
the war on terrorism are evident. Let us not forget that the 2003 Iraq war was to a great extent justified 
as part of the war on terrorism.
3.3.6 The Clinton Administration
During the decade of the 1990s neoconservatism seemed to fade because it was no longer in the 
administration. Also, it was identified with the bygone debates of the Cold War and it merged to some 
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degree with mainstream conservatism.318 This period is an example of the historical contingency to 
which the neoconservative faction has been subjected.
Though for some neoconservatives Bill Clinton seemed at first a good alternative to Bush, soon his 
administration became a disappointment, and so they accused him of not being a true moderate 
Democrat but, rather, a left winger disguising himself to win the election. In foreign affairs, 
neoconservatives began attacking the president in the spring of 1993, criticizing his apparent 
acquiescence in the stagnation of multilateralism and his unwillingness to use military force. The 
Kosovo experience led the neoconservatives to conclude that the NATO alliance was more a hindrance 
than a help. They focused on Clinton’s failure to rescue the Bosnians. His indecision led the 
neoconservatives to worry that foreign governments might perceive the US as turning isolationist and 
weakening militarily.319
The editors of the New Republic were also unhappy with Clinton’s softness toward Saddam Hussein: 
they thought the president had an “obsession” with UN requirements and “legalism”. Paul Wolfowitz 
stressed that the real questions facing US foreign policy were not being addressed, such as future 
threats from “‘backlash states’ like North Korea, Iraq and Iran...”.320 Notice the mention of states that 
would later be labelled as part of the ‘axis of evil’ that Bush would warn about after September 11, 
2001. 
With mounting anger Wolfowitz fixated on Iraq in the mid-1990s, fuelling a campaign to rectify the 
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unfinished business. He warned that Saddam was too dangerous to be contained, because with his 
stockpile of biological weapons “he could kill the entire population of the world”. In 1997 Wolfowitz 
and Khalilzad demanded Saddam’s overthrow by the US and its Iraqi allies. They wrote: “If we are 
serious about dismantling Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, and preventing him from building 
more, we will have to confront him sooner or later – and sooner would be better.”321
The disappointment and aspirations of neoconservatism were expressed by William Kristol, who wrote 
that conservatism 
ought to emphasize both personal and national responsibility, relish the opportunity for national 
engagement, embrace the possibility of national greatness, and restore a sense of the heroic, 
which has been sorely lacking in American foreign policy – and American conservatism – in 
recent years. 
The revival of the heroic required a “remoralization of American foreign policy” that recognized that 
the principles of the Declaration of Independence were “universal, enduring, ‘self evident’ truths.”322
3.3.7 The Project for the New American Century
William Kristol and Robert Kagan founded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 
1997, an indication that neoconservatism had completed a generational transition. Kagan, Kristol, 
Muravchik, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and others had assumed leadership roles that had been held 
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by Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Norman Podhoretz. The terms of their 
debate shifted replacing the Soviet threat with a broad idea of “American global leadership” and an 
intent above all else on waging a second Gulf-War.
The members of the PNAC had strong links to the national security bureaucracy, the Defence 
establishment, the print and cable media industry, dominant sections of the US Defence industry, and 
some of America’s wealthiest conservative foundations. A large portion of the signatories, such as 
Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, Bennett, Dick Cheney, Eliot Cohen, Aaron Friedberg, Frank Gaffney, Fred
Ikle, Zalmay Khalilzad, Jean Kirkpatrick, Dan Quayle, Peter Rodman, Henry Rowen, Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz had served in the Reagan and Bush senior administrations. Others had 
worked for the CIA, such as Reuel Marc Gerecht and James Woolsey, the agency’s director from 1993 
to 1995. Among the intellectual members were Francis Fukuyama, Donald Kagan, Podhoretz and 
Midge Decter. Also in the PNAC were Jeb Bush, brother of the current president, and Perle.
In February 1998 Wolfowitz told the House International Relations Committee that regime change in 
Iraq was the “only way to rescue the region and the world from the threat that will continue to be posed 
by Saddam’s unrelenting effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction...” That month an open letter 
was sent to the White House suggesting a strategy for bringing down the Iraqi regime, and another one 
in May with a similar message was addressed to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority 
Leader.
Among the signatories of the letter to Clinton were Abrams, Richard Armitage, John R. Bolton, 
Douglas Feith, Khalilzad, Perle, Peter Rodman, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, David Wurmser and Dov 
Zakheim, Graffney, Kagan, Kristol, Muravchik, Martin Peretz, and Leon Wieseltier. They called 
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themselves the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf.323 Of the 18 people who signed the 
PNAC letter to Clinton, eleven became part of the Bush administration.324 Thus it is natural to expect 
that the objectives of the PNAC would be reflected in discourses related to the administration.
The PNAC is not the only influential neoconservative organization. The American Enterprise Institute, 
for example, sits on the three floors above the headquarters of the PNAC in Washington, and has a 
tradition of extensive associations with the top levels of government. AEI’s interaction with 
government circles has included George H. W. Bush, Gerald Ford, and ex Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak 
Shamir. Kirkpatrick, Ledeen, Muravchik, Perle Wattenberg, and Wurmser are all members.
In the financial network organizations such as the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the John M. 
Olin Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Castle Rock 
Foundation all provide the money for research institutions such as AEI, the Heritage Foundation, and 
the Hoover Institute – the latter includes Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice among its alumni, and 
several of the institute’s fellows sit on the Defence Policy Board.325
3.3.8 The Rise of the Bush Jr. Administration and the Bush Doctrine
When George W. Bush came to power in 2000 an alliance between the two generations of 
neoconservatives was evident.326 For weeks, while the 2000 election verdict was being decided 
between the Florida Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court, the Weekly Standard fiercely 
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contended that Bush should be president. Meanwhile, the neoconservatives got very good 
appointments, thanks to Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld.327 John P. Burke reported that planning 
for the Bush administration commenced a year and a half before a possible inauguration and that the 
Bush team, particularly Karl Rove, drew on the experiences of the 1980 Reagan transition.328
In the Bush administration we find the following individuals: Dick Cheney, Vice President; Lewis 
Libby, Chief of Staff until his resignation in late 2005; Eric Edelman, Foreign Policy Advisor; Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence until 2006; Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defence until his 
departure and appointment as head of the World Bank; Doug Feith, Under-Secretary of Defence 
(Policy); Steven Hadley, Deputy to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and later Secretary of 
State replacing Collin Powell; John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and later 
ambassador to the UN; Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defence Advisory Board, until his resignation 
in March 2003; Zalmay Khalilizad, special envoy to Afghanistan and Iraq; an Paul Kozemcheak, 
Defence Department in charge of ‘radical innovation’ in Defence planning. Others connected to these 
individuals in the administration include Abram Shulsky, Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Special 
Plans; and Stephen Cambone, Under Secretary of Defence (Intelligence). Both are at the centre of the 
concern about spurious intelligence to justify the Iraq war.329
The ‘Bush Doctrine’ which emerged after September 11, 2001 resonates with neoconservative 
perspectives, almost word for word. It is characterized by its support for the use of overwhelming force 
in the face of threat, even if potential. Pre-emption is an official strategic policy. There is an inclination 
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towards unilateralism, hostile attitudes towards global liberalism and its multilateral institutions, and an 
ideological representation of US’ exceptionalism. The doctrine also includes the idea that this is an 
opportune time to transform international politics and that peace and stability require the US to assert 
its primacy in world politics.330 The National Security Strategy of the US elaborates the doctrine by 
endorsing the idea of spreading freedom, democracy and free enterprise throughout the world.331
It appears that Kagan and Kristol’s book, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American 
Foreign and Defence Policy of 2000,332 as well as the 1992 Defence Planning Guidance were 
blueprints of the Bush Doctrine.333 Since they had been thinking about a strategy for years, the attacks 
of September 11 found the neoconservatives well prepared, with their response in place and targets 
fixed.334
In the eight months after the terrorist attacks, the already huge US defence budget received a 14 per 
cent increase,335 a sign that the military would be having a primary role, confirmed by the wars in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. These invasions are but the most visible effects of the Bush Doctrine so far, 
but the consequences have been profound in many other respects, some of which will be partially 
covered in further chapters in terms of discourse.
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4. The Israel lobby
What is called the US Israel “lobby” is not just the Jewish community, but also the major segments of 
liberal opinion, the leadership of the labour unions, religious fundamentalists, conservatives, and cold 
war warriors336 which strongly support Israel. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt define it as
a convenient short-hand term for the loose coalition of individuals and organizations who 
actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction... [While it is not a unified 
movement with a central leadership, its core] is comprised of American Jews who make a 
significant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances Israel's 
interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for candidates who are pro-Israel to include 
letter-writing, financial contributions, and supporting pro-Israel organizations. But not all 
Jewish-Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient issue for many of them... 
Jewish-Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key organizations in the 
Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), 
are run by hardliners who generally supported the expansionist policies of Israel's Likud Party, 
including its hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other hand, is 
more favorably disposed to making concessions to the Palestinians, and a few groups – such as 
Jewish Voice for Peace – strongly advocate such steps...337
Thus, it should be noted that the Israel lobby is far from encompassing the whole of the Jewish-
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American community. Nor is it a monolithic and clearly defined group. Furthermore, Mearsheimer and 
Walt observe that many members of the Israel lobby are not Jewish, but Christian evangelicals who 
believe that the state of Israel plays an important role in Biblical prophecy, and other non-Jews.338
The Israel lobby is closely connected to neoconservatism. Though there is no logical reason why 
neoconservatism should be linked to hardline Zionism, in fact it often is, mingling the neoconservative 
and Israel lobby networks and making them sometimes indistinguishable from each other. Naturally, 
both groups resonate with each other in a similar fashion as that described by Connolly, quoted 
previously in this chapter.339 Gary Dorrien writes:
Most unipolarist leaders were Jewish neoconservatives who took for granted that a militantly 
pro-Israel policy was in America’s interest. Wolfowitz, Perle, Podhoretz, Krauthammer, 
Wattenberg, Muravchik, both Kristols, Kagan, Boot, and Kaplan fit the description, as did 
dozens of neocons at all levels of the Bush administration from the Pentagon desk officers to 
State Department deputy secretaries and advisors in the vice president’s office. 
Some of these were members of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), founded in 
1976, which took a very hard line against the Palestinians and US diplomatic relations with Syria. 
According to Dorrien, JINSA has sometimes outflanked Israel’s Likud Party to the right. 
JINSA’s board of advisors before 2001 included Richard Perle, James Woolsey, Dick Cheney, John 
Bolton, and Douglas Feith, until they moved into the Bush administration. JINSA gave a voice to those 
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who wanted to see the US continue to provide Israel with ample support in case of another war in the 
Middle East. The Institute is now committed to argue in favour of the link between US National 
security and Israel’s security, as well as strengthening both. Since the 1970s, JINSA has grown to a 
highly connected and well-funded $1.4-million-a-year operation, much of which goes toward 
facilitating contact between Israeli officials and retired US generals and admirals with influence in 
Washington. Indeed, one of the military figures connected to JINSA was Jay Garner, the Bush 
administration’s first choice for the reconstruction of Iraq, and one of the signatories of the US 
Admirals’ and Generals’ Statement on Palestinian Violence, which stated: “We are appalled by the 
Palestinian political and military leadership that teaches children the mechanics of war while filling 
their heads with hate.”340
JINSA overlaps considerably with the Centre for Security Policy (CSP), another hardline Zionist 
organization. Both are underwritten largely by Irving Moskowitz, and their membership lists are 
interchangeable. The CSP is directed by Frank Gaffney, a Perle protégé, and it promotes wars for 
regime changes throughout the Middle East while stridently defending Israel’s settlements policy.341
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in the 1950s and with a 100,000 
members across the US, is mostly concerned about ensuring that Israel is strong enough to meet its 
security challenges. Its website boasts that publications such as The New York Times and Fortune have 
described it as one of the most powerful interest groups and the most important organization affecting 
the US’ relationship with Israel. It helps pass more than 100 pro-Israel legislative initiatives through 
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meetings with members of Congress.342
Other institutes lobbying for Israel include the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the 
Middle East Forum.343
The loyalty of the neoconservative Jews seems to be exclusively related to the Likud Party and the 
extreme right of Israeli politics344 – a trait that again highlights the importance of the specificities of the 
network of power. One of the most outstanding events to come out of this relationship was the 1996 
research paper published by the Israeli think tank the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political 
Studies, A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm. It was a policy guideline for Israeli 
Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu which argued that Netanyahu’s “new set of ideas” provided an 
opportunity “to make a clean break” with the afflicted Oslo peace process. The paper criticized the 
“land for peace” initiative and emphasized: “Our claim to the land – to which we have clung for hope 
for 2000 years – is legitimate and noble.” The “clean break” also meant re-establishing “the principle of 
preemption”. The study group that contributed to the report included JINSA member James Colbert, 
Charles Fairbanks, Feith, Perle, Jr., David Wurmser, and his wife Meyrav Wurmser.345 The document 
also called for the use of proxy armies to destabilize and overthrow Arab governments. It advocated 
Israeli attacks on Syrian military targets in Lebanon, and, if necessary, Syria. Since Iraq was an enemy 
of Israel, it asked Netanyahu to support Jordanian Hashemites in their challenges to Iraq’s borders.
Perle, Feith and Wurmser told Netanyahu, with whom they had close personal ties, that the US would 
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support a hard line against the Palestinians and a policy of “hot pursuit into Palestinian-controlled 
areas.” More important, Israel was under no obligation to honour the Oslo agreements if the Palestine 
Liberation Organization did not fulfil its obligations of compliance and accountability. The time had 
come to find alternatives to Arafat’s and Israel’s dependence on the US, they urged.346
No doubt that Netanyahu paid good attention to the words of neoconservatives, since shortly after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks he asked the US to smash Iraq, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian 
resistance. Neoconservatives added Syria, North Korea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan and 
Algeria.347
Bush’s announcement of 14 March 2003 of support for the road map for the peace in Palestine set off
the alarms among neoconservatives and the Israeli government. The issue was Bush’s degree of 
seriousness to promote the road map and the State Department’s suggestion of the creation of a 
Palestinian state by 2005. However, on several occasions Bush signalled that he was not serious, 
suggesting that the plan could be amended later. As for Colin Powell’s State Department’s critical 
stance towards the barrier separating Israel from the West Bank, the supporters of Israel won the match. 
Though Powell complained about Israel’s repression on Palestine and Bush asked Ariel Sharon to build 
the security barrier as close as possible to the Green Line, on October 1, 2003, Sharon resolved to cut 
deeply into the West Bank to protect the settlements, vowing to retain the major ones while 
withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. The Bush administration approved the decision and disavowed the 
Palestinian right of return. Though Sharon claimed to accept the goal of a two-state solution, its policy 
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sabotaged the possibility of a viable Palestinian state.348 This should serve as example of the effects of 
the work of the Israel lobby, a group with particular goals not necessarily linked to an overall discourse 
of American identity and security.
4.1 A note about the Israel-US relationship
The historical open support of the US towards the state of Israel is widely known and documented. 
Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of direct US economic and military assistance 
and the largest total recipient since World War II. The total direct US aid to that nation amounts to over 
$140 billion dollars (in 2003 dollars). Israel receives roughly a fifth of the yearly US foreign aid 
budget. Among other privileges, Israel is the only recipient of US aid that does not need to account for 
how the money is spent; it has received nearly $3 billion to develop weapons systems from the US; and 
enjoys access to intelligence that the US denies NATO allies. Furthermore, since 1982 the US has 
vetoed 32 UN Security Council resolutions that criticized Israel, a number larger than the combined 
total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members. The US has also blocked Arab states
efforts to put Israel's nuclear arsenal on the International Atomic Energy Agency's agenda.349
Less well known, because of their covert nature, are the paradoxical cases of espionage between these 
two countries. One such case is that of Jonathan Jay Pollard, a civilian analyst working for naval 
intelligence who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1986 for passing copies of secret documents to 
Israel. Shimon Peres, back then Israeli Foreign Minister, apologized and said it would not happen 
again. But the Israeli secret agents who had recruited Pollard and handled his material were 
                                                
348 Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: 208, 209, 212, 214
349 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’: 2, 3
146
promoted.350
AIPAC might also be involved in a case of espionage, according to revelations made to the media in 
August 2004. While working in the office of undersecretary of defence Douglas Feith, Larry Franklin 
was accused of transmitting information to AIPAC, which then forwarded it to Israel, about the White 
House's war plans for Iraq.351 Indeed, Franklin later admitted disclosing classified information related 
to Iran to a foreign official who was not authorized to receive it. Two former senior AIPAC staffers, 
Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman, and an official from the Israeli embassy, Naor Gilon, appeared to be 
the recipients.352 Franklin was indicted a month later, though the indictment made no mention of the 
AIPAC members involved, the foreign official, or his nationality.353
Likewise, Richard Perle, who functions as a link across many of the neoconservative think tanks, 
research institutions, and other organizations on the network,354 was, according to researcher Stephen 
Green, caught by the FBI in 1970 discussing classified information with an Israeli Embassy official. 
Wolfowitz was also investigated in 1978 for providing a classified document to an Israeli official via an 
AIPAC staffer on the proposed sale of a US weapons system to an Arab government.355
An interesting source of information about Israeli espionage on the US is the work of ex Mossad 
officer Victor Ostrovsky, who in 1990 wrote a book describing his experiences in the organisation. 
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While it is impossible to verify all of his claims, two facts suggest that he is telling a largely true story. 
The first one is the degree of detail of the accounts and descriptions in his books, which include 
reproductions of organisational charts and documents (administrative hierarchy, official and actual flow 
of intelligence, a layout of the Mossad Academy, a Mossad pay sheet, and others). The second is the 
fact that the Israeli government tried to ban the publication of his first book. According to The 
Washington Post, lawyers for the Israeli government argued that the publication could “endanger the
lives of various people in the employ of the state of Israel, and would be detrimental to the government 
of the state of Israel.”356 Four years later, when Ostrovsky had just published his second book on 
Mossad, Josef Lapid, the former general manager of the Israeli Broadcasting Corporation and a leading 
political commentator, requested on Israeli television that Mossad kill Ostrovsky. A few days later 
Lapid appeared on Canadian television and called for “a decent Jew in Canada” to assassinate him.357 It 
was Ostrovsky’s loyalty to Israel that was being challenged – not his credibility.
According to Ostrovsky, the CIA is wrong to believe that Mossad does not operate actively in the US 
itself. The ex agent declares that a secret division of Mossad called Al (Hebrew for “above”) employs 
between 24 and 27 veteran field personnel who work mostly within US borders: “Their primary task is 
to gather information on the Arab world and the PLO, as opposed to gathering intelligence about US 
activities. But... the dividing line is often blurred, and when in doubt, Al doesn't hesitate to cross over 
it.”358
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The paradox of a close alliance between the US and Israel tainted by cases of espionage should serve as 
a reminder that the network of support for Israel within the US – as well as neoconservatism – exists 
within a context of fluid, complex and unstable power relations, marked by historical contingency and 
discontinuities. It is not unreasonable to state that cases such as these have the potential to rearrange the 
configuration of power relations within the network.
5. Other Power Relations
5.1 Oil Industry
It is possible to speculate that the the real reasons for the war on Iraq had nothing to do with the threat 
posed by Saddam Hussein but with the desire to control Middle Eastern oil. If so, it would be logical to 
assume that economics played a major role. I do not believe, however, that the importance of oil is in 
itself sufficient to explain the war or any of the other effects of the war on terrorism for the matter. 
While it should not be ignored, it is just one factor and one part of a larger network of power relations, 
and not necessarily the one most directly related to the discourse.
The importance that the Bush administration and its neoconservative advisers attribute to Persian Gulf 
oil can be traced back to 1976, when Paul Wolfowitz, working as the deputy assistant secretary of 
defence for regional programmes in the Carter administration, wrote the Limited Contingency Study, 
the first extensive examination of the need for the US to defend the Persian Gulf. The document began:
We and our major industrialized allies have a vital and growing stake in the Persian Gulf region 
149
because of our need for Persian Gulf oil and because events in the Persian Gulf affect the Arab-
Israeli conflict… The importance of Persian Gulf Oil cannot be easily exaggerated.359
If the Soviet Union were to control Persian Gulf oil, Wolfowitz warned, NATO and the US-Japanese 
alliance would probably be destroyed “without recourse to war by the Soviets”.
The study also addressed the possible threat of Iraq to Western interests. The solution: 
we must not only be able to defend the interests of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and ourselves against 
an Iraqi invasion or show of force, we should also make manifest our capabilities and 
commitments to balance Iraq’s power – and this may require an increased visibility for U.S. 
power.360
The personal careers of some of the members of the Bush administration also suggest that the issue of 
oil was carefully taken into consideration. The Secretary of Commerce Don Evans is the former 
chairman of Tom Brown, an independent oil and gas position that exploits natural gas in the Rocky 
Mountains. Vice President Dick Cheney was chief executive of Halliburton, the world’s largest oil field 
service company, and George W. Bush himself owned a small oil company, Arbusto. That his 
experience shaped his decisions to some degree is revealed by his own words: “I lived the energy 
industry. I understand its ups and downs. I also know its strategic importance to the United States of 
America. Access to energy is a mainstay of our national security”.361
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The assumption that oil was one of the main reasons for war on Iraq is reinforced by Crude Designs: 
The rip-off of Iraq's oil wealth, a 2005 report authored by Greg Muttitt, from the London-based charity 
PLATFORM, and backed by US and British pressure groups such as War on Want, the New Economics 
Foundation (NEF), Global Policy Forum and Institute for Policy Studies. It claimed that Iraq would 
lose up to $194bn (£113bn) of oil wealth if a US-inspired plan to hand over development of its oil 
reserves to US and British multinationals would come into force in 2006. The report says the new Iraqi 
constitution opened the way for greater foreign investment and that negotiations with oil companies, 
such as the Anglo-Dutch Shell group, were already under way ahead of the December 2005 election 
and before legislation was passed. The authors claimed to have details of high-level pressure from the 
US and UK governments on Iraq to look to foreign companies to rebuild its oil industry. The report 
added that the use of production sharing agreements (PSAs) was proposed by the US State Department 
even before the invasion and adopted by the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Earlier in 2005 a BBC Newsnight report claimed to have uncovered documents showing the Bush 
administration made plans to secure Iraqi oil even before September 11, 2001.362
5.2 Christian Conservative Groups
Since the discourse of neoconservatism portrays world politics as a struggle of good versus evil, an 
image that grew with the events of September 11, 2001, it found support and common ground among 
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domestic Christian conservative groups. Commentators such as Jerry Falwell and Christian 
Broadcasting Network President Pat Robertson offered similarly apocalyptic accounts of events.363
This does not mean that neoconservatives actually share their beliefs, but that there is a great degree of 
resonance.
Some of these Christian conservatives also share a world-view marked by overwhelming threats that 
need to be confronted. An example of their thinking is offered by Robertson’s comments of August 
2005 on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Chavez, he said, was a “terrific danger” to the US 
because he would make Venezuela a “launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim 
extremism.” His solution:
You know, I don’t know about this doctrine of assassination, but if he thinks we’re trying to 
assassinate him, I think that we really ought to go ahead and do it. … It’s a whole lot cheaper 
than starting a war ... and I don’t think any oil shipments will stop. …We have the ability to take 
him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability. …We don’t need another 
$200 billion war to get rid of one, you know, strong-arm dictator... It’s a whole lot easier to have 
some of the covert operatives do the job and then get it over with.364
In another instance of resonance, Robertson has supported the Israeli settlements movement and 
denounced peace negotiations with the Palestinians. The basis for his position is the Bible’s geography 
of the promised land and, mostly, the belief according to which the gathering of Jews in modern Israel 
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was a prelude to Christ’s second coming at which Jews would be converted to Christianity or 
condemned to hell.365
This interpretation of the significance of the state of Israel as the site for the second coming of Christ is 
shared by Christian right groups such as Empower America, founded by PNAC co-signatory William 
Bennett and Jack Kemp in 1999, and the Foundation for the Defence of Democracy (FDOD), resulting 
in their support to the neoconservative agenda and Israel’s Likud Party. Ralph Reed joined together 
with Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein to found Stand for Israel, with the purpose of generating political support 
among the Christian community for Israel and later the war on terrorism. The group was created out of 
the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews (IFCJ), which has been central in the promotion of 
the relationship between evangelical Christians and US Jews since 1983.
In return, neoconservative figures such as National Security Council official Elliott Abrams, also 
helped to promote the links between Washington’s neoconservatives and Christian evangelicals, 
sometimes advocating for issues of importance to religious groups such as sex trafficking and AIDS.366
Furthermore, the goal of George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative is to enable partnerships between 
faith-based organizations and the government in the delivery of social services, making them eligible to 
compete for grants. Once with federal funding, they would be able to consider a person’s religion when 
hiring staff, which constitutes discrimination in hiring on the basis of religion, and to use federal funds 
build or maintain structures that could be used for religious purposes. Not all of Congress would pass 
Bush’s legislation, so the President used executive orders and rule changes to get what he wanted for 
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the benefit of his religious supporters.367
The agenda of the Christian right has also a place in the Republican Party. In the March 2004 Texas 
conventions the delegates agreed, among other things, to the idea that homosexuality should be 
repealed, that Israel has an undivided claim to Jerusalem and the West Bank and should do whatever it 
wishes in order to eliminate terrorism. Arab states, on the other hand, should be “pressured” to absorb 
refugees from Palestine.368
A survey conducted after September 11, 2001 shows how closely linked are the ideas of the Christian
right to the war on terrorism. When asked to name the most important reasons for the support of Israel, 
56 percent of evangelical Christians referred to its alliance with the US against terrorism. Even 
neoconservative Daniel Pipes recognized as much in July 2003: “To those who wonder why 
Washington follows policies so different from the European states, a large part of the answer these days 
has to do with the clout of Christian Zionists.”369 Another poll from April 2004 discovered that among 
US citizens who go to church at least once a week, 56% agreed that the “situation in Iraq was worth 
going to war over.” Less than 45% of those who seldom attend church thought so. Consider the 
political importance of these relationships in the light that at least one in five US citizens identify 
themselves as Evangelicals.370
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6. Conclusions
The description of the power relations behind the current US discourse on terrorism shows that the 
most influential group has been the neoconservatives. Their ideas and goals – already established many 
years before 2001 – find in the themes of the discourse (to be discussed in chapter 3) a complement, an 
updated purpose and an extension. This group of power-holders is also privileged for linking the Israel 
lobby – with which they often overlap – to the outgoing US administration, and certain sectors of 
academia, industry and religion. This is not to say that the discourse has been exclusively 
masterminded by neoconservatives. Rather, since 2001 and up to this point they have been at the centre 
of the resonating elite network of societies of discourse and doctrines from which the discourse has 
emerged. As this is a fluctuating network rather than a rigid structure, it is possible that the range of 
their influence may change or be diminished due to historical contingency. It follows that the discourse 
must be understood in similar terms: as a set of variable discontinuities over which no single group has 
entire control.
While the network of power is immersed and inserted within Foucauldian historical categories – such 
as overarching discourses of American identity and security – this chapter has shown that the network 
can be reasonably traced to specific names of people and institutions which articulate the discourse of 
the war on terrorism in a unique way. Without an empirical description, its most basic elements – some 
of which constitute discontinuities of the war on terrorism in regards to larger discourses predominant 
within American society – would be missed. Some of these elements play a role in recreating the 
discourse, or manifesting it as the discourse that it is today, in ways that do not appear to have been 
foreseen by Foucault, such as the use lies, the practice of lobbying, the still important category of an 
economically privileged class with specific interests (e.g. oil), or religion as an element which 
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strengthens geopolitical alliances (Israel – US). 
The two key points where a Foucauldian approach reveals limitations in the analysis presented above 
are: the reluctance to analyse elite groups and their historical specificities (as a result of having ‘cut the 
king’s head off’); and the apparent irrelevance of agency if the idea of the inescapability of discourse is 
interpreted as a structural quality.
Other elements of the analysis presented above do fit with a Foucauldian approach, such as the 
identification of institutions of an academic or intellectual character as elements of power and 
discourse; the unstable and historically contingent character of power; and the notions of societies of 
discourse and doctrines.
The chapter that follows complements this one by presenting further objections to a Foucauldian 
approach, this time in regards to the notions of discourse, knowledge and truth; and by analyzing the 
themes articulated in the discourse of the war on terrorism, further establishing the link with the 
network of power and its capability to shape the discourse in particular ways.
156
Chapter 3
'Truth' Produced, Facts and The Text of the Discourse on Terrorism
Once the network of power relations has been examined we have a better chance of properly 
understanding the elements of the discourse on terrorism that it contributes to produce. This chapter 
focuses on power producing discourse, pleasures, domains of objects, rituals of 'truth', 'knowledge' and 
'reality', as Foucault would put it,371 by detecting the themes produced through texts. In doing so 
through the case study at hand, it also argues that the discourse analysis would not be complete without 
what we can learn by retaining a basic sense of the objectivity of facts and events. This is a departure 
from Foucauldian tradition, which does not consider any sort of objective truth as a requirement for 
discourse analysis. Quite the contrary, a Foucauldian analysis would not be mainly concerned with “the 
ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted”, but rather with “the ensemble of rules” 
that distinguish true from false.372 Foucault and those writing after him would argue that anything we 
can learn from objects in the world is always constructed through interpretation and discourse, which 
are in turn determined by social and historical conditions, particularly those related to identity. It is the 
meaning we give to things and the rules that determine the meaning, and not things themselves, which 
matter from a Foucauldian perspective. It is true that meaning and interpretation have a central 
importance for our understanding of a discourse, but I believe that there is value in contrasting 
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statements of the discourse with elemental facts, as I will try to show below.
The chapter also deals with the themes as they are produced through some of its practices. If we 
limited our analysis strictly to words, we would lack the awareness of the presence of the network of 
power producing it and by missing the material manifestations we would lose a portion of the message. 
The discourse would have a different meaning, i.e. only the one that is being openly stated. Considering 
practices as part of the discourse is yet another departure from Foucault, who maintained a distinction 
between the discursive and the non-discursive. In that sense, this analysis places itself closer to Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. This is not to say that Foucault did not see a relation between the 
discursive and the non-discursive. For Foucault, the rules of formation of a medical discourse, for 
example, had to be articulated with its non-discursive historical conditions: political events, economic 
phenomena, and institutional changes that are not discursive; “[h]owever, the relation between the 
discursive and the non-discursive is neither one of determination nor one of expression” for him. In 
contrast, Laclau and Mouffe insist on the interweaving of the semantic aspects of language with the 
pragmatic aspects of actions, movements and objects.373
Rather than offering an exhaustive account of the spoken and written language used by US authorities 
and their ideological supporters, I seek to identify the major themes, objects, concepts,374 as well as 
some of the pragmatic aspects that surround them. The nature of the themes and objects would not be 
complete without a final section of this chapter dealing with the principles of exclusion as proposed by 
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Foucault that reinforce the discourse.
The reader will see that the themes and objects that spring from the text are dynamically linked and 
implicit to each other. For that reason the division of themes presented below is an abstraction and not 
the only possible one. Still, it serves its purpose, namely organizing the message in themes and objects 
to understand it better. We should also keep in mind that there is not one speaker, but many, and while 
the words of some carry more weight, depending on their position of power, the chorus of lesser 
commentators should not be ignored, since they contribute essential elements to the overall message.
Before presenting the specific elements of the discourse we need to examine the production of the 
notion of terrorism on which it is founded. I begin with this issue as my argument follows Foucault in a 
non-problematic way in regards to it, and it helps to clarify how his views would apply to the case in 
hand.
1. The Production of Terrorism as a Discursive Object
From a Foucauldian perspective concepts such as delinquency, madness or terrorism do not have an 
essential existence; they are discursively produced, and legal and political systems make use of them in 
the context of power.375 'Real' or 'essentialist' definitions376 of terrorism would be motivated by a will to 
power under the guise of a will to truth. Foucault’s “deepest truth” is that things “have no essence”, 
because “underneath it all everything is already interpretation”.377 This is not to say that there are no 
objects in the world. As I have noted in chapter 1, a common misunderstanding regarding the nature of 
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discourse is that the construction of every object as an object of discourse involves dispensing “with the 
realist claim concerning the existence of a world external of thought... For example, a stone can be 
discursively constructed as a projectile or as an object of aesthetic contemplation, but it is still the same 
physical object.”378
While it may be philosophically argued that at least some concepts do have an essence, this is not the 
case for value laden concepts which are easily used as instruments of power. Rather than being used to 
describe objective phenomena, terrorism “is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is 
generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would 
otherwise prefer to ignore… Use of the term implies moral judgement”.379 That is why, to a 
considerable extent, it has been a term of propaganda, and not description.380
Further proof that we are dealing with interpretations in this case is the fact that there are over a 100 
different scholarly definitions of the term, some which exclude or contradict each other.381 The word 
was originally used by Edmund Burke in 1790 in his Reflections on the Revolution in France to refer to 
the revolutionary French democratic movements.382 The irony of the term being created to condemn an 
ideology that is today often considered as its opposite should be enough to prevent us from ascribing an 
essence to it. Tracking a concept through its epochal variations is what Foucault proposed as the 
practice of genealogy; in this case, we learn from this genealogical observation that the idea of 
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'terrorism' was linked to a threat to the status quo from its creation, a link which survives today to a 
great extent, as we will see below.
Any essentialist definition will be almost arbitrary; only determined by a will to power or a resistance 
to it. For a proper understanding of the current US discourse on terrorism we need to determine which 
is the implicit definition of the concept upon which it has been founded. A brief examination of the two 
major sets of definitions of terrorism, tactical definitions or political status definitions, follows. Tactical 
definitions are so because the determining elements are the characteristics of the mode of violence and 
its targets; political status definitions are focused on the perpetrators, their illegality and position 
towards the status quo.
1.1 Tactical definitions
C. A. J. Coady offers a tactical definition of terrorism as “[t]he organised use of violence to attack non-
combatants (“innocents” in a special sense) or their property for political purposes”. In this “special 
sense” the quality that makes a person “innocent” is the principle of non-combatant immunity that has 
been commonly invoked by just war thinkers.383
Under the same light, Igor Primoratz defines terrorism “as the deliberate use of violence, or the threat 
of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of 
action they would otherwise not take.” Equally, he describes the innocent as “persons who are neither 
members of the armed forces or security services, nor persons who supply these with ammunition, nor 
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political officials involved in the conflict”.384
The first consequence of accepting any of these tactical definitions is that states and authorities can be 
guilty of terrorism: “States can and do use the tactic of attacking the innocent”. In the same way, not all 
anti-state political violence need be terrorist.385 The definition also comprises revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary terrorism, as well as terrorism of the left and of the right. It is politically 
neutral.386
Another important consequence is that it “captures the elements of terrorism that cause many of us to 
view [terrorism] with utmost moral repugnance”, which are violence against the innocent and, under 
Primoratz’s view, the purpose of intimidation and coercion.387 Here, some may argue against Primoratz 
that a definition should not carry any negative (nor positive) connotations for the sake of scientific 
objectivity and neutrality. This may be true for essentialist definitions and under the philosophical 
assumption that the world independent from the observer is devoid of value. However, in the case of 
terrorism we are dealing with a recently constructed concept that has been used, since the time of its 
creation in the late eighteenth century, for the purpose of condemning certain forms of political 
violence. We cannot hope to rid the term of its negative connotation simply by stating so and ignoring 
that in the social and political world “on one point, at least, everybody agrees: terrorism is a pejorative 
term”.388 In fact, ridding the word of its negative connotation may be read as a further indication of an 
attempt of covering a will to power under a pretence of objectivity and neutrality.
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Still, both Coady and Primoratz reveal their aspiration towards neutrality in a case in which it has no 
place by insisting that the immorality of terrorism is not built into its definition389, not making the 
moral condemnation of terrorism analytically true, nor its moral defence analytically false.390 These 
remarks are difficult to defend, since we would find ourselves hard pressed to find a convincing 
argument in defence of the killing of the innocent as morally right. Take, for example, Leon Trotsky’s 
apology for terrorism. From his consequentialist argument terrorism is not morally wrong in itself; it 
depends on the consequences it is going to have in the circumstances given.391 For Trotsky, in the 
revolutionary struggle all means are justified if they are efficient and not too costly. But as Primoratz 
counter-argues, terrorism “is always an attack on illegitimate targets, on innocent people… therefore 
morally impermissible even when employed by a side that otherwise wages a war, or a revolution, 
which is morally justified in terms of its character and goals”.392 Given his argument, it remains 
unexplained that this author and Coady insist on the moral neutrality of their definition. What these 
authors fail to see is that the association between the term and its negative value is so strong that there 
is no room for neutrality. If one were to choose a definition – and the choice would only be a 
convention for a specific practical purpose, since there is no objective essence of terrorism to be 
defined – the best approach would be to assume its negativity and capture it in the definition. This is of 
course a clear confirmation that we are dealing with an object that has been produced and not 
discovered in the real world.
Though there are many other possible tactical definitions, I have chosen to comment on the ones 
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proposed by Primoratz and Coady because their inescapable negative value makes them the closest to 
the common understanding of terrorism by civil society. The simple fact that the definition places the 
innocent as victims, who in most cases are civilians, is enough to see the link between the tactical 
definition and the emotional horror produced on the population. The Economist, a publication whose 
main audience are neither scholars nor government officials, shares the same intuition of how terrorism 
should be defined: “The violence [of terrorism] is aimed specifically at civilians… [It is] an act of 
indiscriminate violence to terrorise citizens at large”. The article offers as examples the Allied bombing 
of Germany and the atomic weapons that vaporized Hiroshima and Nagasaki.393 Scholars or politicians 
may argue otherwise, and in fact they often do, but the shocking image of the killing of innocents is 
still perceived as terror and emotional trauma by the civil society at large. In view of this, perhaps the 
tactical definition could be best described as the civil society definition, to contrast it better with the 
political status definition described below.
1.2 Political status definitions
The common understanding of terrorism by the population in general diverges in different degrees from 
official definitions of terrorism. The US State Department defines it as “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. For the FBI, it is “the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”. According to the US Department 
of Defence, it is “the unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or 
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property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or 
ideological objectives”.394
The above definitions are said to have differences simply because they reflect the priorities and 
particular interests of the agencies involved.395 How these agencies interpret their own definitions and 
put into practice their interests may carry negative consequences for civil society. Take an example that 
could well be applied to the US: after September 11, the European Commission issued a draft 
Framework Decision, which stated that “if the motivation is to alter seriously or to destroy the 
fundamental principles and pillars of the state, intimidating people, there is a terrorist offence”.396 UK 
law considers as terrorism any threats or actions intended to influence government, “or to intimidate the 
public or a section of the public” for any “political, religious or ideological cause”.397 The problem with 
these definitions, as David Campbell has noticed, is that dissent and protest can be criminalized.398 In 
addition, common criminals may be judged as terrorists and as a consequence receive punishments out 
of proportion with their crimes. This is especially clear with former US Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
proposed definition of terrorism, which broadly includes “the use or threat to use ‘any explosive, 
firearm or other weapon or dangerous device’ with the intent to endanger person or property”.399
For an example of a similar definition by a scholar consider the characteristics of terrorism according to 
Bruce Hoffman:
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Ineluctably political in aims and motives;
Violent or threatens violence;
Designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or a conspiratorial cell (whose 
members wear no uniform or identifying insignia);
And perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.400 (Emphasis added.)
All of the above definitions fall within the category of what Coady calls “political status definitions”, 
for terrorism is always performed against the state that represents the status quo and never by it; this is 
implied in the use of the words “subnational”, “clandestine”, “unlawful” or “non-state entity” to 
describe terrorist groups, and in the contention that the purpose is to “intimidate governments” or 
“destroy the principles and pillars of the state”, in the words of the European Commission’s draft 
Framework Decision.401
One of these definitions identifies the targets of terrorism as non-combatants (apparently making it a 
tactical definition); yet the identification of the perpetrators as groups different from the state puts it on 
the same category as the rest, for it is the implications for the exercise of power that matter the most in 
here.
It could be argued that the UK law and Ashcroft’s definitions leave the possibility open for the 
government attempting to intimidate or endanger the public, acts which would become terrorism by 
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virtue of the definitions. However, the practice and applied interpretation has so far failed to include 
intimidation or aggression from Western governments towards civilian populations. Again, we need to 
remember that these are tools of power; thus we may read the breadth of these two definitions as an 
attempt at facilitating their application and making them agreeable to civil society. Here we first 
encounter a constant of the discourse on terrorism: the implied definition of the word in any particular 
text is vague in order to allow the public to understand it as a threat to innocent civilians whilst 
simultaneously leaving another interpretation open: that it is the political status quo that needs to be 
defended.
The fact that terrorism is performed by only “subnational groups or non-state entities” makes out of 
terrorism a crime that is never imputable to the state. This way, governments get a carte blanche to 
commit acts of violence against civilians, while freely accusing any other groups of immorality and 
terrorism. Hoffman openly defends this position: he thinks that a reasoning that defines terrorism by the 
act of violence (any tactical definition) and not the motivations or justifications behind it is not 
satisfactory because “it fails to differentiate clearly between violence perpetrated by states and by non-
states entities, such as terrorists”.402 Here Hoffman assumes that state actors are the source of 
legitimacy and legality, thus their justifications for violence would always make it non-terrorist. It 
would seem that political status definitions find their basis on the largely quoted Weberian definition of 
the state: 
Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory… The state is 
                                                
402 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 32, 33
167
considered the sole source of the “right” to use violence.403
However, to conclude from these words that the state, by its very essence, is always legitimately 
entitled to use violence is a fallacy, for Weber’s definition is a description, not a justification of the 
state. Michael Gold-Biss argues: 
Ultimately, “the use of physical force” by the state is legitimated by virtue of its being 
“successfully claimed”, i.e., widely accepted and recognized as legitimate by the subjects of the 
states and other states. This comes close to a tautology and is clearly a utilitarian and 
instrumental understanding of a concept which remains as “nebulous” as that of the “state”. 
Nevertheless, time after time, authors and experts return to their narrow and formal definition of 
the state as if merely stating and repeating it were sufficient to justify the concept of violence 
and the use of force practiced by the state.404
1.3 The implied definition within the discourse and the articulation of American identity
Most of the times in spoken and written word, and always in interpretation and application, the 
possibility of Western or democratic states committing terrorism is excluded. This has also been the 
case with the current discourse of the war on terrorism. Consider George W. Bush’s speeches 
immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001. While Bush does not offer a clear definition, and 
neither do the members of his administration – Joan Fitzpatrick writes, “the 'war against terrorism' 
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eludes definition, largely because those prosecuting the campaign find ambiguity advantageous to 
avoid legal constraints and to shift policy objectives with minimal accountability”405 – we do get some 
clues from the words of the President:
Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the best that is in our country, with 
courage and concern for others. Because this is America. This is who we are. This is what our 
enemies hate and have attacked.406 [...] America was targeted for attack because we're the 
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.407 [...] The American people need to 
know that we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in 
shadows, and has no regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and 
unsuspecting people, then runs for cover… This enemy attacked not just our people, but all 
freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.408
In Bush's view, terrorists hate values represented by the US, such as courage, concern for others, 
freedom and opportunity; they disregard human life; and they are exceptional because they are cowards 
who “hide in shadows”, alienating themselves in actions and morality from society in general and 
therefore from the status quo, implicitly understood to be represented by the state that defends people's 
freedoms. The portrayal of the “enemies of America” is such that their “evil” motivations are inhuman 
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and irrational, and therefore contrary to any political settlement or ideology. (In this sense, Bush 
contradicts many scholarly definitions of terrorism, such as Bruce Hoffman’s, who thinks that the 
phenomenon is “ineluctably political in aims and motives”409, because evil and irrationality are beyond 
political ideology.)
While Bush does mention that the enemy “preys on innocent and unsuspecting people” (tactical 
definition), it is also implied that the state is never guilty of terrorism, since it represents the exact 
opposite of its enemy (political status definition); on other occasions he has explicitly stated that “we 
do not target innocent people”.410 In the end, writes Michael Gold-Biss, “WE never practiced terrorism, 
or even political violence, only THEY were capable of such actions”.411  Thus, we see the function of 
the produced object-terrorism as an articulator and reinforcer of Western and American identities.
As a consequence of the opposition between attacker and attacked Richard Johnson has interpreted 
Bush's (and the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s) discourse as an expression of the idea of the other as 
a constitutive force in the construction of the self; the other which irrupts into the world of the self.
‘Way of life’ functions in several different ways in the speeches of Bush and Blair. ‘The attack’, 
‘terrorism’ or global uncertainties more generally are represented as chaotic events which break 
into the orderliness of ordinary living. […] Blair draws – within the global setting – a sharp 
moral line between a here and an elsewhere. For him it is only the externalities that are chaotic; 
the interior is orderly, safe and surprisingly uniform, very much under control, though 
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threatened it is true.412
About a month after September 11, 2001, Bush defined the goal of terrorism as trying “to force us to 
change our way of life, [to] force us to retreat, [to] force us to be what we're not”.413 The state performs 
as the protector of Western “way of life”, i.e., the existing state of affairs or status quo. There is a loose 
unification – an orderly uniformity – of everything that relates to Western society ('us'): the population, 
its values and way of life, the state and its laws, which are all as one under the threat of terrorism (the 
'other'). This unification implies identification between civil society and the state when confronted by 
terrorism: it is the innocent who are attacked and so is the state; it is the state who responds and so must 
civil society.
This example of Bush’s discourse serves to illustrate that the vagueness of his words – and those of the 
whole of the network of power that produces the discourse – imply both a political status definition and 
a tactical definition of terrorism: the state is never guilty of terrorism, still there is an appeal to civil 
society by identifying the victims as innocent. As a tool of power, the discursive object of terrorism is a 
versatile and malleable one. The elements of its implied definition may change according to 
circumstances and application; however, as it remains a tool of power, the defence of the state and the 
status quo will always occupy a central position and predominate over any identification of the victims 
as innocent civilians.
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2. Problems with the ideas of 'production' and 'truth'
The object 'terrorism' is (re)produced in the context of the events during and since September 11, 2001, 
as we have seen above. Further down we explore the grand themes of this discourse through examples 
of how they are articulated. But before proceeding, a few remarks must be made about the problems 
implied by the ideas of 'production' and 'truth' that should reveal some of the limits of a Foucauldian 
theoretical approach. 
This is necessary for the analysis of the discourse of the war on terrorism because the nature of the case 
suggests the following: first, that in order to appreciate certain aspects of the discourse we need a point 
of reference with the basic objectivity of facts and events, i.e. truth at its most basic level, truth which 
is not produced but learned; and second, that a certain degree of repression (as opposed to production) 
takes place.
2.1 Truth matters, after all
Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda have written eloquently about the problem of radical 
relativism or constructivism in the context of social analysis. In order to examine what they call a 
“moral panic” – the phenomenon of some members of a society being perceived as an evil and
existential threat to the social body – Goode and Ben-Yehuda consider its disproportionality or “the 
implication that public concern is in excess of what is appropriate if concern were directly proportional 
to objective harm”. Thus, they need to include an objective dimension. In doing so, they distance 
themselves from radical relativists or strict constructionists who “wish to define the objective 
dimension out of existence” by arguing that all views of reality are relative and equally subjective, and 
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thus “[a] claim of fire in a crowded theater is simply a claim, they say – whether an actual fire exists or 
not is both irrelevant and incapable of verification; what's important is how and why that claim comes 
to be made, and by whom.”414 Although Foucault cannot be accurately characterized as a relativist, a 
literal interpretation of his work could lead to a similar position for the purposes of discourse analysis.
Consider his claim that “underneath it all everything is already interpretation”415; together with his 
insistence that science is not marked by a “will to truth” but by a “will to power”; the idea that 'truth' is 
something that is produced and not discovered; and the focus on the rules and conditions of possibility 
of production of 'truth', as opposed to any objective referent. As mentioned above, neither Foucault nor 
the majority of constructivists are implying that there is no world external to thought or that all claims 
are of equal value.416 However, it is true that a discourse analysis strictly based on a literal 
understanding of Foucault leaves little to no room for the recognition of objective facts as standards of 
truth or as referents for disproportionality and the recognition of lies, because facts become irrelevant 
and meaningless outside discourse. 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s observations are indeed relevant for an assessment of Foucault because it is 
not true that for the purposes of discourse analysis the meaning and interpretation we give to facts 
make their veracity secondary or irrelevant. It is a given that we inscribe facts and objects within a 
framework of understanding, but that does not imply that we should give up all standards or aspirations 
of truth and science when analyzing discourse.
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Goode and Ben-Yehuda acknowledge the shortcomings of science. Scientists draw conclusions from 
incomplete information or conduct their studies poorly, and sometimes even resort to fraud.417 I should 
add that it is also true that many of their conclusions are influenced by deeply embedded and 
unrecognized cultural or social discursive assumptions.
However, they write, admitting the flaws of science should not be stretched and twisted to reach the 
conclusion that whatever scientists propose “is untrue, or no more likely to be true than those made by 
the man and woman on the street... Even those who argue for the relativity of scientific, medical, and 
other expert truth in theory, in practice accept the fact that experts know more than the rest of us.” But 
more to the point for this thesis, according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda
The fact is, we place varying degrees of confidence in different statements. We can be almost 
completely confident that some propositions, accepted by all or almost all practicing natural or 
social scientists, medical figures or other experts, are true: the earth is round, not flat; species 
were generated over a period of billions of years through a process of evolution, and not in a 
single week through divine creation; the existence of the Holocaust – the systematic murder of 
millions of Jews and other ethnic groups by the Nazis during the 1930s and 1940s – is a verified 
historical fact, and is not a false claim hoked up by evil Zionists and their agents and dupes; and 
so on. Likewise, and more to the point of moral panics, we can have a great deal of confidence, 
given the nature of the evidence, that: LSD does not seriously damage chromosomes or cause 
birth defects; satanists are not kidnapping, abusing, torturing, and murdering tens of thousands 
of children every year in the United States and England; legal drug use is responsible for far 
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more deaths than the abuse of illegal drugs; in 1982, not even close to half of Israeli high school 
students abused illegal drugs, nor do they do so now; in Renaissance Europe, hundreds of 
thousands of men and women did not literally consort with an actual, concrete devil; and so 
on.418
Likewise, many of the claims of the war on terrorism that we encounter below are equally unlikely to 
be true. This is not to say that we are currently in possession of or can ever reach absolute or ultimate 
truths that will once and for all reveal the true nature of the socio-political phenomenon referred to as 
“terrorism”. Goode and Ben-Yehuda quote Stephen Gould:
“[F]act” does not imply “absolute certainty”. Absolute certainty exists only in mathematics, 
logic, and theology. Any statements describing the material or empirical world must retain a 
measure of uncertainty, small though it may be, for statements regarded as facts. Natural and 
especially social scientists do not make a claim to eternal, perpetual truth. According to Gould, 
what is called a fact is that which has been “confirmed to such a degree it would be perverse to 
withhold provisional assent.” He adds: “I suppose that apples might start to rise tomorrow 
[instead of fall], but the possibility does not merit equal time in physics classrooms.” 419
In chapter 1, I have argued for the possibility of objective knowledge, albeit limited. As in hard science, 
determining that an empirical fact is true or false does not mean absolute certainty. Philosophical 
considerations aside, political events, data and facts reach the public only through a series of filters that 
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distort them on varying degrees. Journalists on the ground, the media for which they work, authorities 
and their sources (such as intelligence services) and any other political agents in position of informing 
the public are not only subject to human error, but are also capable of intentionally distorting 
information through selectivity and other forms of deception as part of their struggle for power. But this 
difficulty does not mean we should forget about the validity of empirical facts altogether when doing 
social science or discourse analysis. As an example for our purposes, the claim formulated in the 
context of the war on terrorism that Saddam Hussein's regime held weapons of mass destruction – at 
times suggested to be nuclear – that could be deployed against Western countries in very short period of 
times, could have been possible in principle, but given the information available at this point, it is so 
unlikely that we can reasonably declare it to be false.
So how do we reconcile the idea that 'truth' is produced with the above position that some statements 
can be reasonably considered to be objectively true or false? The answer, I believe, lies in the nature of 
the statements. Those that refer to simple events, facts and objects are either true or false; things 
happen or they do not, bombs explode or not, a certain number of people die and not any one more or 
less, whether they are reported accurately or not and regardless of the fact that we always give them a 
meaning and interpretation. But statements that compose greater themes and complex and often value 
laden discursive objects are indeed produced to the point that their veracity may become irrelevant or 
impossible to determine. That a certain act of violence is part of a campaign of terrorism that threatens 
civilization, an act of  martyrdom or a struggle for freedom, are 'truths' produced for reasons related to 
power.
Can we not analyse discourse without the need to make any reference to basic factual statements that 
can be determined to be true or false? Perhaps certain discourses do not need so in order to reach a 
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good level of understanding, but the nature of the discourse of the war on terrorism suggests that at 
some points we should at least maintain a sense of the likelihood that certain statements are true or 
false, and contrast them with the statements that compose the discourse. The first reason for this was 
already explained in the previous chapter: at least some members of the network of power seem to have 
been influenced to some extent by a Straussian philosophy which accepts the use of 'noble lies' and the 
intentional creation of myths by the intellectual elite; and even if Strauss had no such influence, we 
observe that in the context of the war on terrorism they have occasionally distorted facts.
The second reason, as explained by Goode and Ben-Yehuda, is that “it is only by knowing the 
empirical nature of a given threat that we are able to determine the degree of disproportionality.”420
While it is not my objective to follow these authors' method, I do seek to rescue their sense of 
contrasting statements with objective facts. Because to do so is to recognize that the discourse of the 
war on terrorism is not only the product of underlying sociohistorical assumptions or discursive 
constructions proper to the American culture that surpass any given group of individuals and which 
determine the beliefs and identity of society as a whole. Rather, the discourse of the war on terrorism is 
also the product of specific people with personal worldviews and interests.
The third reason, also already mentioned, is that contrasting statements with the likely objective truth 
provides a venue for political resistance, at least on the individual level. Stressing the fact has an 
ethico-political implication, and in this respect it opens possibilities for the fulfilment of a Foucauldian 
aspiration: that of 'the political task', which is
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to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to 
criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself 
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them.421
One of the most efficient criticisms to be made of the discourse of the war on terrorism is that it has 
obscured events and facts under a cover of neutrality, law and justice. Straightforward examples of this 
can be easily understood by everyone without the need of sophisticated academic theories or jargon, 
and they do not need to make reference to grand ideological constructions.
In the context of criticising Foucault's conception of power, Steven Lukes argues that the trouble with 
Foucault is that he clothed his idea of power “in Nietzschean rhetoric, within which power excluded 
both freedom and truth”. According to the rhetoric there can be no liberation from power, nor a way of 
judging between ways of life, since each imposes its own regime of truth and its 'general politics' of 
truth. The unsurprising consequence, Lukes continues, is that it is widely supposed that “Foucault's 
achievement is to have undermined 'the model of the rational, autonomous moral agent'.”422
It might be a matter of interpretation of Foucault's works as a whole whether he actually  believed that 
there was no possibility of freedom. As noted above, Foucault's 'political task' as an ideal meant 
criticism and implied, therefore, resistance, and as such the possibility of freedom, even if only in a 
limited form. It also appears that Foucault was speaking of 'grand truths' and not of how the production 
of a discourse could deal (or fail to deal) with elemental facts, i.e. basic truths. He simply appeared to 
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have no interest in the possibility that the latter could effectively destabilize a 'regime of truth'.
2.2 Production or repression?
Lukes states that Foucault's idea that power both represses and produces is “repeatedly restated and 
developed, and also wildly overstated and exaggerated”.423 The problem, I believe, is that this 
exaggeration leads to an overlooking of the most obvious and traditional understandings of repressive 
power – even if Foucault was aware of them. Again, in the context of discursive practices, the most 
elemental covering of facts and events is a form of repression of factual truths – things that happened in 
one way or another are constantly 'spinned' by people who hold political power. It appears that this is so 
much taken as a given that it rarely finds its way into academic analysis, and instead the emphasis is 
placed on production. The original idea of production, “in its non-overstated and non-exaggerated 
form”, Lukes explains, is simply
that if power is to be effective, those subject to it must be rendered susceptible to its effects... 
'Production' is 'positive': power in this sense 'traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse'... More specifically, it produces 'subjects', forging their 
character and 'normalizing them,' rendering them capable of and willing to adhere to norms of 
sanity, health, sexuality and other forms of propriety.424
This is of course true for the war on terrorism as well. Subjects are produced by contrast with the 
terrorist and as its mirror image. But the production of discourse and identity is not possible without at 
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least a minimal repression of elements that do not accord with the discourse produced. Repression of 
alternative discourses or of facts or events is a necessity for the production of discourse. While an open 
and direct repression is rare in contemporary Western societies, we can still identify discursive 
strategies deployed that marginalize or minimize alternative discourses and possible identities.425
The idea of a 'regime of truth' - and what Lukes identifies as Nietzschean rhetoric - if exaggerated, 
negates the possibility of resistance by challenging the discourse with the most elemental factual truths 
which it seeks to repress and which it cannot explain.
3. The themes of the war on terrorism
3.1 Genealogy and socio-historical and political specificities
Employing the Nietzschean-Foucauldian concept of 'genealogy' consists in seeking to trace structural, 
epochal variations in the meaning and use of the notion of a concept, for example, 'sovereignty',426 or 
'terrorism', as we briefly saw above. The current discourse is a specific recreation of the mythology of 
historical American identity as described by David Campbell.427 Tracking practices of differentiation 
and modes of exclusion from as far back as the European consciousness before Columbus' voyage 
across the Atlantic, through the creation and development of the American imagined community until 
what has been declared the end of the Cold War, Campbell has detected many instances where the 
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construction of 'otherness' from within and outside the nation (native tribes, Mexicans, Japanese, 
Soviets, drug addicts and others) has sustained the values of identity. His genealogy of American 
security finds its way to the present as the war on terrorism is “morphing into a re-run of the Cold 
War... a struggle into which any number of potential candidates – regardless of their strategic capacity 
to be a threat – were slotted as a threat.”428 It is not surprising that the war on terrorism has grown in a 
similar template as the Cold War since the neoconservative ideology was developed at the time. Some 
of its most notable representatives, such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld or Paul Wolfowitz, were 
involved in policy making when the Soviet Union was perceived as a threat, as noted in chapter 2.
Among the themes the current discourse has successfully (re)produced we find a global dichotomy 
where the US stands for democratic values and has as its mission to confront tyranny abroad. On one 
side of the equation there are Western democratic societies ('us'); on the other there is a vaguely defined 
terrorist enemy, sometimes identified with Muslim or Arab societies, others with an 'axis of evil' of 
'rogue states' ('them'). Linked to this idea it is proposed that 'we' now live in an era of war and 
unprecedented danger. The solution is to be found in the moral leadership and military supremacy of 
the US asking its citizens and the rest of the world to accept that exceptional measures need to be taken, 
such as preemptive war or legislation and practices contrary to generally accepted civil rights and 
moral principles.
Richard Jackson has articulated and summarized429 the above narratives and themes within the 
discourse as follows:
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The events of September 11, 2001 were presented as an 'act of war' which as such justified a 'war 
on terrorism'. The narrative of the events of the day were embedded in meta-narratives about 
Pearl Harbor, World War II, the Cold War, civilisation versus barbarism and the advance of 
globalisation.
Terrorists have been characterized as 'enemy aliens', evildoers, savages, barbarians, cruel and 
inhuman as opposed to innocent, decent, kind, loving, peaceful, united and heroic Americans 
(the 'us' and 'them' divide).
Terrorism has been constructed as a catastrophic threat to the American 'way of life'. Thus, terrorists 
are sophisticated, ruthless and numerous, working from hideouts and supported by 'rogue states' 
which wish to provide weapons of mass destruction. Once again, war appears as a reasonable 
response.
The way in which the US' counter-terrorist campaign has been carried out is 'good' and an example 
of a 'just war': one with a just cause, purely defensive, and which is a last resort conducted with 
care for the innocent. At the same time it is a 'new' and 'different' kind of war, given the 
peculiarities of the terrorists.
Mapping out the themes above and situating them within their genealogy is consistent with Foucault. 
Although much is to be learned from such an exercise, I would like to propose that it should be 
complemented by an appraisal of socio-historical and political specificities, where groups of people, 
individuals and their actions and words (their use of language) are as important as the genealogical 
themes within which they are immersed. As Jan Selby has written in an enlightening article on the use 
of Foucault within the discipline of International Relations: “[T]he critique or deconstruction of 
ideological categories need not rule out all analysis of structural socio-historical specificities – and it is 
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in this sense that there exists an ontological specificity and irreducibility to the international”.430
I have noted earlier that when Foucault was reproached for not presenting an overall theory he replied 
that such a task would be both “abstract and limiting” and that his desire was rather “to open up
problems that are as concrete and general as possible”.431 Like Foucault, my analysis has no desire to 
propose a theory, but rather to examine a concrete problem. Unlike him, it seeks to highlight certain 
specifics rather than generalities; the reason being that otherwise the uniqueness of the discourse of the 
war on terrorism would be lost. It is true that in a sense Foucault was particularly concerned with the 
specifics of society and history. By using an empirical method, he described and analysed specific 
historical procedures, institutions, techniques and strategies of power. The difference is that I also wish 
to stress specificities which refer to concrete people and groups of power, their geopolitical and 
ideological agendas, their actions and use of language, and the contrast with the actual facts to which 
they make reference.
Foucault drew a distinction between 'power' on the one hand, and 'violence' or 'force' on the other. 
Whereas a relationship of violence acts upon bodies or things, “the 'exercise of power consists in 
guiding... conduct”.432 A parallel can be drawn in terms of language and discourse. While the 'spinning' 
and misrepresentation of facts is a form of violence through specific examples of the use of language, 
the overall historical assumptions that can be traced through a genealogy (a grand discourse) are similar 
to a guiding or conducting principle – except that no one individual or group in particular is the 
conscious guide. Violence through language is, on the other hand, always done by someone specific, 
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and with a specific intention. It appears that Foucault was not particularly interested in specific events 
of the violence of language, but rather in the categories of knowledge we construct that would then 
result in this violence.
Likewise, a parallel can be drawn between an analysis that focuses on genealogy versus another one 
focusing on socio-historical specificities, and the debate of structure vs agency. Colin Wight has 
covered the latter debate and has taken a position that recognizes the value of both sides of the debate:
While I have argued that particular acts and events can only be investigated for their casual 
patterns, significance and meaning within a structural context, I do not deny the merit in a 
division of labour between the explanation of particular events and that of structural 
understanding. Structural understanding, however, whilst necessary in order to proceed with the 
explanation of events, is not sufficient, since on one level, every act or event is different from 
every other and the precise mix of causal factors will vary with every case. Nevertheless, every 
social act is only possible within a structural context and no act is the outcome of a truly unique 
set of causal mechanisms.433
A strict Foucauldian approach would analyse the discourse of the war on terror through a genealogy 
akin to a structure of ideas (albeit a flexible structure, not necessarily coherent nor monolithic). This is 
why Wight's comment is relevant here, for analyzing specific persons, events, actions and their use of 
language would be closer to an analysis of agency. A complete analysis would require both approaches, 
but Foucault allows for the first much better than the second. Incidentally, a genealogy of American 
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identity and security has already been performed satisfactorily, as seen at the beginning of this section, 
and so the observations that follow in regards to the discourse focus more on specificities post 2001. 
However, I do attempt to present such specificities by detecting the major themes of the discourse that 
suggest themselves through patterns in the discourse.
In this regard, it should be noted that strictly speaking, it may not be possible to write a genealogy of 
the war on terrorism since 2001, because the object of analysis is quite new and so far has lasted for a 
relatively short period of time. A genealogy, as the name suggests, is much better suited for historical 
grand discourses expanding and morphing through hundreds of years.
We can find yet another limitation to a Foucauldian approach when attempting to apply to our case 
study, which is an intrinsically international affair, both in terms of language, origins and consequences. 
Selby points out that there are clear limits to the application of Foucault to the international arena. He 
notes that Foucault 
directed his critiques primarily against liberalism, focusing above all on the 'how' rather than the 
'why' of modern power, and he thus provided only limited tools for analyzing core features of 
international politics: its inter-societal 'between-ness', its concentrations of power, the centrality 
of state interests and rivalries, and its marked unevenness. And it follows from this that if 
Foucault's insights about the practices of liberal and modern power are to be convincingly 
applied to the international arena, then these need to be situated within a theoretical framework 
that allows equally for analysis of the 'why' of power – for analyses of economic and political 
concentrations of power, and of economic and political interests, strategies and decisions, as 
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well as of the means by which subjects are disciplined, governed and constituted.434
Bearing in mind all the coincidences and divergences with Foucault pointed out so far, I now proceed 
to the themes of the discourse of the US war on terrorism which suggest themselves as identifiable 
patterns within current socio-historical specificities of language and actions.
3.2 Us vs them; Democracy vs Terrorism; West vs Islam?
Terrorism as a discursive object serves as a platform on which the themes of the war on terrorism are 
produced. The first theme in the discourse on terrorism is a global dichotomy reminiscent of the 
neoconservative ideology where the US stands for democratic values and its mission is to confront 
tyranny abroad. A day after the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Bush described “a 
monumental struggle of good versus evil” in which “the freedom-loving nations of the world” would 
stand by the US and eventually “good” would prevail.435 The division established at that point would 
not allow room for third options: “You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror”, 
remarked Bush a couple of months later. Neither neutral ground nor lack of action would be permitted: 
“A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy, a coalition partner must perform… all 
nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something… Over time it's going to be important for 
nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity”.436 That same day, speaking to the Warsaw 
Conference on Combating Terrorism, the president attributed a moral high standard to the war on 
terrorism:
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Our efforts are directed at terrorist and military targets because – unlike our enemies – we value 
human life. We do not target innocent people, and we grieve for the difficult times the Taliban 
have brought to the people of their own country.437
A couple of days later he reinforced the message.438 The implication is that ‘we’ – the west, democratic 
societies, the US and its allies – never commit such crimes; not even if ‘we’ do commit them. As noted 
above, the assumption is that terrorism is always performed against the state or the status quo, in this 
case the US or its allies.
3.2.1 Are ‘the others’ Muslims and Arabs?
Shortly after September 11 Bush sent a reassuring message to the Muslim community, relieving any 
guilt from it as a religious and ethnic group. “These acts of violence against innocents violate the 
fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith… The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. Muslims… 
need to be treated with respect.”439 Speaking to the UN General Assembly he warned against the 
possibility that the war against terrorism would “serve as an excuse to persecute ethnic and religious 
minorities in any country”.  Innocent people, he added, should be allowed to live with their own 
religion and express dissent peacefully.440
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However, his remarks contrast with a number of comments from some of his supporters in politics and 
the media. For example, in the aftermath of the attacks, Republican US representative John Cooksey 
commented that “if I see someone [who] comes in that's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt 
wrapped around the diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over.” When someone noted that 
this implied illegal racial profiling, Cooksey replied “that some people, that 100% of the people who 
were involved in this, met a certain profile. ... [W]e can and should scrutinize people that fit that 
profile.” Ann Coulter, contributing editor for National Review On-Line, proposed to “invade their 
countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity”.441
Likewise, in his column of September 12th, 2001, neoconservative Charles Krauthammer described the 
attacks as “war”, immediately taking for granted that the terrorists were radical Islamists: “Who else 
trains cadres of fanatical suicide murderers who go to their deaths joyfully?” He emphatically pointed 
to the nations that harboured terrorists, contending that this was the front for the war against terrorism. 
Krauthammer would not allow any alternative views; he accused dissenting intellectuals of relativism 
or for blaming the US first. Because after the attacks, he argued, “has there ever been a time when the 
distinction between good and evil was more clear?” Ronald Reagan, he argued, had shown a better way 
to fight communism, and now Bush would show a better way to fight radical Islam. “The Bush doctrine 
marks the beginning of the rollback of the Islamic terror empire”. Afghanistan marked the “turning of 
the tide”, although the difficult part would still come in Iraq and Iran. The key to victory was to “bomb 
the holy warriors – and overawe the fence-sitting spectators.”442
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In a similar fashion, radio talk show host Jay Severin proposed that in order to stop Muslims from 
taking over the US its citizens should “all kill Muslims”. He was forced to apologize on the air, though 
he did not lose his job. Another radio commentator, Paul Harvey, described Islam as “a religion which 
encourages killing”. US General William G. Boykin, Undersecretary for Defence on Intelligence, 
removed from office in 2003, referred to Islam as an idolatrous, sacrilegious religion against which “we 
are waging a holy war”. While discussing his pursuit of a Muslim Somali warlord, Boykin declared, “I 
knew that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God and his was an idol”.443
Two years later, US Christian evangelical broadcaster Pat Robertson said on his live television 
programme that “the goal of Islam is… world domination”, adding that radical Muslims were “satanic” 
and inspired by “demonic power”.444 Notice that these citations constitute examples of the phenomenon 
of resonance described by Connolly and cited in chapter 2. Members of loosely connected groups – the 
military, the media, religion – share discursive elements which “fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and 
dissolve into each other”, morphing “into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and 
interinvolvement”.445
Whether intended or not the fact that such comments exist as the frame and background of the 
discourse of the authorities sends an ambiguous double message whereby Muslims, after all, could
indeed be targeted for their religion or ethnicity, albeit not always openly. The ambiguity is not unlike 
the double use of the concept of terrorism as both an attack on the innocent and never perpetrated by 
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the state in that it may change according to circumstances and at the convenience of power. As a 
consequence of the ambiguity, a 2004 report prepared by the University of Michigan indicates that 
fifteen percent of Arab Americans in the Detroit area said to have experienced harassment or 
intimidation since September 11, 2001, and 60 percent worry more about their family’s future than 
before the attacks. Most complained about derogatory comments or job discrimination, but some even 
declared being targeted by unfair law enforcement tactics.446 More recently, a Washington Post-ABC 
News poll found that 58% of Americans believe there are more violent extremists within Islam than in 
any other religion and that the faith encourages violence against non-Muslims. Since January 2002 the 
proportion of those who believe mainstream Islam promotes violence against non-believers has risen 
from 14% to 32%. 46% now hold unfavourable attitudes towards Islam, compared with 24% in January 
2002. An analyst cited in the study, Carroll Dougherty, from the Pew Research Centre for the People 
and the Press, notes as one of the possible reasons for the erosion in tolerance that after the first 
positive words from Bush towards Islam after September 11, 2001, there has been an absence of similar 
messages in the following years.447
Perhaps more relevant than the open discrimination from media commentators is the fact that in 
practice we find examples of specific targeting of Muslims – not because of reasonable suspicions of 
guilt but because of their religion. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, this is another departure 
from Foucault, who would preferred a distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, and an 
approach to Laclau and Mouffe's notion of the interweaving of language and actions.
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For example, in September 2004 a flight was diverted from its course because pop star and charity 
worker Yusuf Islam, formerly known as Cat Stevens, was a passenger. His entry to the US was refused 
on the basis that his name was on a list of people suspected of posing “a risk of air piracy or terrorism 
or a threat to airline or passenger safety”. The executive director of the Council on American-Islamic 
Relations, Nihad Awad, observed that the event sent “the disturbing message that even moderate and 
mainstream Muslims will now be treated like terrorists”.448 Again, whether intended or not, the fact is 
that practices add meaning to the discourse. Practices are both consequence of the message and part of 
the message in their own. Through them the discourse recreates and perpetuates itself; in this sense it 
has gained a life of its own beyond the control of any particular group of people.
About two months before the event involving Yusuf Islam, US authorities arrested the leadership of one 
of the largest Muslim charities in the country, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. 
The government alleged that money from the charity passed to “charitable fronts” for Hamas, 
apparently as aid for the families of its members jailed or killed. Both a Hamas senior official and the 
charity’s lawyer denied the accusation, but even if the case had been based on correct information, it 
does not explain why aid for family members – not militants themselves – would be considered a direct 
aid to terrorism. Coincidentally, Holy Land had been the subject of accusations by journalist Steven 
Emerson and self-described “terrorist hunter” Rita Katz – accusations which were never taken seriously 
because of their long history of false claims against Muslim US citizens.449
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Taken as a whole other seemingly trivial practices have contributed to the message: In December 2004 
Muslims returning to the US from an Islamic conference in Toronto were detained at the Lewiston-
Queenston Bridge until they agreed to be fingerprinted. A spokesperson for Homeland Security’s 
Customs and Border Protection explained that people were stopped based on information that 
gatherings like those could be a means for terrorists to promote their cause.450
The discourse on terrorism has also had consequences for the subject of foreign policy in issues where 
the real distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is not as clear as presented by commentators, and where 
once again the decisive factor seems to be Islam or Arab ethnicity. Neoconservatives Daniel Pipes, 
Norman Podhoretz and Krauthammer have made the radical Islamist and Palestinian issues central to 
their work. Krauthammer has categorically maintained that the war against countries harbouring 
terrorism had to go through Palestine, even if Israel had to do the actual fighting. His argument was that 
Yasir Arafat was committed to the destruction of Israel, Palestine was a “nasty police state”, and thus 
the only alternative was to eliminate the Palestinian Authority. If the US and Europe would not do it, 
then “Israel should be allowed to go in and do the job itself”.451
The neoconservatives and members of the Israel lobby were following a strategic rhetoric of Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who shortly after September 11, 2001, equated Osama Bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Hizbollah, Iraq and Iran.452 Joel Beinin 
comments that the fact that the Bush administration would later adopt Sharon’s argument of 
equivalence “demonstrates how easily the term [terrorism] can be abused to obscure the disparate 
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histories of events that appear superficially similar”.453
When Bush announced his support for the ‘road map’ for the peace in Palestine in March 2003, 
William Kristol, Donald Kagan, and Krauthammer said that supporting a Palestinian state “was pathetic 
and dangerous, because it was rewarded by terrorism”. The Weekly Standard urged Bush to finish the 
job in Iraq, extend the war on terrorism to other countries, and hold off on the peace process until 
Arafat and Palestinian terrorism were gone. In Podhoretz's view, there was “not a smidgen of 
difference” between Bush’s war in Afghanistan and Sharon’s invasion of the West Bank, since both 
were waged “for exactly the same reason”: to destroy terrorists. Podhoretz believed that to be complete 
the Bush Doctrine needed to assimilate Israel’s war against terrorism “into our own”.454
In what may be considered an example of resonance within the network of power, these calls seem to 
eventually have had an effect on the actual policies of the US government. Over the six months after 
September 11, 2001, vice president Dick Cheney and the then secretary of State Colin Powell, the 
leading spokesmen for two different viewpoints within the administration on the Middle East, each 
made extensive trips through the region in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although in the 
end it was Cheney’s vision that prevailed. To the so called ‘hawks’ of the Bush administration, 
including Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, the most important 
factor was the supposed underlying confluence of interests between Arafat’s Palestinian leadership and 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. They believed that each reinforced the other. Therefore, their short-term 
priority was to end the Palestinian uprisings. Long-term progress would only be achieved by finding a 
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way to make the Palestinian leadership more accommodating.455 Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and other 
Pentagon leaders resisted the idea that the administration should come down hard on Sharon, arguing 
that the Israeli military operations were part of a legitimate campaign against terrorism.
On June 24, 2002, Bush delivered a speech on the Middle East where he did not call for an 
international peace conference, as Powell had proposed; instead, he urged the Palestinian people to 
elect new leaders who were “not compromised by terror”. Bush promised that after a new, democratic 
Palestinian leadership was in place, the US would support the creation of a Palestinian state, explicitly 
abandoning Arafat. Also discarded was the past approach of seeking concessions from both Israelis and 
Palestinians at the same time. Under Bush’s new policy, it would be up to the Palestinians to change 
their leadership first, before Israel was required to take new steps of its own toward peace.456 A couple 
of years later the president described Sharon as a “man of peace”, ignoring the background of a leader 
known for his ruthlessness in war, particularly for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacre in southern 
Lebanon in the 1980s, a crime of which he was declared “personally responsible” by the official 1993 
Israeli report.457
The discourse on terrorism has been delivered on different levels, but with one general outcome. On 
one of these levels, the White House had been at first politically correct in its separation between Islam 
and terrorism, but eventually mostly silent about this essential distinction. Another level appears where 
lesser commentators have openly and aggressively equated Islam or Arab ethnicity with terrorism, 
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promoting rough and simplistic categories, such as linking the events of September 11 with the 
complex Palestinian conflict. The comments, added to a number of practices, resonate with each other 
and presumably have an influence on US government policies. This way, the final result of the equation 
of the overall message, while being ambivalent and contradictory – and thus more useful to power for 
its versatility – is a general demonisation of a specific group of people.
That the openly discriminatory face of the discourse serves a functional role for power is manifest 
through the selective application of the war on terrorism. It is not true that terrorism and tyranny are 
targeted; only terrorism and tyranny that have been identified as Muslim or Arab and that have been 
identified as enemies by the network of power emitting the discourse. The selectivity works both for 
foreign policy and through capillary power, in the everyday life of occupied countries such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and within the US itself.
It is also easy to see in the examples above that there exists a high degree of disproportionality in 
regards to any real threat, especially if it is said to be as dire as a “war”. There is no need to make use 
of statistics or other empirical data to realize that targeting a segment of the population for their 
religion, their names or the clothes they wear bears no relation to a perceived danger – whether real or 
not – to the US as a political or a cultural entity.
3.3 A new era of war and unprecedented danger
The second grand theme in the discourse has an almost apocalyptic connotation. According to Bush and 
many in the chorus the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were more than crimes, “they were acts 
of war”. The side under attack is that of “freedom and democracy”, whilst the attacker is a “different 
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enemy than we have ever faced”, one that “hides in shadows, and has no regard for human life”.458 It is 
not a regular war, but “a new kind of war”.459 Similarly, two days after the attacks, Wolfowitz told 
reporters “that we have, unfortunately, entered a new era.” That week, Wolfowitz spoke of parallels 
with the last world war, revealing the magnitude of his thoughts: “As Winston Churchill commented on 
the day after Pearl Harbor, dictators underestimate America’s strength.” In those days, he also warned
that the danger would not stop with taking care of a few criminals; rather, what was needed was a broad 
campaign to cut off the entire terrorist’s support system. The deputy secretary of Defence called for a 
strategy of “ending states who support terrorism.” He must have realized the implications of his words, 
for a day later he corrected himself, asserting that he had meant “ending state support for terrorism”. 
However, he did name Saddam Hussein as “one of the most active supporters of state terrorism”.460
This new war would not be regular. During the Afghanistan military campaign, Rumsfeld commented 
in a talk show that “it would be long” and “difficult”. He later told American soldiers in the field that 
with the close of the Afghan campaign “your job is certainly not over”. Bush had already warned at the 
beginning of the campaign that the “war on terrorism begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there”, 
while Powell regularly spoke of Afghanistan as “phase one” of a larger war.461
The members of the Bush administration contend that if the US does not make the world better, it will 
grow more dangerous. In his West Point address of 1 June 2002, Bush said: 
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Today our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states 
these weapons are tool of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbours. These 
weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent 
us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behaviour of rogue states. Such states also see 
these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the U.S.462
The suggestion that the enemies are more than a small group of people, but “rogue states” with 
“weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice” is what sustains the president’s assertions that 
“peril draws closer and closer”, a point that has been stressed several times, including the 2002 State of 
the Union.463 Indeed, during the last stages of the Afghan war, there had been a shift in the public 
rhetoric. The emphasis increasingly fell on the danger that Al Qaeda might obtain weapons of mass 
destruction. Rumsfeld said that it was “reasonable to assume” that Bin Laden had some access to 
chemical or biological weapons. Bush warned that terrorists were “searching for weapons of mass 
destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust”.464 Initially the focus was on terrorists 
obtaining weapons of mass destruction, but before long, there was another switch and the attention 
began to focus on the potential suppliers.465 Revealingly, at West Point Bush also said that “even weak 
states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations... If we wait for threats 
to fully materialize, we will have waited too long” (emphasis added); and speaking to a special session 
of the German Parliament on May 23, 2002: “if these regimes and their terrorist allies were to perfect 
these capabilities, no inner voice of reason, no hint of conscience would prevent their use”, suggesting 
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that the US had to take action before the weapons were acquired466 (emphasis added). The implication 
of the conditional tense is that the threat is a possibility and not an actuality, thus contradicting the 
original statement that we are, in fact and already, in a new kind of confrontation.
In terms of the approach for discourse analysis, the relevance of the language of war and the mention of 
states and heads of states is that they are an indication of a specific international agenda and 
geopolitical strategy; and therefore, the members of the network of power are not simply reproducing 
the discourse of World War II, nor merely speaking as a result of socio-historic ideas and assumptions, 
i.e. a long-lasting discourse of American identity and security such as the one analysed by Campbell.467
This is where a Foucauldian approach turns out to be limited and could be better complemented by 
other understandings of power.
3.3.1 Producing a sense of threat at home 
Once again, certain practices have helped produce a sense of threat within the US. A June 2006 case 
illustrates the point and serves as an example of disproportionality. Seven men were arrested in a 
warehouse in Miami for planning to blow up Chicago’s Sears Tower and an FBI building in North 
Miami Beach. According to the FBI and US Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales they were “home-
grown terrorists” inspired by “a violent jihadist message” who had sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda, yet 
had no contacts with it. No weapons were found and their plan was described as “aspirational” rather 
than “operational”.468
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The case against the men was based on comments that their leader Narseal Batiste made to FBI 
informants who pretended to represent Osama bin Laden. The warehouse in which they were meeting 
had been rented and wired for sound and video by FBI agents. The informants provided the money, the 
meeting place, video cameras for conducting surveillance, cell phones, and suggested the Miami FBI 
office as their first target.
The plot of the group was unlikely to succeed or even to be ever carried out; it featured self-proclaimed 
militant religious leaders who referred to themselves as kings; talked of establishing their own nation 
inside the US by declaring the independence of a sect, the Moorish Science Temple; called their 
headquarters an embassy and discussed plans to train their recruits to use bows and arrows and jump 
from bridges into the water. Batiste's father declared to the media that his son was “not in his right 
mind” and needed psychiatric treatment, while defendant lawyers alleged that the oath to al-Qaeda was 
“induced by the government themselves in an effort to set these people up.”469
In spite of the small probability that the group would successfully commit acts of terrorism, Gonzalez 
stressed that if “left unchecked, these home grown terrorists may prove to be as dangerous as groups 
like al Qaeda.”470
This was not the first case that was blown out of proportion. A popular 2004 BBC documentary, The 
Power of Nightmares – whose main argument is that for lack of a convincing ideology contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                                       
2006)
469 Walter Pincus, ‘FBI role in Terror Probe Questioned’, Washington Post, (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html, September 2, 2006)
470 ‘Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Florida Terrorism Indictments’, Department of Justice, 
(http://149.101.1.32/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_0606231.html, June 23, 2006)
199
leaders make use of fear as a way to secure their power and authority – makes a point of cases where 
the evidence was misinterpreted or exaggerated in order to give the impression of the existence of 
dangerous terrorist ‘sleeper’ cells.471 In the first terror trial after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US 
government based its case against four men of Middle-Eastern descent largely on the words of Youssef 
Hmimssa, a ‘career con man’ in jail for fraudulent use of credit cards and identity theft who agreed to 
testify in exchange for a reduction of his sentence. Hmimssa had previously denied that he knew 
anything about terrorists. Later he gave details of alleged attack plans and targets.472 According to the 
BBC documentary, Hmimssa declared to a prison mate that he had made up his declaration.
The case against the alleged terror cell was also based on two sketches drawn on a day planner and 
found in the Detroit apartment of three of the men.  The sketches are a series of doodles that the 
prosecution interpreted as plans of a hospital in Amman, Jordan, and an American air base in Turkey.473
The true meaning of the drawings is disputed and it is unlikely that it will ever be known. The BBC 
adds that they appear to have been drawn by a previous occupier of the apartment and not by the men 
accused.
The final piece of evidence was a video of landmarks in New York, Las Vegas and California which 
was interpreted as a surveillance video for later terrorist operations. However, a man who appears in 
the video testified that it was amateur footage from a Tunisian university student trip in which he took 
part. He said he believed another member of the student group may have sold the cameras after the trip 
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later back in Tunisia.474 The BBC included parts of the footage of the video and the scenes selected 
appear to confirm this version, as they show young women and men in a relaxed mood in tourist 
landmarks such as Disneyland.
Though three years later after their detention the Justice Department admitted that the prosecution was 
filled with a “pattern of mistakes and oversights” and a judge dropped the charges of the two men who 
had been found guilty475, the Bush administration had already hailed the detention of the men as a 
success in the war on terrorism. On the second anniversary of the 2001 attacks, Bush included the 
Detroit four among the alleged terrorists that had been “thwarted”, along with cases from Buffalo, 
Seattle, Portland, North Carolina and Tampa. Declaring that 260 suspected terrorists had been charged 
in US courts and 140 already convicted, he asked the Congress to “change the law and give law 
enforcement officials the same tools they have to fight terror that they have to fight other crime”.476
While it is beyond the focus of this thesis to examine each one of those cases in detail, it is worth 
considering Georgetown University’s professor of Law David Cole’s declaration to the BBC that 
“when you look at the details [of the above mentioned cases] the facts just don’t support that [these are 
sleeper terrorist cells] and [the authorities] have not proved that any group within the United States has 
plotted to engage in any terrorist activity within the United States in all of the cases that they have 
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brought since 9/11”.477
Naturally, that there are some cases where we can be reasonably certain that the threat has been 
exaggerated does not prove that all cases suffer from the same degree of disproportionality. The 
information presented here does show, however, that there is a tendency, manifested more than once 
through certain practices of people in positions of power, to support and stimulate the theme of a 
constant danger from terrorism. These practices resonate when their results become material for the 
declarations of higher ranking officers in the administration, just as the original declarations appear to 
have stimulated the practices. Furthermore, the declarations often serve the purpose of justifying 
specific changes in policy or law, i.e. a direct exercise of power that would otherwise have not been 
easily accepted by the population. When signing the controversial Patriot Act, Bush emphasized that 
the new law would “help counter a threat like no other our nation has ever faced”.478
3.3.2 Producing a sense of threat abroad
The threat has also been characterized as coming from abroad and requiring military action. The 
president declared that the “war on terror will not be won on the defensive”, announcing that “this 
nation will act”; thus, all US citizens had to “be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend 
our liberty and to defend our lives”.
The most obvious example of the discourse of threat is the war on Iraq. In an address to the UN 
                                                
477 The Power of Nightmares, Part 3: The Shadows in the Cave
478 ‘President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill’, White House, 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026-5.html, October 26, 2001)
202
General Assembly on September 12, 2002 Bush focused on the case against Iraq while repeating the 
argument that “we cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather.”479 On another speech on 7 
October 2002, he called for the disarmament of Iraq and inserted phrases like “on September 11th, 
2001, America felt its vulnerability”, thus linking the powerful psychological memory of September 11, 
2001, with Saddam Hussein. Three months later, when accused of wanting to invade Iraq, Bush replied: 
“prior to September 11, we were discussing smart sanctions. ...After September 11, the doctrine of 
containment just doesn't hold any water. ...My vision shifted dramatically after September 11, because I 
now realize the stakes, I realize the world has changed.” Rumsfeld followed him by explaining that the 
US “did not act in Iraq because dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We 
acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on 
September 11.”480 We should recall, however, that neoconservatives had long had Iraq as one of their 
targets. They were also producing a discourse of danger at least for a full year before the attacks on the 
WTC and the Pentagon: a 2000 document published by The Project for the New American Century that 
called for a “revolution in military affairs” lamented that the transformation would occur slowly –
unless “some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a New Pearl Harbor” took place.481 Again, this 
speaks of an explicit agenda promoted by specific groups of people. Foucauldian considerations about 
history and identity may serve as a context but are not sufficient to explain the specificities.
It appears that a revolution in military affairs is what was being sought. While touring Europe, 
Wolfowitz repeatedly argued that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiated by the Nixon 
administration no longer made sense. “The world of 2001 is fundamentally different from that of 
                                                
479 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: 141
480 Robert Jervis, Understanding the Bush Doctrine: 371, 372
481 ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century’, The Project for the New 
American Century (September 2000): 51
203
1972,” he said, wondering why more than a decade after the Berlin Wall came down “we are still in 
some ways… wedded to old Cold War notions of deterrence.”482 Following the same line of thought, 
Bush announced in December 2001 that the US would withdraw from the ABM treaty because the 
agreement “was written in a different era, for a different enemy”. The irony is that Bush and Wolfowitz 
are attempting to stimulate a discourse that borrows much from the Cold War by establishing a distance 
from the Cold War strategy of deterrence. In this respect Foucault was correct by observing that 
discourses were often marked by discontinuities. The case in hand suggests that discontinuities may be 
the result of socio-historical specificities: groups of people, their language and actions.
In early 2002 the Pentagon delivered to Congress a classified document: the Nuclear Posture Review. 
The new strategy shifted the nuclear purpose away from the concepts of defence and deterrence and 
towards war fighting: bunker-busting nuclear weapons could be employed against enemy supplies of 
chemical or biological weapons, and nuclear weapons could also be used in response to “an Iraqi attack 
on Israel or its neighbours, or a North Korean attack on the South, or a military confrontation over the 
status of Taiwan”. No explanation is given of how a nuclear offensive strategy would effectively 
combat terrorism, apart from Rumsfeld’s: “The terrorists who struck us on Sept. 11 were clearly not 
deterred from doing so by the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal”, therefore “defending against terrorism 
and other emerging 21st Century threats requires that we take the war to the enemy”. In short, “the best 
and in some cases the only defence is a good offence.”483
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3.4 US military supremacy as a solution
The sense of threat leads to the conclusion that the US must seek supremacy, mostly in military terms. 
With the self-granted right to preemptive action the US established itself as “the world’s preeminent 
power, as the chief judge and enforcer of international stability”, as James Mann put it. In the West 
Point Speech, Bush shared his view of a world dominated by a superpower so militarily strong that any 
attempts to match it would not be worth the effort. He warned: “America has, and intends to keep, 
military strength beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, 
and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”484
Neoconservative commentators again reinforced the message by explicitly supporting US supremacy. 
While Krauthammer argued against the need for seeking legitimacy with other countries for US 
military action,485 the Weekly Standard published as its main feature an article entitled “The Case for 
American Empire,” by Max Boot, a month after September 11, 2001. Boot wrote that imperialist 
realism was the country's most realistic option; the terrorist attacks were a call for the US to 
unambiguously embrace its imperial responsibilities.486 He also declared that the invasion of 
Afghanistan “provided a vital boost for US security, not only by routing the terrorist network, but also 
by dispelling the myth of US weakness”, and in March 2003 claimed that “the invasion of Iraq will be 
another vital step toward restoring a healthy fear of US power”.487
                                                
484 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: 328; Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’: 372
485 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment’, Survival, 46-1 (2004): 13
486 Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: 155
487 G. John Ikenberry, ‘The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment’: 14
205
3.5 Idealism
The then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had also far-reaching schemes in her mind; hers 
were not constrained to the military. According to Rice the US is not merely fighting terrorism but 
constructing a whole new order, born from the changes that have taken place after the collapse of 
Soviet power, in a transition that is now coming to an end: this is “a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when 
American leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states – Japan and Germany among 
the great powers – to create a new balance of power that favoured freedom.”488
The members of the Bush administration have attempted to balance the negative idea of an 
unprecedented and threatening struggle with a positive one which may be identified as idealism. A 
possibility of progress is offered. A week after September 11, 2001, Bush is reported to have told one of 
his advisers: “We have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it 
right.” Six months afterwards, in a formal speech, he said: “When the terrorists are disrupted and 
scattered and discredited,... we will see then that the old and serious disputes can be settled within the 
bounds of reason, and goodwill, and mutual security. I see a peaceful world beyond the war on terror, 
and with courage and unity, we are building that world together.”489
Having examined in the previous chapter the possible Straussian origins of the network of power, 
together with the known examples of misrepresentation of facts, we should not immediately assume 
that the declarations above are motivated by moral values and ideals – at least not by them alone. As 
discussed, the Straussian ideology that seems to have influenced neoconservatism to some extent 
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advised the elite to make use of ‘noble lies’ and to create myths to conceal the truths of power. Again, a 
Foucauldian perspective is helpful as a platform to understand discourses and myths that surpass the 
actions, language and intentions of any individual or group of people; Foucault's notions of the 
inescapability of interpretation490 and a discursive standpoint as a requirement to make sense of 
things491 suggest deeply embedded historical and cultural assumptions that permeate society as a 
whole, even if discontinuously. But it does not have much to say about the possibility of groups in 
positions of power consciously producing or reinventing discourses and myths, what degree of success 
they may have in such endeavour, and what role they may play in creating the discontinuities observed 
by Foucault.
3.6 Targeting states: the axis of evil
The neoconservative group shifted the policy of the war on terrorism from what could have been 
exclusively political and intelligence-based mechanisms – similar to those that have been applied in 
countries such as Northern Ireland or the Basque country against rebel or separatist groups – and into a 
much broader model of state-on-state conflict. Conservative critics Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke 
have used the term ‘hijacking’ to describe the takeover by neoconservative plans that had been in 
preparation for at least a decade. The ‘hijack’ consisted of controlling the debate in order to exclude 
other options, promoting an almost exclusive focus on the Middle East and the use of military force not 
simply for defensive purposes but for preemptive reasons.492
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The countries to be targeted were explicitly identified by neoconservatives both in and out of the 
government. In the first days after September 11, Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby argued that the forces 
behind terrorism in the Middle East were all interconnected, therefore, if the US could defeat Saddam 
Hussein, terrorist groups throughout the region would be weakened.493 The day of the attacks in New 
York and Washington presidential speechwriter David Frum spent an hour on the telephone with 
Richard Perle, whose first response to the events was to counsel that the US go after “not just terrorists, 
but whoever harbours those terrorists”.494 Likewise, Krauthammer wanted the US to attack not only 
Afghanistan, but also Syria, Iraq and Iran, urging government officials to focus on countries harbouring 
terrorists, not on the terrorist networks themselves. “The overriding aim of the war on terrorism is
changing regimes”, he declared openly – a statement more evidently linked to geopolitical strategy and 
a specific international agenda than issues of American identity and security. Kristol and Kagan used 
their columns, television appearances, and the PNAC to make the case for extending the war to Iraq, 
Iran, and Hezbollah, usually in that order.495 Cheney announced that the administration had concluded 
that it would bring down “the full wrath of the United States” upon nations that provide sanctuary or 
support for terrorists. Asked about Iraq, though, he said that Osama was the target “at the moment… at 
this stage”. In late November 2001 Richard Armitage admitted that while it had been unsuccessfully 
tried to tie Iraq and Al Qaeda together, he had the view that there were “enough problems with Iraq 
with its weapons of mass destruction”, something for which they would have to pay a price sooner or 
later.496 He did not provide evidence for the latter claim.
The president followed the lead of the neoconservative network. On the night of September 11, 2001, 
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Bush used the suggested phrase about targeting “those who harbour” terrorists. For a moment, on 
September 12, he seemed to aim at non-state actors by saying that “this enemy hides in shadows”. But 
on October 7, as the Afghan war opened, he added: “Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is 
broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any 
government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, 
themselves.”  By his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, he was firmly focusing on states. 
He termed Iran, Iraq, and North Korea the “axis of evil”, a phrase that has been credited to Frum.497
Frum later confessed that the original aim of the speech of the State of the Union was specifically to 
target Iraq. Mark Gerson, Bush’s speechwriter, had asked him to find a justification for war against this 
country. Iran was added later, and finally North Korea as a seemingly casual afterthought.498
Frum's admission simply confirms that key elements of the discourse on terrorism had conveniently 
morphed through different speeches to suit the neoconservative agenda – that it was more or less 
coherent with historic ideals proper to American culture does not appear to be the main motivating 
factor, but rather the condition of possibility for the specificities of the discourse of the war on 
terrorism. James Mann describes the transformation:
Thus over a period of less than five months the administration had progressively shifted the 
focus of the war on terrorism from (a) retaliating against the perpetrators of the September 11 
attacks to (b) stopping terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction to (c) preventing 
states from supplying terrorists with these weapons. Indeed, there were suggestions in Bush’s 
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speech that a link between the states and terrorism wasn’t absolutely necessary; what mattered 
above all were (d) the axis-of-evil states and their weapons programs.
Over the fourteen months after the 2002 State of the Union, while the administration prepared for the 
invasion of Iraq, officials repeatedly emphasized that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of 
mass destruction.499 This had been chosen as the primary justification for war. Wolfowitz admitted in a 
May 2003 interview with Vanity Fair that the main reason for war had been a deliberate choice:
The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we 
settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as 
the core reason, but... there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of 
mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the 
Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the 
connection between the first two...  The third one by itself, as I think I said earlier, is a reason to 
help the Iraqis but it's not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly not on the scale 
we did it. That second issue about links to terrorism is the one about which there's the most 
disagreement within the bureaucracy...500
Months after the facts, Zalmay Khalilzad, who was in charge of Iraq policy for Rice’s National Security 
Council, confirmed that the removal of weapons of mass destruction was not the real reason for war by 
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stating that the administration would not be satisfied without regime change.501 Finally, at the end of 
March 2006, The New York Times confirmed that the weapons of mass destruction were not the relevant 
issue when it cited a confidential British memorandum where Bush made clear to Blair in January 2003 
that he was determined to invade Iraq without a UN resolution and even if arms inspectors failed to 
find weapons of mass destruction in the country.502
We learn from Wolfowitz, Khalilzad, and the British memorandum that the network of power picked a 
primary justification out of three or four for an invasion that was already decided for a different reason, 
possibly making use of a ‘noble lie’.
Once an argument for the public was chosen the neoconservatives divulged it. Richard Perle, James 
Woolsey and other officials and former officials pressed it throughout 2002. In Perle's words, “The 
casus belli is that we know Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons... We know 
that he hates the United States. We know that he is working on nuclear weapons.” On August 26 2002, 
Cheney rejected sending UN weapons inspectors back to Iraq, because “Saddam has perfected the art 
of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception”. He assured that Saddam had 
resumed his attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and to enhance the country's capabilities in chemical 
and biological weapons, adding that Iraq had 10 percent of the world’s oil reserves, and if Hussein had 
weapons of mass destruction, he “could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, 
taking control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies.” The president followed the vice 
president: in a speech to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, Bush warned that if 
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Hussein wanted peace, he should “disclose and remove or destroy” all weapons of mass destruction.
These weapons would never be found. David Kay, the former UN weapons inspector appointed to run 
the CIA’s postwar search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, told Congress in October 2003 that 
Iraq’s nuclear program had been in only “the very most rudimentary” state.503
When European nations criticized the new approach of the US, Krauthammer replied by calling Europe 
an “axis of petulance. …The ostensible complaint is American primitivism. The real problem is their 
irrelevance.” Powell said that the French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine – who had called Bush’s 
State of the Union “simplistic” – was “getting the vapours”. 
A double standard was revealed when North Korea confirmed it had an ongoing nuclear weapons 
program and the Bush administration insisted there was no sense of crisis or urgency. Powell noted that 
“with respect to Iran and with respect to North Korea, there is no plan to start a war with those 
nations”, omitting Iraq from his comment. What was taking place with North Korea was “not a crisis,” 
according to Powell.504 Their lack of interest in North Korea in contrast to their position towards Iraq 
reveals the selective use of language and therefore a specific intentionality; again, one which cannot be 
explained away by simply making reference to issues of national identity.
3.7 Preemption
It was at the West Point address in June 2002 that the president first talked about the key concept of 
“preemptive action” that would be part of the justification for the Iraq war. “We must take the battle to 
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the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge,” the president said.
“Preemptive action” meant that the US could start a war if it felt threatened, that containment and 
deterrence would now be forgotten – in contradiction with a principle of the United Nations Charter: 
that of war only as self-defence.505 Considering the degree of disproportionality in the theme of threat 
and the specific international goals of the neoconservatives, the idea of preemption results almost in an 
euphemism for attack at will.
The administration's policy of preemption achieved formal status when it was included in the National 
Security Strategy published on September 17, 2002, described by neoconservative Max Boot as a 
“quintessentially neoconservative document”. Halper and Clarke rightly describe the doctrine of 
preemption as “a kind of global Monroe Doctrine” married to the Wilsonian ideal to “bring the hope of 
democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world”; a policy that would 
require a greatly enabled and reconfigured US military.506
It should be stressed that the idea was not to take the initiative against an enemy who was about to 
attack the US, but rather to take action “against... emerging threats before they are fully formed,” 
(emphasis added) as Bush explained in a letter accompanying the National Security Strategy.507
The strategy openly argues that this is the proper way to proceed against terrorism, thus placing 
preemption as a central strategy of the war on terrorism:
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Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics 
are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom 
in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness... The United States has long 
maintained the option of preemptive action to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for 
taking anticipatory action to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.508
The document did include some references to cooperation and balance of power509, but they were in 
conflict with the vision of an unchallengeable US superpower with right to preemptive attack.
4. Principles of production and reinforcement of discourse
This section seeks to identify some of the systems of exclusion explained by Foucault which are at 
work in the production and reinforcement of a discourse, while assessing their actual relevance to the 
discourse of the war on terrorism.
4.1 Opposition Between True and False
The first principle, already implicit in the examples above, is the opposition between true and false. As 
seen above, some of the producers of the discourse of the war on terrorism may have made certain
propositions with the idea of the Straussian ‘noble lie’ in mind. But here I wish to consider Foucault’s 
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notion that when things are seen from a grand scale and above the level of propositions, the “will to 
know” becomes an institutionally confining system. Like the other systems of exclusion, the will to 
truth rests on an institutional support: pedagogy, the system of books, publishing, libraries, learned 
societies and laboratories. It also tends to exert “a sort of pressure and something like a power 
constraint” on other discourses.510
Following Foucault, what lies at the bottom of the true/false divide in our society is a pretension of 
sustaining one’s claims with science, which implies a specific method and a will to truth. Much of his 
work was aimed at showing how a will to power hides underneath this alleged neutral and scientific 
description of reality. While every producer of a discourse needs to appear to sustain their claims on 
science, or more generally on this will to truth, in order to achieve and preserve credibility, the 
demands for evidence and rationality vary depending on the context and the discipline. More rigor is 
demanded from a scholar than a politician. 
While I have argued in a previous section that basic facts as revealed by scientific research should not 
be dismissed on the basis of radical relativistic arguments, Foucault's observations are valid here in the 
sense that the discourse of the war on terrorism seeks to validate itself as a scientific 'truth' for reasons 
of power. In what follows I seek to explore the possibility that works of research and science may have 
had an effect on the post-September 11, 2001 discourse on terrorism, i.e. if science has exerted a sort of 
pressure on political discourse, or perhaps vice versa.
During the decade before the attacks on the WTC a number of texts of political scientists were 
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produced that could have well served as a basis for the current political discourse. Widely known is 
Samuel Huntington’s 1993 thesis of a “clash of civilizations” where “the central axis of world politics 
in the future is likely to be... the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-
Western civilizations to Western power and values.”511 We see these grand conflicting categories 
echoed in a central theme of the discourse of the war on terrorism: ‘our’ values (“freedom and 
democracy”) in confrontation with ‘theirs’ (those of a vaguely defined ‘other’: ‘terrorists’, usually 
‘Islamic extremists’). Perhaps more surprising for its similarities with Bush’s definition of an ‘axis of 
evil’ (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) and the justification for a war on Iraq (weapons of mass destruction and 
an open reference to the threat of terrorism) is the following:
The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not 
exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other 
sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic 
capabilities for achieving that goal.512
More directly related to the study of terrorism, authors writing shortly before, during and shortly after 
September 11, 2001, clearly portrayed the threat of terrorist groups, specifically al-Qaeda, in 
catastrophic terms – another constant element of the contemporary discourse of the war on terrorism. In 
February 2001, Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam declared “that we have entered into an Age 
of Super and Cyber Terrorism” and that “perhaps even the survival of civilization itself” would be in 
question.513 Similarly, Roland Jacquard wrote in late 2001 that the destruction of the Taliban and al-
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Qaeda should not make us forget that “the threat remains intact”, for the global network persisted 
thanks to “mysterious financial powers, and no doubt new leaders lurking in the shadows” who could 
some day master weapons of mass destruction and target “entire cities or countries”, in which case “all 
of humanity would be in grave danger.”514
After September 11, 2001, we find authors who portray al-Qaeda in identical terms as the dominant 
discourse. Rohan Gunaratna describes it as “the first multinational terrorist group of the twenty-first 
century” which “confronts the world with a new kind of threat”. Gunaratna’s main support for his 
characterization of Al Qaeda is a series of interviews with “hundreds of terrorists, including Al Qaeda 
members and government specialists.” Indeed, upon examining his references, we often find interviews 
with US or British intelligence officers, or with Islamic leaders, often anonymous. According to 
Gunaratna, intelligence specialists had so far thought of terrorist cells acting independently, but that 
was because we were unaware of how Al Qaeda “cleverly reverted to one-to-one contact, primarily via 
couriers, as a means of keeping in touch that circumvented governments’ technical means of 
intelligence-gathering”. Thus, the reason that the world ignored that Al Qaeda was a worldwide 
network rather than independent cells appears to be that intelligence services were deceived by 
personal contacts. He further writes that another reason for the previous misconception was that the 
name “Al Qaeda” was never used by Osama bin Laden before September 11, 2001, and the group 
sometimes uses other names. In this way, it keeps us “guessing about its true motives, its true 
intentions. Al Qaeda maintains its practice of absolute secrecy” even when dealing with allied 
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groups.515
The anonymity of the sources, their direct involvement in struggles for political power, their apparent 
failure to correctly characterize Al Qaeda as a global network before September 11, 2001, and the fact 
that the true nature of the group is concealed by “absolute secrecy” do not diminish the ‘scientific 
validity’ of the overall research because it is assumed that the researcher’s sources are bona fide and 
reliable. Therefore, the question about the role that works like this one may fulfil in the preservation of 
a discourse produced in the context of power, and not of truth, never arises.
In spite of the assumed will to truth, Gunaratna manifests a certain degree of scepticism towards the 
perspectives of history and political science when studying Al Qaeda. They are valuable, he writes, but 
they “can lead to an underestimation of the phenomenon”, for “Al Qaeda is a worldwide movement 
capable of mobilising a new and hitherto unimagined global conflict”.516 A political scientist would 
examine the manifestations of the phenomenon within their specific political and social circumstances 
and a historian would seek to situate them within a historical context. It would be hard to maintain the 
view that Al Qaeda is capable of global reach and of creating an unprecedented conflict if specificity 
and the context of history are provided. We discover in Gunaratna’s comment, apparently a minor one, 
a reflection of the reaction of the discourse of the war on terrorism towards a manifest challenge. If left 
to their own, history and political science may lead to conclusions that would force the discourse to 
shift one of its major themes: that of the existence of an unprecedented threat.
It is clear, then, that a relationship exists among certain works of research – some considered political 
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science – and the discourse of the war on terrorism. What is not evident is if science is exerting 
pressure on political discourse or if the political is influencing science. Perhaps it is best to think of it as 
a reciprocal and sinergic relationship where both parts feed on each other.
It is important to notice, however, that there are many other works, also considered of science, and 
journalistic research, that are critical of the positions summarized above, some diverging in non-
essential points but others in stark contradiction. In this sense, and for the case of the war on terrorism, 
the Foucauldian assumption that all institutionalized science, or the most of its mainstream, supports 
the discourse is incorrect.
Journalist Jason Burke insists that Al Qaeda “is less an organization than an ideology”.517 While Burke 
is also assumed to be writing for a will to truth, his conclusions are a challenge to the discourse and 
contrary to Gunaratna's. Al Qaeda, he writes, is not the “fantastically powerful network comprising 
thousands of trained and motivated men” around the globe that is commonly believed to be.518 Islamic 
militants always understood the term qaeda in the sense of “precept” or “method”, and so when 
Abdullah Azzam, the chief ideologue of the non-Afghan militants who joined the Mujahideen to fight 
the Soviets and a spiritual mentor of bin Laden, called for al-qaeda al-sulbah (a vanguard of the strong) 
in 1987, he was referring to a mode of activism, a tactic and an ideal, not an organization. Al Qaeda 
only evolved into resembling something like an organized group between 1996 and 2001.519 Even then, 
writes Burke, it was centred around a small core of only between fifty and a hundred committed 
militants which provided funding and advice to different groups from all over the Islamic world. But 
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seeing that group “as a coherent and structured terrorist organization with cells everywhere” or 
containing “all other groups within its networks” would be “to profoundly misconceive its nature and 
the nature of modern Islamic militancy.”520 The group was not even called Al Qaeda by its own 
members. “It was the FBI”, he writes, “during its investigation of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in 
East Africa – which dubbed the loosely linked group of activists that Osama bin Laden and his aides 
had formed as “al Qaeda”.”521 The decision was partly a consequence of institutional conservatism and 
partly because of the application of conventional antiterrorism laws by the FBI.522 According to Burke 
the structure in Afghanistan has been destroyed, bin Laden and his associates have scattered, been 
arrested or killed. What remains, he writes, is Al Qaeda’s worldview, with adherents among many 
groups. Still, Islamic moderates are the great majority around the world. The labelling of Al-Qaeda 
subsists, though; with the implication that bin Laden’s group is something it is not. Contrary to 
Gunaratna’s skepticism towards history and social science, Burke notes that “the contingent, dynamic 
and local elements of what is a broad and ill-defined movement rooted in historical trends of great 
complexity are lost.” 523
However, it should be noted that Burke’s account is not entirely alien to the discourse. In his view, the 
worldview and ideology of Al Qaeda still represent a considerable threat that will remain so “in the 
years to come”.524 Still, his book remains as one which mostly contradicts the assumptions of the
discourse of the war on terrorism.
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Authors dealing with the subject of terrorism and Al Qaeda are well aware of the temptation of seeing a 
confirmation of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Many resist it. Peter L. Bergen observes that “superficially”, 
bin Laden seems to fit into Huntington’s thesis, but “a closer look shows that his rage is as much 
directed against one of the most conservative Muslim states in the world – Saudi Arabia – as against the 
United States”; he adds that many examples of other contemporary conflicts do not occur for cultural 
differences and that treating Islam “as a monolith” is defying common sense.525 Even more critical is 
Noam Chomsky, who describes the designation of the actions of the U.S. as a “war on terrorism” as 
“simply more propaganda”, and the ‘clash of civilizations’ as “fashionable talk” which “makes little 
sense”.526
4.2 Commentary
Decades before 2001, the tendency of those who wrote and spoke about terrorism in global terms was 
to do so in the context of the Cold War. Truly, as noted above the contemporary war on terrorism owes 
much to the previous one, when the masterminds of global terrorism were mostly suggested to be 
communists. Commenting on the US discourse on terrorism of the 1980s, Michael Gold-Biss observed 
a “small but vociferous community of interpretation” (a society of discourse) comprising media 
commentators, policy analysts and scholars, who categorized terrorism as a social actor independent of 
context and history – recall Gunaratna’s scepticism towards political science and history – and assumed 
that terrorism “was not only novel in terms of its contemporary manifestation”, but also in its “mythical 
destructive proportions”. As it is today, terrorism was perceived to be “mostly anti-Western”. However, 
it was also believed to be “pro-revolutionary”, and therefore communist. The message of the 
                                                
525 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, (Phoenix, 2001): 227, 228
526 Noam Chomsky, 9-11 (Seven Stories Press, 2001): 16, 78
221
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate 
(1981-1986) was “a simplified version of an imminent apocalypse in which the powers of Evil – the 
Soviet Union, its sundry allies and sycophant lackeys – clashed with the bastion of Good and Morality 
– the United States and Western Civilization – over the future of mankind”.527
Many have noted the parallels between the mentality that prevailed during the Cold War in the US and 
the current war on terrorism. Some even observe a sort of continuity of such ideology. David Campbell 
writes:
What we have, then, is the war on terrorism morphing into a re-run of the Cold War. The Cold 
War, remember, was both a struggle which exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union, and 
a struggle into which any number of potential candidates – regardless of their strategic capacity 
to be a threat – were slotted as a threat... [T]he sort of struggle the phrase denotes is a struggle 
over identity: a struggle that is not context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a 
particular kind of threat. But what was distinctive about the Cold War, and what has survived 
the demise of the Soviet Union, are the long established interpretive dispositions towards the 
international environment. These involve the zero-sum analyses of international action, the 
sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge
and subversion, the tendency to militarize all responses, and the willingness to draw the lines of 
superiority/inferiority between us and them.
This return of the past means we have different objects of enmity, different allies, but the same 
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structure for relating to the world through foreign and security policy.528
In the same line of reasoning, N.P. Singh comments: “It is almost too obvious to say that terrorism now 
occupies the place and function that fascism held in World War II and that communism held within the 
discourse of the cold war.”529 Indeed, some of the themes detected in the text of the discourse appeared 
in similar form during the Cold War and have never gone away completely. When standing within a 
Foucauldian perspective we should remain sceptical about any historical explanation that proposes the 
existence of long term continuity or of a single cause in the past for multiple phenomena in the present. 
Yet we cannot dismiss the corresponding characteristics that link the US war on terrorism to the Cold 
War mentality; the former being a commentary (“things said once and preserved because it is suspected 
that behind them there is a secret or a treasure”530) of the latter.
Richard Falk wrote at the beginning of the 1990s about the process of legitimating US “terrorism” 
around the world since 1947. He detected four elements that were necessary to avoid an adverse public 
opinion in a society with democratic values:
- Cold War mindset: The society needs to be convinced that the public is threatened by “an 
unscrupulous, powerful, and evil enemy”.
- Secrecy, deceit: To avoid criticism, the government relies on secrecy and the manipulation of 
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information. The CIA operates through covert operations funded by a non-accountable budget; its 
methods are often indistinguishable from those of terrorist groups condemned for their illegality and 
immorality.
- Invisible government: The “national security” process is sustained by unelected career bureaucrats 
with links to the media, the private industry “– even to its criminal underground – and the ultra-right.”
- Racism: In order to accept the terrorist acts of the state, its targets have to be dehumanized, portraying 
them as “fanatical monsters” or “subhuman beings” opposed to national values and way of life.531
Compare these elements with the themes that are repeated in the war on terrorism. The Cold War 
mindset (in the general sense of 'us' vs 'them') and racism have already been discussed above. What 
Falk calls the invisible government is an element comparable to the power relations examined in the 
previous chapter. The element of secrecy and deceit is discussed at different points in this chapter, 
mostly through what appear to be cases of the use of ‘noble lies’.
It should be added that the producers of the discourse will not always recognize the parallels with the 
Cold War if it is not convenient for specific purposes. This is what marks the discursive discontinuity 
and the presence of contradictions – both elements rightly observed by Foucault.  Wolfowitz repeatedly 
argued that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiated by the Nixon administration no longer made 
sense because “the world of 2001 is fundamentally different from that of 1972,” wondering why more 
than a decade after the Berlin Wall came down “we are still in some ways… wedded to old Cold War 
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notions of deterrence.” Reading from the same script, Bush announced in December 2001 that the US 
would withdraw from the ABM treaty, because the agreement “was written in a different era, for a 
different enemy”.532
Just as the war on terrorism is a commentary on the Cold War, the main body of the current discourse 
constantly resonates and is reproduced by journalists, authors and politicians around the world. Burke, 
himself a journalist, is aware of the repetition of the message of Al Qaeda as a threat; he attributes this 
to the reassuring effect that the idea of a single man behind the threat has for the public, to the 
preference of news editors to “splash a ‘bin Laden link’ on their front pages”, and to political and 
“more consciously cynical motives too”: repressive governments label opponents ‘Al-Qaeda’ to limit 
international criticism and to encourage support from the US. Examples of such a shift in local political 
discourses in the months after September 11, 2001, can be found in China, Macedonia, Tunisia, 
Philippines,533 Israel, Russia and Spain.534
Similarly, the government and media discourses specific to certain post-911 events, such as the 
bombings in Madrid and London, are commentaries of the discourse of the Bush administration, and 
the elements, themes and discursive objects may be easily traced in those cases.
4.3 Author and Disciplines
The author as a principle where an identity and individuality confer meaning, coherence and 
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truthfulness to a group of texts and messages, finds its most obvious manifestation in US political 
figures for which the national public has, a great respect and who are in general considered trustworthy 
for reasons of patriotism or the tradition of institutions. Although the members of the Bush 
administration have seen their reputations eroded at the end of their second term, in principle the 
president, the vice president and the members of their staff, as living national symbols, step into office 
exempted from the same degree of natural scepticism that other figures taking part in the public debate 
would get from the public. The reputation conferred by academic degrees or positions in the media – of 
which some cases we have already examined above – may also allow actors not directly related to 
political power to achieve the status of authors.
This principle is also closely connected to that of discipline, sometimes to the point where they can 
only be separated by abstraction. The authorities who incarnate the author are assumed to hold “a 
domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and 
definitions, of techniques and instruments”.535 If science is the discipline for scholars, then the art of 
government – which the public assumes to include skills such as leadership, ability to administrate, 
diplomacy, etc. – is the discipline for political authorities. Naturally, the assumption that the discipline
of government is trustworthy applies for virtually any discourse that springs from most governments 
around the world, except those going through crises of credibility.
In the case of the US war on terrorism these two principles have had a further specific manifestation in 
lower levels of authority: those related to intelligence and security. Many basic propositions supporting 
the discourse are validated by pointing out that the sources possess a discipline that qualifies them as 
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authors. It is all too common that ‘intelligence sources’ whose reliability is unquestioned are cited. 
Most of the times there are few details provided about these sources under the assumption that the work 
of military or security services will be hindered. The secrecy that this type of information requires 
makes the situation an opportunity for the abuse of power. Burke observes that in spite of the fact that 
“intelligence services lie, cheat and deceive”536,
a convention seems to have developed whereby something from a ‘security source’, even if 
released by politicians, suddenly acquires a degree of reliability. Actually, such material should 
be treated with extreme circumspection, not exempted from normal journalistic practices. The 
fact that it cannot be corroborated independently should not be seen as a confirmation of the 
utility of the information but as the opposite... There are many who have no scruples about 
disseminating misleading information to achieve their own goals...537
The finest examples of the use of sources of intelligence as a sort of validating discipline for purposes 
of power took place in the months preceding the war on Iraq. After the Bush administration repeatedly 
alleged that war was necessary to disarm a country which had major stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction, and that there was reliable intelligence about the connections between Saddam Hussein and 
Al-Qaeda, no such weapons were found nor proof of such links. On the contrary, a memo from 
Downing Street later revealed that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” of 
removal of Saddam since 2002 and not the other way around, as the public was led to believe. Iraq’s 
weapons capability was really “less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran”.538 As already noted 
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above, Wolfowitz admitted in a May 2003 interview with Vanity Fair that “for reasons that have a lot to
do with the US government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on 
which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason” for invasion539, while Khalilzad stated that 
the administration would not be satisfied without regime change.540 At the end of March 2006, The New 
York Times cited a confidential British memorandum where President Bush made clear to Prime 
Minister Tony Blair in January 2003 that he was determined to invade Iraq without a UN resolution and 
even if arms inspectors failed to find the weapons in the country.541
Thus, bureaucrats picked a justification for an invasion that was already decided for a different reason, 
while it was generally presented as valid information gathered by the discipline of intelligence.
4.4 Ritual
Gestures, behaviour, circumstances and other signs which accompany the discourse reinforce the 
strength of the words. Virtually every speech or act performed by the president of the US contains 
various symbolic elements that empower the text to the point that they become a complete and 
independent message, sometimes more important than the speech itself.
Bush provided a clear example when in early May 2003 he landed on aircraft carrier USS Abraham 
Lincoln. The exterior of the jet was marked with “Navy 1” in the back and “George W. Bush 
Commander-in-Chief” just below the cockpit window. The president got off wearing a green flight suit 
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and holding a white helmet. He commented that he had taken a turn at piloting the jet. From the tower 
of the aircraft carrier hung a banner with the words “Mission Accomplished”, referring to the Iraq 
war.542
There was no particular reason why Bush should decide to deliver a speech declaring that major 
combat operations had been completed in Iraq on the deck of a ship off the coast of California, except 
for the symbolic value of the setting. Had he chosen a more common setting, that day would probably 
not be remembered as the one on which the war was declared over. It was a strong signal to the media 
and the public to dismiss future acts of violence in Iraq as exceptional, not worthy of major concern 
and not threatening the objectives already triumphantly fulfilled (“Mission Accomplished”). The effect 
of the signal appears to have been resented by both the media and the public after some months when it 
became clear that instability and violence in Iraq were still constant. The banner was mocked to the 
point that the White House sought to disavow any connection with it. “I know it was attributed 
somehow to some ingenious advance man from my staff — they weren't that ingenious, by the way,” 
said Bush; later it was attributed to the crew of the USS Abraham Lincoln itself.543
In a more specific context of war on terrorism some procedures are also surrounded by a set of 
symbols, presumably with the purpose of having a greater effect on the mind of the public. Take the 
Color-coded Threat Level System of the Homeland Security Advisory System. The threat level may 
range through “Low” (Green), “Guarded” (Blue), “Elevated” (Yellow), “High” (Orange) and “Severe” 
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(Red).544 Since the system was established in March 2002 the threat level has fluctuated between 
“yellow” and “orange” with the exception of August 10-13, 2006 for passenger flights from the UK, 
after British authorities arrested 21 persons under suspicion of plotting to detonate liquid explosives on 
board multiple commercial airplanes.545 Leaving considerations about the actual nature of the threat 
aside, the raising of color-coded level to “red” reinforced the overall theme that the threat of terrorism 
is real and imminent, even five years after September 11, 2001.
5. Conclusions
The discourse produces terrorism as a discursive object but defines it only vaguely. If we examine it 
closely, we discover it is essentially based on a status quo definition by not allowing the possibility of 
Western states to be guilty of this crime. Though written in the 1980s, Noam Chomsky's words still 
apply here: “it is the other fellow’s crimes, not our own comparable or worse ones, that constitute 
‘terrorism’”; thus, “the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘retaliation’ are used as terms of propaganda, not 
description.”546 However, the discourse also produces, through both declarations and practices, the fear 
of an unprecedented danger for the innocent population, appealing in this way to a tactical definition 
and the more common understanding of terrorism, i.e. attacks on civil society. The appeal appears to be 
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a justification for changes in policy and law, war and a confrontational posture against certain states, a 
need for military supremacy and preemption.
A Foucauldian approach is useful for revealing that a discursive object such as terrorism is produced as 
a 'truth'. However, it falls short in failing to recognize that basic facts and events can and should be 
considered as objective, even in discourse analysis, for the sake of determining the degree of 
disproportionality of the discourse and revealing the use of lies. The discourse of the war on terrorism 
provides several examples of a language disproportionate to the available facts: petty criminals with 
little chance to successfully do any significant damage to society are presented as dangerous terrorist 
cells that have been dismantled; Iraq is said to be in possession of weapons of mass destruction and in 
contact with Al Qaeda, and so on.
Foucaldian theory is again useful when genealogically tracing themes of the discourse of the war on 
terrorism to previous American discourses of danger, security and identity. However, it does not grant 
an adequate importance to socio-historical specificities involving people in power, their interests and 
their particular use of language – all elements which confer the discourse a unique character and 
represent its historical discontinuity. These specificities reveal the weight of agents in the struggle of 
power and the production of discourse – adding a complementary dimension to cultural and historic 
discourses of identity. For example, the interest of the network of power in an international agenda 
focused on the Middle East and with a relatively little attention to comparable cases, such as North 
Korea, reveals a specific intentionality that goes beyond the general historical discourse of American 
identity.
The themes of the discourse are revealed as patterns emerging from the examination of the specificities 
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of the network of power, their language and practices. This is another limitation of a Foucauldian 
approach, as it does not recognize practices as integral elements of discourse.
For example, the specificities of the network of power, their language and practices, are all at work in 
the 'us' vs 'them' divide theme. Bush made a distinction between the ‘enemy’ and Islam during the first 
days after September 11, 2001, but he did not reinforce it afterwards. Simultaneously, several 
commentators were allowed to opine differently by identifying terrorism with Palestinians, Muslims or 
Arabs, thus linking the fear with certain groups of people; while some practices have also sent a 
discriminating message by targeting mostly these groups. There is a tendency to demonise Muslims, 
albeit not always openly. While the tendency is not explicit in every facet of the war on terrorism, it is 
strong enough to be central and may thus be considered a general subtext. Joel Beinin correctly 
observes that “September 11 further consolidated an understanding of the world drawing sharp 
oppositions between “us” and “them”, and positing Islam as the “new enemy for a new world 
order”.”547
Foucauldian theory turns out to be accurately helpful when showing that the process of the production 
of the discourse is not limited to a series of statements, whether factually true or not, but is also related 
to underlying principles manifested in the authority of what is generally considered science, the art of 
government and the discipline of intelligence gathering; the resonance with historical discourses, such 
as the Cold War; and the symbols and rituals that accompany the messages.
While chapters 2 and 3 have identified the network of power and the themes and production of the 
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discourse, as well as the relevance and limitations of a Foucauldian approach; chapters 4 and 5 each 
focus on two further aspects of discourse while still assessing Foucault’s work. Chapter 4 examines 
discourse as practices related to biopolitics and Giorgio Agamben’s notion of bare life; while the 
subject of chapter 5 is the confrontation of the hegemonic discourse with the constitutive outside – a 
pertinent concept borrowed from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.
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Chapter 4
Biopolitics, Rendering of Bare Life and the Panoptical Principle as Elements of the Discourse of 
the War on Terrorism
1. Analyzing practices as part of the discourse
In the previous two chapters I have argued in favour of a discourse analysis that focuses on socio-
historical and political specificities in regards to people and groups of power, their geopolitical and 
ideological agendas, their concrete actions and use of language, and the contrast with the actual facts to 
which they make reference in order to assess the degree of disproportionality of the discourse. This is 
not the method that Foucault would have used. But to be fair, we should make clear that there is a sense 
in which Foucault was also concerned with social and historical specificities. In fact, he claimed to be 
'an empiricist', and a great deal of his texts deal with concrete history.548 As I have noted earlier, the 
difference is that he concentrated on the procedures, institutions, techniques and strategies of power 
that permeated a society and its mentality; for example, the way in which the inmates of a prison, a 
hospital or a factory were disciplined in order to maximize the efficiency of their control.
At first sight, it would appear that it is possible to reduce practices to discourse (or viceversa) with 
Foucault, given that in his view the power of language is linked to external, material and tactical forms 
of power. This is why power cannot be fixed or apprehended in the meanings of texts, but must be 
grasped and traced through the analysis of tactical and material relations of force. Discourse itself may 
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take material forms, and be ‘embodied’ in various kinds of practice. The analysis of these material and 
extra-textual practised forms of powers should be involved within a Foucauldian methodology, 
emphasizing both text and context.549 However, in his empiricism Foucault distanced himself from 
Jacques Derrida, who would contend that 'there is nothing outside the text' and thus concentrated on 
meanings, ruptures and inconsistencies internal to texts.550 Foucault's empiricism was based on the 
extra-discursive, and thus denied that everything could be reduced to text. He was hostile towards 
Derrida's “reduction of discursive practices to textual traces”,551 and was more interested in the 
question of power than issues of language, arguing that
one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language [langue] and signs, but to 
that of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather 
than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.552
If one is to take Foucault's idea of discourse strictly and accept that it is composed of a set of historical 
and paradigmatic assumptions and rules that determine even how we objectify things, then it would 
naturally follow that 'there is nothing outside the text' indeed. It appears that his difference with Derrida 
is not of an essential nature but rather one of stressing certain issues over others. Foucault preferred to 
read relations of power before language and signs, i.e. relations of meaning, but he did not deny that 
power and discourse were intimately related; on the contrary. Thus, Derrida's preference for language 
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does not logically contradict the essential Foucault, but complements him.553
In any case, if we accept Foucault's distinction between relations of meaning and the extra-discursive, 
such as practices, this chapter, like the previous one, departs again from Foucault in its analysis of the 
war on terrorism. In regards to the latter, I intend to analyse biopolitics and other related practices as 
part of the discourse. I do not propose as a matter of principle that everything can or should be reduced 
to discourse. But I do believe that our understanding of the discourse of the war on terrorism increases 
if we read some of its practices as a complementary part of the discourse, and as such, carrying a 
meaning and message. 
As has been pointed out in previous chapters, in this respect this analysis is closer to Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe, who reject the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, and 
insist on “the interweaving of the semantic aspects of language with the pragmatic aspects of actions, 
movements and objects.” As Jacob Torfing explains, “discourse is co-extensive with the social and 
cannot be reduced to either its semantic or its pragmatic aspects. All actions have meaning, and to 
produce and disseminate meaning is to act.”554
What follows in this chapter is an examination of certain practices of the war on terrorism – those 
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related to the management and manipulation of human life, including the extreme form of torture –
through the lens of the concept of biopolitics, the idea of sovereignty as the power to render bare life, 
and the principle of the Panopticon as a disciplinary technique, while considering these practices as 
essential elements of the discourse of the war on terrorism without which it could not be properly 
understood. In doing so, I wish to show once again that a number of contributions of Foucault are 
relevant for the case, but they fall short of revealing important aspects of the discourse, while the 
complementary work of others – in this case, mostly that of Giorgio Agamben – provide the answers.
While the roles of biopolitics, bare life and surveillance have already been considered by other 
contemporary authors within the context of the war on terrorism, here I seek to add the dimension of 
discourse: to assess these practices as a message. Following Ferdinand de Saussure, the neo-
Gramscians Laclau and Mouffe argue that each element of a discourse, conceptual or practical, lacks 
intrinsic meaning unless placed next to other elements that define it. Meaning is therefore a function of 
difference, and therefore unstable in principle and subject to change according to variation in structures 
of difference. In agreement with this principle, Laclau and Mouffe adopt and modify Antonio Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony to denote the structuring of meanings through discursive practices. For Gramsci, 
hegemony was the capacity of a class to transcend its narrow interests in order to symbolise a variety of 
popular struggles that were external to class or economic practices. Laclau and Mouffe take the idea of 
hegemony as “an ‘articulatory practice’ that ‘sutures’ concepts and practices around key principles such 
that certain elements come to be viewed as ‘naturally’ related or contiguous.”555 Likewise, this chapter 
seeks to identify the derived meaning that emerges from practices when they are understood next to the 
overall language of the war on terrorism.
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That a new meaning emerges does not mean that there is a discursive intentionality in the case of the 
war on terrorism from those directly responsible for these practices, or that the population understands 
them as such. It does mean, however, that the message does take place; that an exchange of information 
with the population occurs; that the message becomes an element of the discourse; and that the 
phenomena can be analysed in order to make the message explicit and improve our understanding of 
the discourse.
When adding the pragmatic dimension we can identify different layers within the discourse. On 
October 17, George W. Bush signed the 2006 Military Commissions Act, which provides a more clear 
legal framework for trying non-US citizens deemed to be “unlawful enemy combatants”. It denies 
habeas corpus rights to detainees who have not been charged with any offence. While the US 
government has issued numerous statements that its military personnel must not use torture, the 
evidence shows that some of the officially sanctioned practices in the war on terrorism – especially as 
applied by certain US intelligence personnel – have amounted to torture.556 Thus, there are at least three 
levels of discourse to be considered: the statements, the legal framework and the actual practices. The 
chapter focuses on the last one and includes some elements of  the legal changes because they are 
directly related to the practices and may even be considered practices themselves.
Again, we must not forget that all three levels are linked and confer new meaning on each other. In a 
mid-August 2003 email a captain in military intelligence says of detainees classified as unprivileged 
belligerents: “we want these individuals broken. Casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering 
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info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks.”557 As this email became public it 
became part of the text of the discourse, albeit unintentionally. A memorandum sent from the Justice 
Department to the White House on 1 August 2002, which had to be withdrawn in 2004, “stood the plain 
meaning of words on their head when it redefined 'torture' to allow a huge range of cruel and inhuman 
treatment to escape the definitional net of US and international legislation. It also strained belief when 
it stated that the president had total and unfettered discretion to ensure that prisoners were effectively 
interrogated, even to the point of authorising torture”.558 It is possible to analyse the practices as a 
consequence of the use of language; this route of enquiry has been explored by others.559 This chapter 
takes an alternative route by assuming that practices are already a message and part of the discourse 
and by trying to determine what its content is.
2. Biopolitics and Bare Life: Foucault and Agamben
By biopolitics Michel Foucault meant “the endeavour, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize 
the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living 
human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race...” He noted that 
these problems have occupied an expanding place since the nineteenth century, constituting political 
and economic issues up to the present day. The framework of political rationality was linked to
liberalism, considered not as an ideology or a theory, but as a “way of doing things”: a principle and a 
method of rationalizing the exercise of government which obeys the rule of maximum economy.560 This 
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practice consists of mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these techniques emerged around the human body 
involving the spatial distribution, organization, serialization and surveillance of individual bodies in 
order to increase their productive force while rationalizing and economizing power to be used in the 
least costly way possible. This was a system of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, bookkeeping and 
reports: a disciplinary technology of labor. In the second half of the eighteenth century appeared a new 
technology of power which integrated discipline. But unlike discipline, this was not applied to human 
bodies as much as human beings as a species. The new technology affected a mass of multiplicity of 
people through the overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and the like. 
Discipline was “in an individualizing mode”, while the new technology was “massifying, that is 
directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species”. If discipline was the anatomo-politics of the 
human body, the new technique was a “biopolitics” of the human race, involving “a set of processes 
such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on.”
Death, epidemics, hygiene, accidents, insurance and the urban problem were some of the starting points 
of biopolitics561, and its object a population conceived as a scientific and political problem.562
In the nineteenth century, Foucault writes, sovereignty's traditional right of taking life or letting live 
was complemented by a new right which penetrated and permeated the old one: the power to “make” 
live and “let” die.563 Biopolitics arrived with the transformation in waging war from the defence of the 
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sovereign to securing the existence of a population. From then on, according to Foucault, decisions to 
fight and kill were made in terms of collective survival and preserving life.564 The sovereign “right of 
the sword”, was then simply one element among other forms of power. It was organized within a power 
of management of life as the scientific possibility of transforming life, not only for its value to 
capitalism as labour, but also as well-being or health. Too many things lay outside the traditional 
mechanism of the power of sovereignty, both at the level of the detail and of the mass. Discipline was 
the first adjustment to take care of this; the second adjustment was that of biopolitics, which was more 
difficult as it implied complex systems of coordination and centralization.565
An implication of biopolitics is that its techniques allow for the practice of 'government at a distance', 
and a 'governmentalisation of the State', where the state becomes oriented primarily to managing and 
regulating populations.566 The community appears as a technical device for its own management. 
Nowadays, local governments of Western countries attempt to regulate not only life and death, but even 
the movements and interactions of citizens by spatial arrangements. Techniques include loud classical 
music played at the entrances of railway stations to chase away drug addicts and homeless people; at 
subway stations, a lack of toilets or benches, and so on.567 It has also been observed that even the 
emergence of non-state actors such as international organisations and NGOs is related to the expansion 
of biopolitics in different contexts, such as war.568
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Foucault was interested in analyzing mechanisms and rationalities of governance under conditions of 
formal freedom or the type of social control which is characteristic of liberal societies.569 Thus, if we 
were to adopt a Foucauldian approach, the concept of biopolitics as a practice of liberal rationality 
would seem to be a useful starting point to examine certain practices of the war on terrorism. However, 
it is insufficient when we find examples of extreme practices on human life, such as torture. The 
problem is that torture is not expected to naturally occur in conditions of formal freedom or in liberal 
societies. Quite correctly, Jan Selby writes:
It is this specific concern with liberal societies which in my view explains why Foucault paid 
such scant attention to what Giorgio Agamben has argued is the exemplary form of modern bio-
political governance, the concentration camp: Foucault was much less interested in situations of 
coercive and totalitarian control, than in power relations which operated within the context of, 
and through, freedom.570
Giorgio Agamben has explored and extended the notion of biopolitics by arguing that the defence of 
life often takes place in a zone of indistinction between violence and the law: the camp, the 
fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West. The paradox is that the privileging of life has provided 
the rationale for some cases of genocide, as one group’s life is violently secured through the demise of 
another.571
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According to Agamben, the threads of research concerning political techniques and sovereign power, 
and the other concerning the technologies of the self, are intertwined at several points.572 He writes:
The present inquiry concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juridico-
institutional and the biopolitical models of power. What this work has had to record among its 
likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion 
of bare life in the political realms constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign 
power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of 
sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing 
biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other 
than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond 
(derived from a tenacious correspondence between the modern and the archaic which one 
encounters in the most diverse spheres) between modern power and the most immemorial of the 
arcane imperii.573
For Agamben, the logic of sovereignty is that of production and isolation of “bare life” as an exception, 
life that can be killed but not sacrificed.574 By examining a legal form of Roman law he identifies the 
concept of bare life with “sacred life”. The sacredness of life “originally expressed precisely both life’s 
subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation of abandonment.” 575
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The production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty. Agamben argues that since the 
beginning of Western patriarchal politics, there has been a distinction between bare life, or the life of 
the home, and politically qualified life, the life of the polis or public sphere. The life excluded from 
politics is a life that can be killed without that killing constituting murder – though it was necessary for 
politics, so that the political community could be constituted as bounded and sovereign. 
Agamben detects in contemporary sovereign politics an increase of the “state of exception”, in which 
bare life no longer remains on the margins, but occupies all the spaces of politics when it became 
biopolitics. All life became bare life at this point. This has happened increasingly everywhere since the 
Nazi camps.576 He “intends to reveal the mobility of the biopolitical caesuras that endlessly separate 
and exclude one life – that of the Jews – in order to reinforce and to cause another life – that of the 
Germans – to emerge from it.”577 Foucault also noted the Nazi genocide’s relation to biopolitics in the 
sense of one race of people killing another for its own alleged preservation. However, Agamben 
deviates from Foucault in two points. First, he believes that biopower and killing, which coincide with 
one another with the Nazis, are indissociable, while they remain heterogenous in Foucault’s analysis. 
Second, extermination is not the exclusive paradigm by which to grasp Nazism; it is the production of 
bare life that can explain this double process. To the extent that the logic of the production of bare life 
leads to killing, the concentration camp is linked to the extermination camp.578
Agamben's analysis is foreign to Foucault in that he is bound to a power and its logic rather than to the 
plurality of its mechanisms. In this respect, if an examination of discourse refers to something with a 
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meaning common to the multiplicity of practices, the observations in this chapter are closer to 
Agamben than Foucault. Katia Genel observes that for Agamben, “biopower is nothing other than the 
deployment of the structure of sovereignty in the form of the crisis. Agamben constitutes it as a 
paradigm rather than locating, as Foucault has done, the discontinuities and historical transformations 
of the way in which power is exercised”.579 Agamben’s focus on the power of sovereignty is central for 
the argument about discourse presented in here, although I do not believe this contradicts Foucault’s 
approach.580
3. Sending a message through practices
The Abu Ghraib scandal, brought to public knowledge by journalist Seymour M. Hersh in 2004 after 
gaining access to an Army report which described “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses”,581
provided several graphic icons of the sharpest contradictions of the war in Iraq and the war on 
terrorism. Shocking photographs of detainees being humiliated, beaten and tortured were published in 
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the world media. Perhaps the best recognized pictures – yet not the ones reflecting the most brutal 
practices – are those of Specialist Lynndie England holding on a leash a naked prisoner lying on the 
ground and of detainee Satar Jabar standing on a box with wires connected to his body. Although the 
Army report was not meant for publication, a message took place, even if unintended, between those 
who hold sovereign power to render bare life and the world population at large, and became embedded 
in the discourse. The message was not delivered through words as much through practices and their 
graphic evidence, and its content was the affirmation and the reminder of the power of the sovereign to 
dispose of human life at will, to render bare life and to create exceptional spaces of indistinction 
between law and violence. In this way, the theme of the exceptional power of the sovereign becomes a 
subtext of the discourse of the war on terrorism.
Other examples stand next to Abu Ghraib. Amnesty International points out that hundreds of people are 
held in Guantanamo Bay, the US naval base leased from Cuba which since 2002 has been used for 
military detention camps for the imprisonment of suspected members of al Qaeda and the Taliban, “in 
conditions which may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”. In a recent report the 
organisation estimates that 70,000 people have been detained outside the US in the context of the war 
on terrorism. It reports on evidence of stress positions, isolation, hooding, sensory deprivation, the use 
of dogs, cruel and prolonged use of shackles, the use of loud music and strobe lights.582
Acts of torture are of course more than the affirmation of the rights of the sovereign. Most obviously 
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perhaps, they are acts of humiliation.583 Beyond torture, it has been argued that the Bush 
administration’s desire to humiliate is the reason why there was never a legal approach to the war on 
terrorism (as in pursuing criminals as opposed to declaring a war), for courts would deliver justice, but 
not “vengeance and counterhumiliation”. Paul Saurette writes: “from this perspective, the attacks on 
Afghanistan and Iraq served not only military purposes, but psychological ones as well, for what was 
the implicit message behind the willingness to go in alone without the UN's approval?” Whether 
consciously intended by policy makers or not, there is indeed an implicit act of communication 
whenever the US government goes beyond legal or moral boundaries.584 The enemy and the ‘other’ are 
humiliated, but a lesser sense of humiliation is extended to anyone who demanded or expected restraint 
from US authorities.
Saurette believes that the desire to humiliate explains tactics of the war on terrorism: the military 
strategy of shock and awe sent a message: “You who have humiliated us will in turn be shocked and 
humiliated by our power. You, and the rest of the world, will then feel awe at our power and thus 
respect us because we have humiliated you”; the prohibition of pictures of dead US soldiers had the 
purpose of avoiding humiliation of their own pretension of invulnerability; the release of pictures of the 
dead sons of Saddam Hussein and of the former dictator hiding in a hole had the purpose of humiliating 
them as less than human; and the acts of Abu Ghraib were a reproduction in the micro level of the same 
dynamics.585 If Saurette’s assumption is correct, then sending messages through such practices was an 
objective rather than an accident. It remains as an interesting assumption, though, since we cannot 
know with certainty how much was intended or not.
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The message towards the masses is comparable to what takes place in a micro level between the 
torturer and the tortured. Just as the physical pain of torture “is so incontestably real that it seems to 
confer its quality of “incontestable reality” on that power that has brought it into being,” 586 the shock 
of the images of Abu Ghraib and the reports from Guantanamo confer “reality” on the war on terrorism 
and the power of those who wage it. Just as the necessity for torture is precisely that the reality of that 
power is so highly contestable,587 practices that do not respect the boundaries are needed for the war on 
terrorism for it to be affirmed as urgent.
Elaine Scarry has described the nature of torture as “repeated acts of display” having as its purpose “the 
production of a fantastic illusion of power”, making it “a grotesque piece of compensatory drama.”588 If 
drama is part of the essence of torture, then the images and reports of torture released in the global 
media become a vehicle of dramatization for the war on terrorism – again, whether purposely or not. 
The world’s knowledge of the horrors of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo has enhanced the effect of 
torture as a drama of power. Particularly the case of Abu Ghraib, for being so graphic, translated human 
suffering into “an emblem of the regime’s strength”, to borrow Scarry’s expression.
The translation is made possible by, and occurs across, the phenomenon common to both power 
and pain: agency. The electric generator, the whips and canes, the torturer's fists, the walls, the 
doors, the prisoner's sexuality, the torturer's questions, the institution of medicine, the prisoner's 
screams, his wife and children, the telephone, the chair, a trial, a submarine, the prisoner's ear 
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drums – all these and many more, everything human and inhuman that is either physically or 
verbally, actually or allusively present, has become part of the glutted realm of weaponry, 
weaponry that can refer equally to pain or power. [...] Now, at least for the duration of this 
obscene and pathetic drama, it is not the pain but the regime that is incontestably real, not the 
pain but the regime that is able to eclipse all else, not the pain but the regime that is able to 
dissolve the world.589
If the agents of torture (or similar types of shocking practices) are needed for the regime to affirm its 
reality, it is reasonable to consider that the same logic of power facilitated that at least part of what was 
taking place in Iraq should be known.
As horrific acts, the messages behind these practices are not easily translated into words. However, 
when attempting to do so, Agamben’s notion of homo sacer – the sacred man – comes to mind: “Life 
that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life.”590 Agamben borrows the notion of homo 
sacer from archaic Roman law. It is an obscure figure whose life was considered by the juridical order 
only because of its capacity to be killed.591 This is directly connected to the power of the sovereign and 
its sphere, “the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without 
celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life… is the life that has been captured in this sphere.592 Is it not 
reasonable then that Agamben has desciphered with these words the message behind shocking acts of 
taking life without committing murder, or torturing it by extension? Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, going to 
war without the consent of the UN Security Council and other practices and actions of US authorities 
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are exceptional; the structure of the exception, according to Agamben, is the sovereign ban, and what is 
caught in this ban is life that can be killed but not sacrificed, “in this sense, the production of bare life 
is the originary activity of sovereignty.” Thus, the medium becomes the message: by showing their 
ability to exceptionally dispose of human life, the wagers of the war on terrorism state their 
sovereignty.593 Through the violence of the processes by which bare life is excluded, a biopolitical body 
is produced on which sovereign power can exercise its power, which is perpetrated through the gesture
of exception. Genel explains:
(T)he state of exception is precisely what is going to generate a certain visibility, to make what 
is hidden emerge. It is from this perspective that the camp will be analyzed: the hidden face of 
power, the locus in which the exception is operative, is revealed in the crisis situation, either in 
the exceptional situation or ultimately in the camp.594
Other events of less graphic nature have contributed to the message. The creation of exceptional laws 
and their application have not been strictly limited to the space of prisoner camps. Administration 
lawyers concluded in a March 2003 Defence Department legal memorandum that the president is not 
bound by either an international treaty prohibiting torture nor by a federal antitorture law because he 
has the authority as commander in chief to approve any technique needed to protect the nation's 
security.  After the memo was described in newspaper reports the Bush administration disavowed it. 
Former White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, assured that it was not relied upon by policy-
makers.595 Backing off the memorandum and condemning the practices of Abu Ghraib may have 
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somehow obscured the effect of the message but not entirely cancelled it, as repeated practices speak 
stronger than words. In the end sum of the contradictions between reports of practices and their denial, 
what remains is the notion of the prevalence and reach of the power of the sovereign.
It shouldn’t be surprising then that citizen’s rights and social contracts are overlooked since “only bare 
life is authentically political” from the point of view of sovereignty. Agamben sees this as the reason 
for Hobbes to seek the foundation of sovereignty “not in the subjects’ free renunciation of their natural 
right but in the sovereign’s preservation of his natural right to do anything to anyone, which now 
appears as the right to punish”.596 The paradox of sovereignty is that the sovereign is simultaneously 
outside and inside the juridical order. Commenting on Carl Schmitt, Agamben observes that while 
juridical order grants to the sovereign the power to proclaim a state of exception of the juridical order, 
then the sovereign “legally places himself outside the law.” The paradox may be expressed this way: “I, 
the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law.”597 Thus, while 
Amnesty International complains about the US using the language of human rights while violating 
human rights, it “can have it both ways precisely because of the operation of sovereign power that is at 
the same time the law and above the law.”598
In the case of the war on terrorism the right of doing anything to anyone is claimed not so much in its 
own territory but beyond the frontiers of the US, as the focus of the punishment are the Arab and 
Muslim people. When considering the targeting of another group of people, the role of biopolitics in its 
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extreme form is revealed in traits of totalitarianism. 
As Agamben sees biopolitics in the extreme, genocides such as that of the Jews by the Nazis were not a 
punishment nor a sacrifice, but the killing of bare life (“as lice”, in Hitler’s words); thus, the dimension 
of the killing was neither religion nor law, but biopolitics.599 The two traits that characterize 
totalitarianism are the power to decide on the value or non-value of life and biological facts becoming 
political facts. For Agamben, the genocidal phenomenon that characterized Nazism is intelligible from 
the biological dimension.600
In this Agamben follows Foucault closely. Foucault argues that racism, after emerging in the sixteenth 
century as a discourse which he calls “race wars”,601 is the basic mechanism of power in modern states 
that allows the sovereign power to kill in a society ever more characterized by biopolitics, which takes 
life as its objective. The result is that “the modern state can scarcely function without becoming 
involved with racism at some point, within certain limits and subject to certain conditions.” Racism 
becomes necessary to determine “what must live and what must die.”602 It is compatible with the 
exercise of biopower: it establishes a relationship between one’s own life and the death of the other in a 
biological-type relationship; therefore the “inferior race” is not killed only to eliminate a threat, but also 
to “make life in general healthier: healthier and purer”.603
David Mutimer has suggested that the war on terrorism is the most recent expression of the racist 
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discourse that allows for sovereignty and biopolitics to function together in one of its most virulent 
articulations.604 He writes:
The discourse of the war on terror, while not explicitly racist in the Nazi sense is extensively 
racialized. It has articulated its enemy as people identifiable not just by their religion, as 
important as that obviously is to their representation, but more particularly by their (racial) 
appearance. Whether it is the often discussed “racial profiling,” or the pervasive, everyday 
association of Islamist terrorists with the features of Arabs, the war on terror has produced a 
global discourse more racist than any we have seen since the time of European colonialism.605
In most of its spoken and written language the war on terrorism denies racism and embraces opposite 
values, yet related practices tell a different story. The overlapping of two contrasting levels of message 
does not result in the cancellation of either, but in the confusion and paradoxical mixture of both. By 
torturing and killing people while speaking of equal rights and universal values the resulting suggested 
idea is that the sovereign state could do this to anyone, even if for the moment it is only to members of 
the 'other race'. This is a new message which appears by the combination of the explicit discourse and 
the discourse composed by acts of torture, killing and arbitrariness.
For Foucault, a normalizing society is at least superficially a biopower, and as such, “racism is the 
indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once a 
State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the state”.606
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Though it is true that racism plays an important role in the early stages of genocide, Foucault does not 
explain how systematic murder can be expanded in later phases to members of the race purported to be 
defended. Furthermore, while he recognizes that only rarely has the discourse of race wars been 
expressed in an overtly racial fashion,607 he does not explicitly ask what is the significance of the 
contradiction of a society engaging in practices with a racist undertone while at the same time declaring 
that it embraces the opposite values, and what the result of this contradiction may be (that such a 
contradiction is possible is due to the fact that modern racism is not bound up with mentalities, 
ideologies or the lies of power, but with the technique of power.608 This is comparable to, and explained 
by, the contradiction between sovereignty and biopolitics, where sovereignty allows the state to kill its 
people, while biopolitics demands that those same people be made to live.609) When the official 
discourse is not racist while torture and killing occur in semi-visibility and almost exclusively targeting 
another race, the door opens for the idea that the sovereign State can indeed torture and kill anyone, 
even if for the moment it does only others.
Foucault did take note of Nazism taking the play between the sovereign right to kill and the 
mechanisms of biopower to the paroxysmal point where “exposing the entire population to universal 
death was the only way it could truly constitute itself as a superior race and bring about its definitive 
regeneration once other races had been either exterminated or enslaved forever.” While not taken to the 
extreme of Nazism, this play, he believes, is in fact inscribed in the workings of many modern states, 
both capitalist and socialist.610 Thus, in every case of authorities relaxing their intolerance towards 
torture or indiscriminate killing we find the potential of universal death.
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3.1 Emergency and exception as normalcy
Implicit within the sovereign power of rendering bare life is the power to declare exception of the law, 
but also exception in terms of emergency. Parallel to the paradox of sovereign power being at the same 
time the law and above the law we find the paradox that the exceptional and the emergency may 
become norm.
The exception is not a simple state of chaos but a kind of exclusion which always maintains itself in 
relation to the rule “in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it”. While the sovereign suspension is a 
zone of indistinction between nature and right, it presupposes the juridical order in the form of its 
suspension.611 Agamben reasons that the exception is the structure of sovereignty, and as such it is not 
an exclusively political and juridical concept, but “the originary structure in which law refers to life and 
includes it in itself by suspending it.”612 This is relevant because the war on terrorism, based on a 
discourse of danger and emergency, has proven the ability of the sovereign to make exceptions and by 
doing so it affirms and normalizes its own power.
Making and creating exceptions would probably not be possible without the discourse of threat. It also 
allows for preventive intervention, for every danger may in some sense evolve into crime613 or tragedy, 
and for disciplinary social measures. Foucault illustrates by commenting on the plague-stricken town:
[A]gainst an extraordinary evil, power is mobilized; it makes itself everywhere present and 
                                                
611 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 17, 18, 21
612 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 28
613 Christian Borch, ‘Crime Prevention as Totalitarian Biopolitics’: 97
255
visible; it invents new mechanisms; it separates, it immobilizes, it partitions; it constructs for a 
time what is both a counter-city and the perfect society; it imposes an ideal functioning, but one 
that is reduced, in the final analysis, like the evil that it combats, to a simple dualism that of life 
and death: that which moves brings death, and one kills that which moves.614
A similar pattern is repeated in other situations of emergency or crisis. Through them, “the state of 
exception becomes the rule”, becomes normalized, “and the hidden foundation of sovereignty is 
revealed, exposing the specificity of political modernity.” Agamben explains that the crisis is made 
possible by means of a double process of the “politicization of life” which consists in the increasing 
inscription of life within the political order, “which in turn makes its exposure to power increasingly 
radical.”615
The pattern may be extended to include not only danger but also risk, as a notion which does not imply 
a particular precise danger embodied in a concrete group of people, but as the effect of a combination 
of abstract factors which make more or less probable some sort of harm to order or society.616 We have 
seen this extension in some instances in the war on terrorism as well when individual citizens have 
been targeted with little or no connection to terrorist activity. The logic of the war on terrorism easily 
extends its focus of attention from danger into risk. This movement 
entails a potentially infinite multiplication of the possibilities for intervention. For what 
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situation is there of which one can be certain that it harbours no risk, no uncontrollable or 
unpredictable chance feature? The modern ideologies of prevention are overarched by a 
grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood as 
the irruption of the unpredictable.617
With a discourse of a constant state of emergency, it is no surprise that danger extends into risk, 
enabling intervention to respect no limits. Under such circumstances virtually every aspect of life may 
be regulated since nothing is too insignificant or marginal to evade intervention. Thus, Christian Borch 
argues of the idea of crime prevention that it has an expansive character that knows no natural limits, 
amounting to “a biopolitical power that contains totalitarian traits” in the sense of aiming at 
“controlling possible forms of behaviour and abolishing the uncontrollable before they have become a 
problem.”618
The above elements found a concrete example in the case of Canadian Maher Arar, who was pulled 
aside and sent to be interrogated as a suspected terrorist while passing through JFK airport in 2002. 
Because of a tenuous link of passing acquaintance with someone suspected of a connection to al Qaeda, 
he was held for almost two weeks in the US, was then deported to Syria, where he was born, and held 
in a three feet wide prison for ten months, where he was tortured.619 As with the case of Abu Ghraib, 
what I seek to determine is what this particular case adds to the discourse in its level of practices as part 
of a message. While the abuses of the jail of Abu Ghraib took place in a country which experiences war 
and violence on every day life, a state of affairs which is the opposite of normalcy, the case of Arar 
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brings such practices closer to the regular citizen of the US or any of its allies. It is thus a step in the 
direction of normalizing the exceptional. This is reinforced by the fact that the authorities knew of such 
a tenuous and circumstantial link to al Qaeda, for it establishes that the norm is that anyone should 
expect to have the details of their lives known as part of the ever more common practices of 
surveillance, discussed in further detail in the last section.
While it is indeed a step into normalization we must take notice that the authorities seek to retain a 
sense of these cases being exceptional, as if defending an image of normalcy which would be to some 
extent still in accordance to the language of values and rights. This may be the reason why torture has 
been put into practice outside US territory. Mutimer observes that the Canadian police felt it necessary 
to hand Maher Arar to the US for the probable reason that it enabled them to circumvent human rights
guarantees for Canadian citizens. Similarly, the US felt it necessary to deport him to Syria, probably 
because “the U.S. officials knew that in Canada Maher Arar was unlikely to be tortured and by 
extension that they were fairly certain that in Syria he would be”.620 As shocking as it is to assume that 
the authorities of US and Canada calculated in terms of evading human rights guarantees and favouring 
torture, Mutimer’s is a reasonable assumption as it appears to be a regular practice for the US 
government to perform “extraordinary renditions”, which critics have correctly described as 
“outsourcing torture”.621 Bush himself has admitted that the CIA runs secret prisons overseas. “This 
program has been, and remains, one of the most vital tools in our war against the terrorists,” he said. 
“Were it not for this program, our intelligence community believes that al-Qaida and its allies would 
have succeeded in launching another attack against the American homeland.” Asked about the 
interrogation techniques, Bush said
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I cannot describe the specific methods used – I think you understand why. If I did, it would help 
the terrorists learn how to resist questioning and to keep information from us that we need to 
prevent new attacks on our country. But I can say the procedures were tough, and they were safe 
and lawful and necessary.
He denied, however, that he was talking about torture – a significant fact when considering the 
discourse of normalcy and values. He added that interrogation was not taking place at the moment 
because “CIA officials feel like the rules are so vague that they cannot interrogate without being tried 
as war criminals, and that's irresponsible”.622 According to ABC News, CIA sources revealed details 
about their “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” in such prisons. They included grabbing, slapping, 
forcing to stand up for more than 40 hours, keeping prisoners and their cells cold, and waterboarding. 
The sources described the techniques in equal terms as Bush: “harsh”, but not torture.623 The fact that 
the authorities have brought ‘closer to home’ exceptional practices, yet they have attempted to partially 
conceal them by performing them abroad, having others perform them and describing them in more 
benign terms (harsh but not torture) is probably the reflection of the paradox of a discourse that 
functions on a spoken level as well as a level of practices that contradict but do not cancel each other.
Mutimer observes that one of the elements that stand out of Arar’s case is “the arbitrary way that the 
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rights we expect apply to us all were denied to him”.624 This way the sovereign power to do anything to 
anyone is confirmed by bringing it closer to ‘us’ (a Canadian citizen) while retaining the racist aspect 
of its application (born in Syria). A man was rendered bare life while his legal rights were the same as 
those of any other Canadian. Therefore, the act of making his an exceptional case is both a 
confirmation of the racist aspects of the war on terrorism and an expansion of the power of the 
sovereign which situates itself above every citizen’s rights. As there was nothing special about this 
particular citizen, one must assume that the same can happen to anyone else, and as such it ceases to be 
an exception and becomes an example of a norm, albeit until now one rarely or not openly used. For 
Agamben, in fact, a generalization of the homo sacer may be expected in modernity as life is more 
clearly placed at the centre of State politics. Sovereignty places all of its subjects in risk of being 
rendered exceptional or bare life.625 As such, these are no longer proper exceptions but a consequence 
of the essential structure of sovereign power. In terms of discourse, the sovereign speaks through these 
actions in an assertion of its power. There was no other point in torturing Arar, not even from the logic 
of emergency. Practices which started as a consequence of a discourse of emergency and danger are 
now moving to a point where the original emergency bears neither relevance nor direct connection with 
the original threat. The exception ceases to exist and slowly turns into a new normalcy which was in 
fact always essential: that of sovereign power as described by Agamben.
A further logical step in the process of normalization is be related to the legal sphere.  A September 
2006 document by Amnesty International illustrates how this has taken place in the war on terrorism:
The US administration’s interpretation of the law has been driven by its policy choices rather 
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than a credible postulation of its legal obligations. One core policy choice was to frame its 
response to the 11 September attacks in terms of a global "war" rather than as a criminal law 
enforcement effort. The law would have to be made to fit this "new paradigm", as President 
Bush characterized the situation in a 7 February 2002 memorandum on detentions... The 
government’s policy of indefinite detention without charge, as practiced in Guantánamo and 
elsewhere, is thus a direct consequence of the war paradigm. Instead of treating these detainees 
as criminal suspects, the US authorities have branded them as loosely-defined "enemy 
combatants" in a global conflict. That the USA sees the world as the "battlefield" is illustrated 
by the fact that those currently held in Guantánamo include individuals picked up in Gambia, 
Bosnia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand, and United Arab Emirates, as well as 
Afghanistan.626
According to an August 2002 Justice Department memo written for the CIA and addressed to Alberto 
Gonzales, torturing al Qaeda terrorists in captivity abroad “may be justified” and international laws 
against torture “may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations” conducted in the war on 
terrorism.627 Three weeks after Bush's admission about CIA prisons the Military Commissions Act was 
approved by Congress, conferring on the president the right to declare “alien unlawful enemy 
combatants” to be tried in Military Commissions, suspending the writ of habeas corpus and prohibiting 
a combatant under trial from invoking the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights. In January 2007 
Alberto Gonzales claimed the authority to deny the right of habeas corpus to US citizens against a 2004 
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Supreme Court's decision.628
These series of shifts in legal interpretations together represent a movement from the exceptional into 
normalcy. Naturally, if practices are to be read as discourse, so are changes in law. What is more clearly 
manifested in the definition and implications of an “enemy combatant”, in the legal justification of 
torture or in the suspension of the right of habeas corpus is the paradox of the sovereign observed by 
Agamben, in which the sovereign, who is outside the law, declares that there is nothing outside the 
law.629 By obtaining from the juridical order the power to proclaim a state of exception, the sovereign is 
in turn in a position to change the juridical order by making use of this very power.
The sovereign also turns into law – and thus discourse – its power to strip life of its political qualities 
and render it bare. The USA Patriot Act, the central piece of legislation enacted in the context of the 
war on terrorism, states that any US citizen can be stripped of their citizenship “if, with the intent to 
relinquish his nationality, he becomes a member of, or provides support to, a group that the United 
States has designated as a 'terrorist organization.'” Under the Domestic Security Enhancement Act, also 
known as “Patriot II”, a citizen could be involuntarily expatriated if his intent is “inferred from 
conduct.” This would conceivably allow the Department of Justice to summarily remove a citizenship 
without judicial review by alleging that the citizen engaged in activities which the government defines 
as “terrorist”.630 Since both the definition and the decision of removal come from the same source, this 
amounts to an explicit proclamation of the right to decide over life as political or bare.
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3.2 The Camp: on the Outside, yet Within
In Agamben's work we read that the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become 
the rule is the camp – a figure which he understands in a wide sense, including not only concentration, 
prisoner or refugee camps, but other less obvious spaces which could include borders or high security 
airports. All of these are spaces where the rule of law is temporary suspended and as such remain 
outside the normal order, yet they are permanent. In the Nazi regime the state of exception as a 
justification for the concentration camps ceased to be referred to as an external and provisional state of 
factual danger and came to be confused with juridical rule itself. Nazi jurists were aware of the 
particularity of the situation to the point that they defined it as a “state of willed exception”. In that case 
the discourse implicit to practice became explicit in the juridical sphere. In the new paradigm of the 
camp the norm becomes indistinguishable from the exceptional. With the appearance of the camp the 
sovereign is no longer limiting himself to declaring the exception as a response to a danger to society, 
but “he now de facto produces the situation as a consequence of his decision on the exception.” In this 
sense the juridical and the factual get confused to the point that the camp becomes “a hybrid of law and 
fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable.”631
Furthermore, to the extent that the inmates of the camp are stripped of political status, reduced to bare 
life and managed as such, the camp is the extreme of a biopolitical space, since power and bare life are 
confronted without any mediation. As such it is a paradigm of political space.632 If we add the 
discursive dimension, then the establishment of a camp could be interpreted as a declaration of 
regression into a primal political state without political rights where the sovereign is defined as such 
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because of its monopoly of violence. Agamben, however, would not see it as a regression but rather as 
a feature of modern states under crisis. He writes:
In this light, the birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that decisively signals the 
political space of modernity itself. It is produced at the point at which the political system of the 
modern nation-state… enters into a lasting crisis, and the State decides to assume directly the 
care of the nation’s biological life as one of its proper tasks... The growing dissociation of birth 
(bare life) and the nation-state is the new fact of politics in our day, and what we call camp is 
this disjunction.633
In terms of the war on terrorism it is easy to recognize in Agamben’s analysis the latest and most clear 
manifestation of the camp in Guantanamo Bay. The US government claims that those held are beyond 
US law and the constitutional rights they would be afforded as prisoners on US soil. Guantanamo 
currently holds some 650 men (as well as some children) without charge or trial. They are denied the 
right to legal counsel and subject to degrading and cruel conditions such as solitary confinement and 
intensive interrogation without the presence of a lawyer. Most have not been charged and the US 
considers them “enemy combatants”, which allows for them to be held indefinitely without recourse to 
the courts, as mentioned above. The US will not declare them prisoners of war nor clarify their legal 
status in front of a tribune as required under the Third Geneva Convention; but rather it plans to try 
them by military tribunals.634 Under the light of Agamben’s work these anomalies should be no 
surprise; the very nature of Guantanamo Bay as a camp would determine and require the existence of 
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undefined legal figures such as the “enemy combatant” and exceptional tribunals. As a paradoxical 
space where the exception has been granted a permanent space and political life has been rendered 
bare, it would be impossible for regular legal conditions to prevail.
The fact that the tribunals which will be taking care of the procedure are military is also significant in 
terms of discourse. Since they are widely perceived as administering a rougher version of justice than 
civil courts635 and form part of the branch of government which can legitimately make use of violence, 
the sword prevails over citizenship and therefore nothing mediates between power and bare life.
An interesting feature of the camps of the war on terrorism is that those which are more openly violent 
remain further away from US territory. Agamben recognized rather benign spaces such as airports and 
cities as camps636 and he argued that in every modern state the line determining the point in which 
biopolitics turned into “thanatopolitics”, or the politics of death, was gradually moving into areas other 
than the political.637 We could certainly find examples of these specifically linked to the discourse of 
the war on terrorism. However, borders tend to be more violent638 and Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and 
secret detention sites where forms of torture are practiced remain outside US territory. This is 
significant for more than one reason. As noted above, the US government argues against granting legal 
rights to inmates of Guantanamo on the basis that it is not US territory. But in fact, this is not Cuban 
territory proper either, just as Abu Ghraib and the secret detention centres do not quite correspond to 
the political borders within which they are found. They are what Engin F. Isin and Kim Rygiel call 
abject spaces, defined as 
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extraterritorial spaces where international and national laws are suspended… spaces for holding 
refugees, asylum seekers, deportees, combatants, insurgents, and others caught in the new 
global policing and policies net. These spaces include various frontiers controlled by state 
authorities, zones where special rules and laws apply, and camps where laws are suspended.639
Isin and Rygiel indicate that those who are constituted through these abject spaces “are rendered as 
neither subjects nor objects but inexistent insofar as they become inaudible and invisible.”640 This is 
correct in the sense that most of these people are not granted any right to speak and remain anonymous. 
But they are not entirely invisible as, intended or not, the world has already been shocked by the cases 
mentioned in this chapter. However, Isin and Rygiel reveal with their observation a possible reason for 
the US government to create the most extreme camps away from its territory: while the true nature of 
the power of the sovereign gets exposed through such practices, the aspiration to keep a certain sense of 
rights and values remains. Abject spaces reflect the paradox that while the sovereign’s right to render 
bare life is immanent to the modern state, it needs to be affirmed in spaces in the ‘outside’, so that the 
explicit language of citizenship with rights can exist ‘within’. Guantanamo Bay and the most extreme 
camps reveal the duplicity of the discourse. The two levels are equally relevant for the production of 
the discourse: the explicit language speaks of these spaces as exceptional because of an emergency or 
state of exception; the unspoken one which is presented on the level of facts affirms the brutality of the 
power of the sovereign.
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3.3 The Panopticon
Camps and torture are some of the most violent examples of the application of power. However, 
biopolitics or disciplinary techniques and control in society are not just as apparent, but also ubiquitous, 
a fact of which Foucault and others were quite aware and made central to their research.641 When 
examining the techniques of management of population we find different forms of micropower. 
Modern day examples of these, associated with immigration642 and travel but also with the war on 
terrorism, are the use of high-tech surveillance mechanisms such as biometric fingerprinting, 
identification cards, and other policing practices.
This section deals with the practice of surveillance as a technique of enforcing discipline in the context 
of the war on terrorism and examined through a discursive perspective, with the goal of identifying the 
message implied. The disciplinary principle of surveillance was exposed by Foucault through his 
analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, the nineteenth century thinker that Marx and Engels 
considered the theoretician of the bourgeoisie.643 Bentham’s Panopticon is an architectural figure 
designed to enforce discipline where needed: prisons, hospitals, schools, factories, and so on. It is 
described by Foucault644 this way: At the periphery of the structure an annular building is built with a 
tower at the centre. The tower displays wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring. The 
peripheric building is divided into cells or rooms, each of which extends the whole width of the 
building. The rooms have two windows, one on the inside, facing the windows of the tower, and the 
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other on the outside, allowing the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that would be 
needed to watch the cells would be a supervisor or guard in the central tower to observe all the 
prisoners, workers or students on the cells around him. This mechanism allows to see constantly and to 
have immediate recognition.
Those confined to the cells are always seen from the front by the supervisor, but they are unable to 
communicate with each other because the side walls prevent them from contact. The consequence of 
this lateral invisibility is a guarantee of order, since it prevents the organisation of collective actions. 
Besides – and this is the major effect of the Panopticon – it induces in the inmate “a state of conscious 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power”. 645 In view of this, Bentham 
laid down the principle that power should be both visible and unverifiable. “Visible: the inmate will 
constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. 
Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any moment; but he must be 
sure that he may always be so”.646
In the Panopticon, Foucault explains, “one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one 
sees everything without ever being seen”.647 It “automatizes and disindividualizes power”.648 Power has 
its principle not so much in a person or authority, but 
in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose 
internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up… There is a 
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machinery that assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, difference. Consequently, it does not 
matter who exercises power. 649
It is not necessary to use force, since the inmates have an “anxious awareness of being observed”.650
The Panopticon works not so much because someone is observing but because of the awareness of the 
inmates of the possibility of being observed at any given moment. As such, its power is derived not 
from a physically constraining force, but rather from a discursive practice, an exchange of information 
between those behind the mechanism and those subjected to it, a message that may be formulated as 
‘power is watching you’. The inmates feel anxious not because the power over them has actually 
become stronger, but because now they have been forced to know this more acutely.
As Foucault argues, the Panopticon “must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a 
way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men”.651 It is to be expected, then, that 
some of the everyday mechanisms we take for granted in our society are in fact panoptical schemes. 
For an example of a variant of the principle within a Western European society, one of the key ideas of 
the Danish Crime Prevention Council has been “to observe crime in terms of its spatial anchoring... 
techniques that aim to prevent interactions from occurring in public space” while seeking ways to make 
people the object of observation. The Council suggests a number of “material technologies which are 
assumed to enable this mutual observation of each other's lives and activities: the use of glass facades, 
good lighting, low plantings, visible paths, etc., which all are believed to make it difficult for potential 
offenders to hide, and which increase the resident's abilities to monitor what goes on in the 
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community.”652 As in Bentham's Panopticon, visibility is crucial, though this scheme has the 
distinguishing particularity that instead of the observation of the many by the few, the arrangement 
allows for the observation of the few by the many.653
Many other new techniques and technologies still favour the observation of the many by the few. Mark 
Poster points out that in the late twentieth century technical conditions of surveillance have 
considerably advanced, though Foucault neglected to take notice of them.654 Writing half a decade 
before the current war on terrorism Stephen Gill already saw a growing tendency in the use of 
surveillance and techniques for maximizing knowledge about and influence over workers, savers and 
consumers, in discourses and practices of world order that he called “disciplinary neoliberalism”.655 He 
notes that much of the contemporary innovation in surveillance practice and technology has been 
driven by the bureaucratic state gathering information about populations and by capitalist enterprises 
seeking to maximize profit and to eliminate risk. The capacity of telecommunications to centralize data 
that was previously stored separately, either geographically or functionally also lies at the heart of these 
developments.656 Gill examines panoptical tendencies in working places, market forces, global finance 
and intelligence agencies, such as the NSA or the CIA. Poster calls the result of the development of 
new technologies a “Superpanopticon” constituted by the “circuits of communication” and the 
databases they generate. It is composed by
a system of surveillance without walls, towers or guards… The populace has been disciplined to 
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surveillance and to participating in the process. Social security cards, drivers’ licences, credit 
cards, library cards and the like – the individuals must apply for them, have them ready at all 
times, use them continuously… Unlike the panopticon, the Superpanopticon effects its 
workings almost without effort… The phone cables and electronic circuitry that envelop our 
world are the extremities of the super-panopticon, transferring our acts into an extensive 
discourse of surveillance, our private behaviours into public announcements, our individual 
deeds into collective language.657
Technology has made it impossible for a person to walk around Manhattan without being recorded at 
almost every instant. It is calculated that a shopper on London's Oxford Street is photographed some 
seventeen times, with the number increasing substantially if the person enters a store. On average, 
someone living in London may be photographed some 300 times in one single day.658 Furthermore, 
traceable RFID and GPS microchips are implanted in a wide range of everyday devices, such as mobile 
phones, PDAs, and car navigation and highway toll-payment systems, allowing for the movements of 
their carriers to be tracked. Biometric devices can identify a person from their fingerprints, iris pattern 
or facial structure.659 Through technology, the disciplinary effect is extended from specific places into 
society at large. It is now the masses who feel the anxiety of the message of being watched by power, 
regardless of anyone actually watching at any given moment or taking any action about it.
Surveillance practices and techniques based on the panoptical principle have swelled with the war on 
terrorism, and as such, they constitute an important aspect of the discourse in its practical form. In its 
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key provisions the Patriot Act updates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by removing or 
loosening constraints on government capabilities to collect intelligence. Among others, John Podesta, 
Bill Clinton's Chief of Staff from 1998 through 2001, has manifested his concern about the bill 
increasing the opportunity “for law enforcement and the intelligence community to return to an era 
where they monitored and sometimes harassed individuals who were merely exercising their First 
Amendment rights. Nothing that occurred on September 11 mandates that we return to such an era.” 660
Section 216 expands to the Internet the allowable use of devices which record outgoing and incoming 
telephone numbers. While the surveillance of the actual content of web transmissions is prohibited, 
exactly what constitutes transactional information as opposed to content is not very clear. Web sites and 
other electronic transactional information may provide a great deal of information about an individual's 
actions and personal life. A web search may reveal private details.661 By covering aspects of life such as 
the Internet or telephone calls, the expansion of surveillance has surpassed its alleged reason for being, 
as it is increasingly difficult to understand how a generalized surveillance of such activities may help to 
prevent terrorism. Even if it does, we may wonder if a slight increase in security is worth the sacrifice 
of privacy of the population in general. Since the measures are not focused on clearly justifiably 
suspected terrorists, another message is suggested: that the sovereign has the power to watch anyone, 
that its discretion counts more than political rights to privacy, that anyone is suspected of being an 
enemy of sovereignty and as such a possible candidate to become bare life.
This is reinforced in different ways, of which the following are only examples. The Patriot Act does not 
require intelligence agencies to demonstrate before a court of law that there is a probable offence in 
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order to obtain a judge's approval for surveillance. It simply requires agents to state that the tap would 
be of some use, “however general or ambiguous, in a criminal investigation, rendering judicial 
oversight of such activities negligible.” Under the Patriot Act the FBI can use its “Carnivore” system, 
which allows it to monitor all subscribers of an Internet service provider if one user is a target, with few 
barriers of privacy protections. Section 206 amends the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
which required intelligence agents to obtain separate court orders to monitor each telephone, computer, 
or communication facility. Section 206 permits “roving wiretaps”, which would tap the person rather 
than the phone. Consider an example of how such extension may affect society: since targets use public 
communications facilities, it is conceivable that all the pay phones in an entire neighbourhood could be 
tapped, allowing the government to intercept communications of ordinary citizens without a search 
warrant. Section 215 allows business records and computer hard drives of anyone to be searched in the 
name of a terrorism investigation and, like the new wiretap law, restrains people from informing 
anyone of such monitoring. This includes records held by public libraries. Government officials have 
much easier access to monitoring the activities of citizens, since “to obtain such records, the 
government need only certify that the target is part of a foreign intelligence investigation and does not 
have to submit any sort of proof that the target is in any way a foreign agent.” Section 213 also amends 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow authorities to search and seize the property of a target 
without notifying the owner. These types of searches are barred from traditional warrants. But they can 
now be conducted if the government argues that notification would engender an “adverse result”. 
Among the draft provisions of Patriot Act II are powers that would allow federal authorities to wiretap 
any individual for fifteen days without a court warrant. The act also creates a “Terrorist Identification 
Database” that would include the DNA of citizens and noncitizens. People would be forced, on penalty 
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of $200,000 and a year in jail, to submit DNA samples to authorities on mere suspicion of an 
association with some sort of terrorist group.662
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Pentagon announced an initiative originally called “Total 
Information Awareness”, later renamed as “Terrorist Information Awareness” because of public 
concerns. It is noteworthy that the very name of the programme was sending a message which made the 
public anxious enough to be noticed by authorities in order for an adjustment to be made. TIA is under 
the auspices of the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA, dedicated to formulating 
high technology and innovative approaches to security issues). The initiative was announced as a 
prototype program that would combine several databases, both commercial and governmental, from 
across the world in order to allow the government to detect “patterns” of possible terrorist activity 
involving details routine aspects of daily life, such as monetary transactions or travel. According to 
DARPA, the object is to allow “identification of connected items of information from multiple sources 
and databases whose significance is not known until the connections are made.” Similarly, the 
Transportation Security Agency would administer the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening II 
(CAPPS II) programme. Travellers would be screened through databases on personal details to 
determine whether they would constitute terrorist threats. Although these two programmes found 
opposition from the Senate663 and thus they may never come into practice exactly as originally planned, 
their effect as discourse has already taken place.
To stress the point once more, the principle of the Panopticon at work in the practices of surveillance 
that have increasingly appeared in the context of the war on terrorism carries a message that stresses 
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again the power of the sovereign and its capability to administer life and death. The recurrence of such 
practices incorporates the message as a subtext of the discourse.
4. Conclusions
The discourse of the war on terrorism cannot be fully understood without an analysis of the level of 
practice, considered as part of the discourse itself. Language and practice together confer an additional 
meaning that neither do separately. In the respect that both are elements of the discourse, we find a 
departure from Foucault, who would see a clear division between the discursive and the extra-
discursive, even if a relationship existed.
While Foucault's concept of biopolitics is a useful platform to understand certain practices of the war 
on terrorism, the work of Giorgio Agamben on bare life and the camp are more to the point. Through 
these concepts we see that the main message appearing at the level of practice – whether intentional or 
not – is an affirmation of the power of the sovereign to strip life of its political qualities and to turn it 
into bare life; that is, to turn a citizen into a human being without rights to protect them from the 
sovereign, the holder of the monopoly of violence. This message often contradicts the message at the 
level of the spoken word, yet it is not cancelled by it. The message as a whole then becomes 
paradoxical and the paradoxes and contradictions manifest in different ways: exceptional circumstances 
yet normal; outside society yet within; the threat from small groups yet measures for everyone.
Through his observations in regards to the Panopticon, Foucault becomes again relevant in order to 
identify the content of the discourse in modern practices of surveillance. The message is again the 
affirmation of the power of the sovereign, but this time in the sense of the capability of observing 
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members of society and stripping them of their sense of privacy – a final reminder of its ability to 
remove political rights and render bare life.
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Chapter 5
Social Antagonism: The Responses of the Hegemonic Discourse to Challenges from the 
Constitutive Outside
In a critical account of Foucauldian power, Steven Lukes points out that in its radical interpretation 
there is no possibility of escaping domination, “for power is everywhere, precluding liberation and 
imposing regimes of truth.”664 Particularly in Foucault's earlier writings the 'subject' was fully 
constituted by power relations since identity itself would be their product. Eventually, Foucault came to 
disown this radical view, which would make resistance impossible and undermine Foucault's own 
critical standpoint and political positions.665 He identified the critical function of philosophy with the 
challenging of all phenomena of domination and proposed an ethos which would allow the inevitable 
games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.666 It is the possibility of resistance in 
discursive domains that opens the door to the subject of the present chapter: the confrontation of 
opposing discourses regarding the war on terrorism in order to learn what it reveals about the dominant 
discourse. As such, the argument presented here is only consistent with the later Foucault.
Foucault thought that there is no essential principle of coherence in a discourse, and that it should be 
conceived only as a more or less regulated system of dispersion. It is true that discourses are never well 
defined monolithic units; they are flexible, change with circumstances and are marked by 
contradictions; they resonate with previous and contemporary discourses and reinvent themselves to the 
point of being unrecognizable, only to reappear again in other historical contexts. This raises the 
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problem of the determination of a discourse. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe provide an answer by 
arguing that “the ordering effects of the relations of difference and equivalence, the workings of 
different kinds of overdetermination, and the nodal points are factors that give rise to a certain 
regularity which can be signified as a 'totality'.” 667
But how are the limits of a discursive formation established? While Laclau and Mouffe accounted for 
the construction of the regularity in dispersion of discourses with a theory of hegemony, they have 
attempted to answer the question of the limits with a related theory, that of social antagonism.668 This 
chapter finds the conceptual framework of hegemony and social antagonism useful as departure points, 
as it aims to explore the friction between the current dominant discourse of the United States war on 
terrorism and challenging narratives as expressed through concrete criticisms and indictments: about 
the results of the campaign, the way it has been conducted, overall US current and historical imperialist 
tendencies, and allegations of deception about the facts sustaining such actions. The notions of 'truth' 
(in a Foucauldian sense), reason, madness and morality are revealed as playing a fundamental part in 
the strategy of the discourse as it is recreated as a response to challenges through a process of 
selectivity: a choice of reported facts on which to sustain the production of chosen themes and 
discursive objects.
One of the central departing points from Foucault of this thesis has been to highlight the importance of 
the validity of basic verifiable facts as useful points of reference for the purpose of discourse analysis, 
mainly in order to identify disproportionality and the Straussian use of 'noble lies' and the creation of 
myths. While this chapter retains the sense that there are valid facts that can be potentially verified and 
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which place different discourses under different categories, the objective is not to reach a forensic proof 
of any factual truths, but rather to assess the responses of the hegemonic discourse towards challenging 
narratives.
This is a necessary clarification because not all of the alleged facts on which the confronting narratives 
base their attacks can be verified straightforwardly. While at this point in time it is reasonable to 
assume, for example, that the regime of Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction nor 
working links with Al Qaeda; or that the 'terrorist cell' captured in Miami posed little to no real threat to 
society; it is a different story to determine the number of civilian casualties in Iraq as a result of the 
war, and there are, indeed, quite diverging versions of this figure depending on the source. While 
George W. Bush admitted 30,000 civilian deaths in Iraq in the first two years of the war669, an earlier 
scientific study had estimated the total toll at around 100,000670, a 2006 UN Report described about a 
100 deaths a day,671 and a 2006 study raised the estimate to 655,000 deaths.672 Critical postures use the 
latter figures as basis while the US administration tends to ignore them.
The reports of political events that reach us do so only through a series of filters in the media, different 
branches of government, institutions in the field of social sciences and occasionally hard sciences. 
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When we find that there is often friction between different narratives in relation to allegations of the 
empirical validity of reported facts and events, it is easy to fall into the temptation of immediately 
preferring one source or version over another. However, precisely because so much is at stake 
depending on where these basic truths lie, we should leave their forensic verification to in-depth 
investigations of a different nature, more suitable for the disciplines of journalism, history and hard 
sciences than to discourse analysis. This is why in this chapter I prefer to refer to reported facts when 
dealing with different versions, except for those that we can safely assume to be true without further 
need of verification.
1. Hegemonic Discourse, Social Antagonism and the Constitutive Outside
Laclau and Mouffe believe that the political and moral-intellectual leadership of a hegemonic force 
finds its expression in the construction of a discursive formation that allows demands, views and 
attitudes. Hegemony is the expansion of a discourse into a dominant position in a context of 
antagonistic forces. However, this is not a Marxist hegemony, as it is no longer conceived as a strictly 
class practice but, rather, as the principle of discursive articulation in general. The construction of a 
hegemonic discourse is the result of articulation, defined as a “practice establishing relations among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”.673 The articulation 
of discursive elements takes place in a conflictual terrain of power and resistance and always includes 
an element of force and repression.674 In this, the authors move away from Foucault, who gave priority 
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to the production of discourse rather than to its repressive aspects. However, it should also be noted 
that, although Laclau and Mouffe were much more explicit about social antagonism as an analytical 
concept, the idea was not entirely alien to Foucault, who proposed at one point “taking the forms of 
resistance against different forms of power as a starting point... analyzing power relations through the 
antagonism of strategies”.675
By constructing and constraining common meanings, power and exclusion are essential features of 
hegemony. James Martin explains the significance of antagonism in hegemony, as proposed by Laclau 
and Mouffe:
Dominant discourses succeed by displacing alternative modes of argument and forms of 
activity; by marginalising radically different discourses; by naturalising their hierarchies and 
exclusions presenting them in the form of ‘common sense’; and by effacing the traces of their 
own contingency. 
A successful hegemony will seek to render itself incontestable. Yet, despite this, no hegemony 
can ever be completely successful. For the political logic of discourse ensures that the condition 
of its possibility is simultaneously the condition of its impossibility. A hegemonic discourse 
cannot fix meaning totally and finally because exclusion and difference are intrinsic to it. There 
is always an ‘outside’ that threatens the stability of the ‘inside’ and reveals the traces of its 
contingency, that is, its hegemonic stabilisation through power and exclusion.676
                                                
675 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, (eds.), The Essential Foucault, 
Selections from The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, (New York, London: The New Press, 1994): 128, 129
676 James Martin, ‘The political logic of discourse: a neo-Gramscian view’, History of European Ideas 28 (2002): 24, 
281
Thus, an hegemonic discourse implies antagonism as it is the contrast with alternatives and challenges 
that sustains and reinforces hegemony, provides some of its essential elements and allows it to reinvent 
itself as a dynamic force.
Not all articulations are hegemonic. What distinguishes an hegemonic articulation is that it involves 
some element of force and repression, and the negation of identity: both in the sense of the negation of 
alternative meanings and options, and the negation of the people who identify themselves with the 
alternatives. Social antagonism emerges as the result of the negation of identity. The hegemonic force 
“will tend to construct the excluded identity as one of a series of threatening obstacles to the full 
realization of chosen meanings and options.”677
In order to establish the limits of a discourse or discursive formation we need to do so in terms of what 
is beyond those limits. We should not be looking merely for new differences, but rather for “a beyond 
that is not simply one more difference, but something that poses a threat to all the differences within the 
discursive formation.”678 A discourse establishes its limits by excluding a “radical otherness that has no 
common measure with the differential system from which it is excluded, and that therefore poses a 
constant threat to that very system.”679 This radical otherness is what Laclau, inspired by Staten, calls a 
constitutive outside, which “introduces a radical negativity that cannot be absorbed by Hegelian 
dialectics, as it is the conceptual system as such that is negated.”680 The question for Laclau, and for the 
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objective of this chapter, is how this constitutive outside is discursively constructed.
2. Challenges to the discourse and strategies of response
Considering that it is not possible to speak of the world without a discursive standpoint, it is safe to 
assume that each of the criticisms articulated against the war on terrorism come from specific general 
narratives, even if only vaguely defined in the mind of the speakers. Traces of diverse philosophical, 
scientific, political or religious ideals – such as socialism, anti-imperialism, international justice and 
equality, liberalism, an advocacy of human rights, the search for truth or Christian morality – may be 
found in the common indictments against the US government and its supporters. However, it is not 
central to the act of challenging to explicitly insert the charges in the grand narrative or narratives that 
sustain them. Most commonly the challengers find that it is sufficient to expose the contradictions of 
the discourse of the war on terrorism or to reveal reported facts that it has selectively ignored, while not 
necessarily making open reference to their sustaining narrative. As the main task in this chapter is to 
analyse the point of friction between opposing discourses in order to examine the strategies of response 
of the discourse of the war on terrorism, I will not describe the narratives that sustain the challenges, 
but the specific reported facts from which the charges spring and which most often sustain the 
indictments. The latter is necessary to show that there exist multiple reported historical and current 
events that are selectively ignored by the discourse of the war on terrorism, thus a great variety of 
alternative discourses may be produced. Therefore, the discourse must somehow deal with these in 
order to maintain its stability and validity and retain its hegemonic character.
Certain types of reported historical episodes are sometimes mentioned as background or context on 
which to refer to current events; the ones that are useful to suggest that it is the US the one engaged in 
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terrorism and not the 'other': the enemy in turn. This is the case of CIA interventions in Latin America, 
Asia and elsewhere that helped organisations in the application of repressive techniques, such as torture 
and murder.681 The International Court of Justice condemned the US in June 1986 for the “unlawful use 
of force” of the CIA and the Contras in Nicaragua,682 an accusation that has been used to characterize 
these actions as 'terrorism' by critics. Since 'terrorism' is a discursive object already defined by the 
dominant discourse, a problematization or relativization of what it is cannot be allowed to take place. 
Indeed, the strategy of some of the critics is to use the discursive object 'terrorism' in its opposite 
direction, accusing powerful states, first of all the US, as historical terrorists.683
Just as the concept 'terrorism' has been used in an opposite direction, the ideal of 'democracy' has been 
invoked against US intervention. The CIA has been reported to intervene in political and electoral 
processes that could arguably be objectified as 'democratic' (even if as 'democratic' processes they are 
largely imperfect or nascent) in at least Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1954), Lebanon 
(1957), Laos (1960-62), British Guiana (1961), Zaire (1962), Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), Ecuador 
(1963), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1981).684 Since the discourse produces the 'truth' that the US 
stands for democracy as a moral foundation, questions about the reasons for the interventions must also 
be denied.
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Historical events have also been used to support the allegation that the allies of the US may have also 
practised 'terrorism'. Ariel Sharon, who was until January of 2006 the Prime Minister of Israel, and 
whose objectives were condoned or supported by the neoconservative and Israel lobby groups in the 
US, commanded Israeli forces in 1953 that murdered 69 Palestinian civilians in the West Bank village 
of Qibya.685 Years later he became Defence Minister, and in 1983, a Commission set up by the Israeli 
government determined that he and other Israeli authorities bore indirect "personal responsibility" for 
the massacre in Lebanon of between 700 and 3,500 unarmed Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila 
refugee camps.686 Reported events such as these may lead to accusations of double standards in US 
classifications of who are to be considered 'terrorists' and who are not.
By making use of similar templates for criticism, current indictments usually refer to the material 
consequences of the war on Afghanistan and Iraq, the most obvious grand scale actions having taken 
place within the context of the war on terrorism, which were partially sold to the public as acts of 
delivering democracy to these countries and a fight against tyrannies that were aiding or harboring 
terrorists, but which have also had the price of a number of civilian deaths.687 Once again, civilian 
deaths are a natural ground on which to accuse the perpetrators of 'terrorism'. 
Also to be considered is the discussion about the real reasons for war on Iraq. As has been mentioned 
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above and in previous chapters, it is now common knowledge that the contention that Hussein held 
weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al-Qaeda was incorrect.688 Thus, from accusations of 
carelessness and irresponsibility for the 'failure of intelligence' to charges of deliberate lies, holders of 
critical stances have had a platform from which to attack the discourse of the war on terrorism, with 
implications for the validity of the practical application of Western 'democratic values'. Similarly, the 
numerous damning reports about the practices of US authorities towards its war prisoners or 'enemy 
combatants' in places such as Abu Ghraib689 or Guantanamo Bay690 have had a negative effect on the 
perception of the fairness of the war on terrorism. The effect has been increased by the perception of 
changes in laws and an increase in surveillance techniques within the US legislation such as the USA 
Patriot Act and the Domestic Security Enhancement Act, which have been resented as erosions of civil 
rights.691
All of the above reported facts are not necessarily used to question the basic assumptions of the 
discourse of the war on terrorism; they may limit their attacks to the manner of carrying out counter-
terrorism, while still accepting that some kind of counter-terrorist strategy is justified and needed for a 
real threat. While they still represent a challenge, by sharing the most basic assumptions they overlap to 
a great extent with the hegemonic discourse. The question here is how the dominant discourse reacts 
when confronted with these issues. Further below we will see examples of criticisms that represent a 
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radical opposition even to the commonly accepted reported factual foundations of the discourse.
Discussion of the above reported facts is not openly prohibited by the discourse. There is no explicit 
punishment for writing, speaking or demonstrating about civilian deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan or 
Palestine. There could not be any without a further price towards the hegemonic discourse itself, which 
is purported to defend democratic principles, which include the right to freedom of speech. An open 
prohibition would probably increase the volume of the challenging voices. If there is any prohibition as 
such, at this moment it is more the product of the unspoken threat of consequences of dissension, 
however mild or severe, than any actual censorship as commonly understood. There may actually be no 
need for any explicit prohibition. According to a study by FAIR, a US media watch group, out of 319 
on-camera sources appearing in stories about the war on Iraq on the nightly network newscasts during 
October 2003, 244 (76 %) were current or former government or military officials.692 While this is no 
proof, it does suggest that the sort of ‘prohibition’ taking place is mostly in the form of self-censorship 
consisting of the broadcaster's choice of official sources over dissenting voices, a selectivity which will 
help determine what is to be 'true'.693
However, other strategies of response different from open prohibition do take place and reveal the 
negation of identity characteristic of social antagonism. It is possible to identify at least five strategies 
that work in a sort of progression depending on the necessity of control over the discourse, though there 
is no reason why these strategies or steps could not take place all simultaneously or in a different 
sequence, as often happens. What I have called a progression is an abstraction based on the degree of 
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intervention of the representatives of the network of power producing the hegemonic discourse. The 
steps do not occur in a predetermined order.
The first step takes place even before the discourse is challenged and as it is being produced – we could 
call it a preemptive strategy. Discursive objects are produced that appear to perform the task of 
preventing certain issues from arising. For example, a discussion about historical context and its 
implications for the war on terrorism is suggested to be irrelevant, because the attacks of September 11, 
2001 marked a “new era”694 and a “new kind of war”.695 Not only do any questions about the past 
become useless, but without the constraint of history or context the network which produces the 
discourse has virtually unlimited possibilities to reinvent it.
Some prison abuse scandals were also preemptively engaged even before their emergence by a legal 
concept and discursive object: that of the 'enemy combatant', a versatile category since it is not properly 
defined. As noted in a previous chapter, the Justice Department argues that any US citizen may be 
detained indefinitely without charges or access to counsel if the executive branch presents "some 
evidence" that he is an enemy combatant. This was the case of Jose Padilla. That such a discursive 
object is a tool for the will to power and not the will to truth is supported by the fact that some terrorist 
suspects are presented as 'enemy combatants' while others are subjected to criminal prosecution in US 
courts, a selective behaviour that suggests that the legal argument is used at convenience. Civil rights 
organisations are concerned that other prisoners, like Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who have been subject 
to criminal prosecution for alleged terrorism-related activities, now face the prospect that the 
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government may take away the privilege of criminal procedure and subject them to indeterminate 
'enemy combatant' status should they begin to win their case.696
A second step occurs when the challenges to the discourse begin to arise or are likely to arise. Rather 
than engaging directly, the representatives of the network of power ignore them at this stage. At the 
same time, the emergence of questions (or their imminent emergence) is compensated with a 
reinforcement of the discourse. A way of doing so is by creating or rephrasing new elements of the 
discourse, but there is still not a direct reply to the challenging voices at this point.
In April 2002 Sharon escalated a military conflict in the West Bank. Bush must have known that the 
actions of his administration back then were to be interpreted as manoeuvres to buy time for the Israeli 
offensive, and so claims of 'double standards' by the US would inevitably arise. Rather than attempting 
any answer or explanation, Bush declared Sharon a “man of peace” and attacked Yasser Arafat for his 
“complicity with terrorism” while omitting any mention of Sharon's personal past as a bellicose 
leader.697 New discursive objects and elements were being created: 'men of peace' and their opposition 
towards terrorist ways. Or rather, a discursive object/theme that was implied by the discourse was being 
brought to light in a new version in order to reinforce it.
We find a third step when it becomes difficult to ignore the challenges. The first ones to step forward in 
defence of the discourse are its supporters and commentators in the media, the academy, political 
parties or other organisations in lower levels than governmental authorities. High level personalities are 
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kept out of a direct confrontation at this point. There are many examples of media commentators 
replying to challenges to the discourse. Many articles in the neoconservative publication The Weekly 
Standard may illustrate the point. The elements of the discourse reinforced by these commentators 
differ from the ones that we would find at governmental levels in that they have a more narrow 
audience, even when considerably large. Since their audiences are somewhat specialized they have a 
certain margin to present their ideas as arguments or research. 
One difference with governmental agents is that commentators may allow themselves to speak in more 
openly, provocative and controversial ways. Consider Charles Krauthammer's 2005 article written as a 
response to a debate in the US Senate about torture. The article provoked many intense reactions for its 
attempt at justifying some cases of torture; its relevance here is the way in which his arguments 
represented an attempt to defend and reinforce the discourse on terrorism. The following paragraph is 
entirely composed of discursive themes already identified in previous chapters:
Breaking the laws of war and abusing civilians are what, to understate the matter vastly, 
terrorists do for a living. They are entitled, therefore, to (no rights). Anyone who blows up a car 
bomb in a market deserves to spend the rest of his life roasting on a spit over an open fire. But 
we don't do that because we do not descend to the level of our enemy. We don't do that because, 
unlike him, we are civilized. Even though terrorists are entitled to no humane treatment, we 
give it to them because it is in our nature as a moral and humane people. And when on rare 
occasions we fail to do that, as has occurred in several of the fronts of the war on terror, we are 
duly disgraced.698
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In the above fragment we find an articulation of the theme of the opposition between 'us' as moral, 
righteous and civilized, and 'them' as barbaric and deserving punishment.
A fourth step takes place when the authorities give responses. At first they are limited, usually in the 
context of press conferences where journalists directly ask about the current 'hot' topic in the news. It 
should be noted that long before the debate has reached them, government officials have been quite 
aware of it. In May 2005 the then secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld opined that a new challenge 
in time of war was dealing with global media that could instantly spread information that could be false 
or damaging to US interests. He lamented that modern media, such as the Internet, had “no inhibitions” 
and “a seemingly casual disregard for the protection of classified information, resulting in a near 
continuous haemorrhage of classified documents, to the detriment of the country”.699 What we see here 
is a complaint from a member of the network of power about a lack of a de facto censorship 
mechanism and the difficulty of dealing with the damage (“haemorrhage”) suffered by the discourse.
When these personalities are finally forced to give direct responses, they usually do so in the form of 
simple discursive objects or short themes not unlike slogans. There is a noticeable lack of an attempt to 
provide complex arguments. In a May 2005 news conference, Bush responded to an Amnesty 
International report that compared the detention camp in Guantanamo to a Soviet-era gulag by 
declaring: “It's an absurd allegation. The United States is a country that promotes freedom around the 
world.” The report, he said, was flawed because it was based on allegations that were made by 
prisoners “who hate America”.700 When asked two years earlier to explain the looting and chaos in 
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occupied Iraq, Rumsfeld said: “Freedom's untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and 
commit crimes and do bad things... They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things. And 
that's what's going to happen here... Stuff happens”.701
Perhaps this insistence on simplicity is an attempt at promoting the sacred atmosphere that surrounds 
some political leaders and their discourse. Or perhaps what is being suggested is that the 'truth' is 
reasonable, self-evident and simple, and so the questions should be regarded as irrelevant or ill 
intended; that the discourse is 'common sense'.
There are other examples of replies by authorities which have a higher degree of complexity, and may 
be considered a second phase of the fourth strategy. These do not occur in the context of press 
conferences or improvised answers, but rather as official reports or analyses. Sometimes the reports 
accept a limited amount of mistakes or wrongdoings, but there is a reinforcement of the notion that 
these actions are necessary or unavoidable evils, or exceptions to the rule ('a few bad apples') that are 
taken care of through trustworthy legal procedures. The notion that the circumstances are to blame and 
not the intrinsic contradictions of the discourse is suggested by the formality of the investigation of the 
events in conjunction with declarations by the representatives of the network of power (the principles 
of discipline and author). For example, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service completed a report 
that collected evidence of a massacre of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in November 2005 by US Marines 
who were reported to deliberately target unarmed women and children.702 Before the report was 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050531/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush, May 31, 2005)
701   Sean Loughlin, ‘Rumsfeld on looting in Iraq: 'Stuff happens'’, CNN, 
(http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/, April 12, 2003)
702 Robert Burns, ‘Haditha Report Could Implicate Marines’, ABC News, 
(http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2265583&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312, August 2, 2006)
292
complete, the White House spokesman Tony Snow emphasized that the inquiry was “a very vigorous 
one”, that the Marines in charge of it were proceeding “very seriously” and “very aggressively”, and 
that allegations from a journalist that there had been “foot dragging” or a “cover-up” were 
prejudices.703 The suggestion that the case was being taken care of lawfully and professionally implies 
that examples of unlawfulness should not be expected to be found within the US military, and if there 
were any they would be exceptional.
These more complex replies may also appear not as reports or analyses but as the natural result of a 
long chain of repetition of a few simplistic declarations to the point where they become generally 
accepted as the best explanation that common sense can offer. We know that the discursive objects and 
themes have reached a point of critical mass when the media begin to present them as more or less self-
evident. The media never took seriously Rumsfeld's declaration that the chaos of Iraq could be 
explained because “stuff happens”; however, at some point most of them did accept the explanation 
that most acts of violence were the product of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, allegedly commanded by Abu Musab 
Al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006.704 Likewise, it was later believed that the increasing violence was a 
nascent “civil war” between Iraqi Shia and Sunni communities.705 The point is not if these explanations 
are correct or not, but rather that they have appeared as simple discursive objects and themes. Like 
manageable objects or tools, the explanations may be summarized in short phrases and inserted in 
different texts or speeches.
                                                
703 ‘Press Briefing by Tony Snow, White House, (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060531-
4.html, May 31, 2006)
704 See for an example: ‘Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’, BBC News, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483089.stm, November 10, 2005)
705 See for an example: Lara Logan, ‘Undeclared Civil War in Iraq’, CBS News, 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/26/eveningnews/main886305.shtml, September 26, 2005)
293
It is important to point out that the discourse shifts and adapts itself to new circumstances and 
challenges, while still retaining its essential assumptions. Before and during the first stages of the war 
on Iraq, the Bush administration insisted that there was a link between Al Qaeda and Saddam 
Hussein.706 Two years later, long after the fact and when it was a commonplace that this was incorrect, 
the link morphed into one of a sharing of resentment. Bush was asked by a reporter what the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre had to do with Iraq, to which he replied:
Nothing, except for it's part of – and nobody has ever suggested in this administration that 
Saddam Hussein ordered the attack. Iraq was a – the lesson of September the 11th is, take 
threats before they fully materialize, Ken. Nobody has ever suggested that the attacks of 
September the 11th were ordered by Iraq. I have suggested, however, that resentment and the 
lack of hope create the breeding grounds for terrorists who are willing to use suiciders to kill to 
achieve an objective.707
Similarly, a discursive object morphed while keeping its essence when in August 2006 the enemy in the 
war on terrorism – until this point “Islamic extremists”, “radicals” or simply “terrorists” –  became 
linked for a while to the idea of “fascism”, in an apparent conscious and strategic choice of words, 
since the President, the Secretary of Defence and the White House spokesman all made public use of 
it.708
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There is a fifth step which takes place in parallel to the rest. It is difficult to assess because of its nature: 
the use of covert manipulation of information. In late 2005 it was revealed that the US Department of 
Defence had paid large amounts of money to buy space in Iraqi newspapers to place “deliberately one-
sided stories written by US “psy-ops” troops.” The Pentagon had a $100m contract with the Lincoln 
Group, a “business intelligence” company for this purpose. The US military hid its involvement while 
the Lincoln Group staff paid Iraqi journalists to write stories about US forces and the Iraqi government 
which ignored any negative aspects of the occupation.709 A scandal in the US followed the revelation 
about the work of the Lincoln Group. Bush reacted by commenting that he was “very troubled” while 
Rumsfeld promised an investigation.710 It is reasonable to assume that other similar cases have taken 
place without the knowledge of the public, thus the difficulty of assessing the extent and implications 
of the strategy.
We do have knowledge of other cases that reveal the existence of a strategy of covert vectoring of 
information. The American Civil Liberties Union revealed that two Oakland police officers working 
undercover infiltrated the anti-war movement in May 2003 in an effort to influence the demonstrations 
and “direct them to do something that we want them to do”, in the words of the Deputy Police Chief. 
The undercover agents were even elected into positions of leadership within the movement. The ACLU 
had also reported cases of spying in Santa Cruz and Fresno.711 That authorities utilize these techniques 
is significant not just for the production and domination of discourse but also as 'technologies of 
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discipline' in the same category of surveillance.
What these strategies of response reveal is that the discourse is fluid. It shifts and changes according to 
circumstances; it recreates itself in regards to the threats coming from the outside; it determines its 
limits and reinforces its version of 'common sense' by contrasting (repressing, negating, antagonising) 
the alternatives. It is in this sense that through the social antagonism it produces, its condition of 
possibility is simultaneously the condition of its impossibility.
2.1 Challenging narratives as madness and immorality
The strategies described above come about in response to indictments against the way in which the war 
on terrorism has been carried out and its consequences, but in general the critics tend to accept a need 
for counter-terrorism as a just and natural answer to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and others. 
Thus, although the alternative narratives are to be found in Laclau's constitutive outside, they can still 
share some basic assumptions and principles with the hegemonic discourse. For example, it is possible 
to criticise the war on terrorism on the basis of recovering the 'true' American identity and its special 
place in the world by embracing the values of justice and democracy, and therefore still accepting 
where the oneness and otherness are placed.
Nevertheless, there are other less frequent charges, aimed against the reporting of the basic assumed 
facts of terrorist attacks, which seek to invalidate the righteousness of the war on terrorism. The 
discourse places these indictments well further into the constitutive outside, away from what is 
reasonable and into the realm of madness. I noted in chapter 1 Foucault's observations on the subject, 
which are of relevance here. Since the Middle Ages, he writes, the words of the madman are considered 
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null and void, and lacking any truth or importance; however, his speech may be attributed with the 
power of uttering hidden truths through a naivety that sees what others cannot.712 I also pointed out that 
for our subject – and for present day society in general – the attributes of the madman include that 
which is disqualified for being in radical opposition to the hegemonic discourse. We should think of 
madness in a figurative sense and substitute it for 'fringe', 'ignorant', 'unreasonable' or 'extremist'. Those 
who speak today from outside the discourse resemble the madman of the Middle Ages in their 
attraction of a limited number of listeners who believe in their power of 'uttering truths' that 
conventional wisdom has apparently overlooked.
While the democratic ideal of freedom of speech will make it difficult for anyone to be openly 
punished for speaking against the dominant discourse, there are negative social outcomes for those who 
cross a certain limit. In the context of the war on terrorism there are categories that take the place that 
was once reserved for mad men, perhaps the most clear example for this context being the discursive 
object of the 'conspiracy theorist' – apart from the terrorist himself. 
In terms of discourse, both conspiracy theorists and terrorists find themselves on the fringe of the 
constitutive outside, since they cannot be reduced into, or merged with, the hegemonic discourse in a 
Hegelian synthesis in any way. The difference is that the discourse of the terrorist automatically 
reinforces the hegemonic discourse and grants it credibility by virtue of confirmation. As such, it 
represents no threat or challenge to the hegemony; it can never replace the dominant discourse, nor has 
it got any real potential of expansion within US society. While it does not share the central assumptions 
of the hegemonic discourse, it shares the same logic by creating a mirror image of it. Terrorism, its 
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discourse and its identity are in fact a necessity for the existence of the hegemonic discourse. The 
discourse of conspiracy, on the other hand, represents a challenge, even if limited, in as much as the 
hegemonic discourse loses all credibility among their subscribers. It also has a limited potential of 
expansion within US society, as it shares some widely accepted human values of the good of 'truth', 
'justice', 'democracy' or the possibility of living in a 'better society'. Although unlikely, in principle 
conspiracy theories could be accepted as 'common sense' among larger segments of society in the
future.
The term 'conspiracy theory' carries an emotional charge that is often enough to exempt the supporters 
of the discourse from replying directly to its allegations. This term and others also clearly mark the 
issues that are out of bounds; perhaps this is what Foucault meant by the “wild exteriority”713 – “wild” 
not because they are a priori unreasonable but because they lie out of boundaries and virtually out of 
sight, where the rules of the discourse do not apply. It is thus assumed that no dialogue is possible, or 
necessary, since the discourse does not regard them as worthy of it.
The conspiracy issues that usually get appellations equivalent to 'madness' sometimes seek to insert 
themselves in a historical narrative to establish a foundation for their validity, for the establishment of 
their rationality is what they most need. They are sometimes made in explicit or implicit reference to 
selected reported events about how Western governments or governments considered democratic have 
covertly and deceptively taken part in acts of violence against civilians in the past for reasons of power, 
especially if they targeted 'democratic' or Western societies, even their own, with the implication that 
this may be common practice, albeit largely unknown to the general public, and easily objectified as 
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'terrorist'. Dominant discourses in Western societies may tolerate some limited discussion of such 
events as long as they are considered exceptions but not common practices. For example, it has been 
reported that in 1954 the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) carried out an operation 
aimed at preventing the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone, what was later known 
as the “Unfortunate Business” and the Lavon Affair. A network of Egyptian Jews in Cairo and 
Alexandria, headed by an Israeli agent, would have perpetrated acts of sabotage against Egyptian and 
American installations in both cities. Apparently, the idea was to show that Egypt was not capable of 
maintaining law and order in its own territory while concealing the Israeli involvement, demonstrating 
the risks implied for Western security interests in withdrawing from the Canal Zone and relying on the 
Egyptian regime.714 The very phrase “unfortunate business” constructs the event as exceptional and 
unintended.
Other reported historical examples which are 'out of bounds' for the discourse of the war on terrorism 
and other dominant discourses of Western culture as civilized and rational are: the case of Russia in 
1999, when Federal Security Service agents were reported to be caught by local police planting bombs 
under a working class apartment building after previous attacks had been blamed on Chechens715; a 
1969 explosion in Milan, blamed on anarchists but reportedly perpetrated by neo-fascists with the help 
of elements of the Italian secret service716; and a 1960s US government proposal, “Operation 
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Northwoods”, that had the written approval of all the Joint Chiefs of Staff but was rejected by the 
civilian leadership, which suggested assassinating Cuban exiles, sinking boats of refugees, hijacking 
planes, blowing up a US ship and orchestrating fake Communist Cuban terrorist campaigns in cities in 
Florida and in Washington for the purpose of generating public and international support for military 
action against Fidel Castro.717
Occasional mention or indirect references to these reported events serve as historical context for 
discussions about the validity of the basic facts of the major terrorist attacks since 2001. There is a 
considerable number of authors – almost entirely confined to the World Wide Web, although some have 
also published printed material – who challenge the official explanations of September 11, 2001 and 
other subsequent attacks, such as the ones in Madrid and London, with the implication that Western 
governments allowed them to happen or were indirectly or directly complicit. Among others, David 
Ray Griffin, a professor at the Claremont School of Theology in California, published a book in 2004 
posing a series of challenges to the version of events proposed by the authorities, including the report 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, generally known as the 9/11 
Commission. His arguments range from alleged physical impossibilities to unlikely coincidences and 
security failures.718 He was partly inspired by a French journalist, Thierry Meyssan, who had 
previously written against the claim that American Airlines Flight 77 had hit the Pentagon, based on the 
photographic analysis of the damage of the site and the lack of debris identifiable as a passenger 
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plane.719 The allegations became part of discussions on the Internet as they became popularized by 
video presentations available for download that summarized the arguments of the above authors and 
others with visual material.720 Such recent video and audio web technologies have stimulated what is 
often referred to in Internet sites as The 9/11 Truth Movement. However, if it is a movement as such, it 
is far from uniform. Many web authors have joined the debate since 2001 with sometimes similar, 
sometimes opposing views on what took place, how and why. The common characteristic they all share 
is a varying degree of skepticism about the official account of events and the motives of the war on 
terrorism. The fact that some of the positions of these authors are dissimilar is just a confirmation that 
they grow on a terrain where the rules of a dominant discourse do not apply: a “wild exteriority”.
All of the above may be considered arguments of 'conspiracy theorists', but that is not the only type of 
challenging 'mad men' to which the network of power producing the discourse may react. Statements, 
arguments or analyses that criticize the actions of the state of Israel or its relationship with the US, 
though not necessarily directed against the war on terrorism per se, are often also 'out of bounds', a fact 
that suggests that the stated sympathy of neoconservatives to the state of Israel is central to their world 
view, and that the current discourse on terrorism, as the latest version of US identity based on the 
us/them dichotomy, has been somewhat successful in incorporating neoconservative specific ideals. 
The focus of criticisms is on the two countries' joint struggle for power in the Middle East and its 
consequences, accusations which imply immorality or contradiction. If the criticisms are strong 
enough, they may be referred to as 'anti-semitic' – another appellation carrying an emotional content 
similar to 'madness' – even if they emerge from a work widely accepted as valid under academic 
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standards. When John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt wrote an article721 on the influence of the 
Israel lobby on US foreign policy, it did not matter that they made a distinction between the group of 
influence promoting an expansionist agenda of Israel and the Jewish people; nor that their work 
followed academic conventions of research. Their article made the headlines because it was accused of 
'anti-semitism' - mostly by members of the Israel lobby itself.722 The accusation of anti-semitism as a 
strategy to discredit was already described and foreseen in their article.723
Sometimes a challenger of the discourse is called both a 'conspiracy theorist' and an 'anti-semite', if  he 
discusses an alleged illegal or immoral act committed in secrecy by members of the state of Israel or 
one or more Jews. In a mirror image of the link between pro-Israel ideals and the US discourse on 
terrorism, some of the Internet authors that deal with the attacks of September 11, 2001, argue that  a 
piece of evidence pointing to Israeli foreknowledge or involvement was the reported arrest on the 
morning of that day of five Israelis who were found celebrating while filming the collapse of the World 
Trade Center. At least two of them were allegedly working for Mossad, Israel's secret service. 
Atypically for Fox News, a traditional supporter of the war on terrorism, it followed the story of the 
Israeli spies; apparently, 140 Israelis were detained prior to September 11, 2001, as part of a 
widespread investigation into a suspected espionage ring that sought to penetrate government facilities; 
after the attacks, another 60 were taken into custody. Carl Cameron reported that a source told him that 
                                                
721 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Israel lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’ (Working Paper), The John 
F. Kennedy School of Government, (March 2006): 14. An edited and reworked version was published in the London Review 
of Books, 28-6 (www.lrb.co.uk, March 23, 2006)
722 Julian Borger, ‘US professors accused of being liars and bigots over essay on pro-Israeli lobby’, The Guardian, 
(http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/news/story/0,,1743769,00.html, March 31, 2006)
723 This is not to say that charges of anti-semitism are never used against those who have non-academic or unjustified 
arguments against Jewish people. However, attacks largely perceived as prejudiced do not pose a challenge to the discourse, 
while researched academic articles do.
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there were “tie-ins” between the Israelis and the attacks.724 Eventually Fox News withdrew the report 
from its website, an indication that this was retrospectively recognized as a inconsistency in the 
production of the discourse. While this is an example of a reported event which has reached the public 
only through a series of filters that make it difficult to determine any degree of certainty about the 
extent or purpose of the alleged Israeli operation (and in any case it is beyond the purpose and focus of 
this chapter), the fact that this was a largely ignored story and is now forgotten by the global media is 
proof of the effectiveness of a discourse that allows only the existence of Arab or Muslim conspiracies. 
Had the people celebrating been Arab the report would have most probably been treated differently. But 
by its very nature it was in the “wild exteriority” as it had no way of being incorporated into the 
discourse; thus its withdrawal from Fox News.
Once again, the objective here is not to determine if the above allegations contradicting the hegemonic 
discourse are factually correct or incorrect, but to establish the fact that they represent a challenge from 
the constitutive outside of the discourse, that they represent possible grounds on which to construct 
multiple alternative discourses (demonstrating that the current version of the discourse was not 
logically inevitable), and to examine how the dominant discourse deals with them when necessary.
To some extent, the strategies followed by the network of power are similar to the ones that take place 
as response to more popularly accepted indictments. As such, the hegemonic discourse proves again to 
                                                
724 Neil Mackay, ‘Five Israelis were seen filming as jet liners ploughed into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001’, 
Sunday Herald, (http://ww1.sundayherald.com/37707, November 3, 2003) ; ‘Fox News: Israel Spying on the US’, Arutz 
Sheva, IsraelNationalNews.com, (http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=15391) . The report by Carl Cameron 
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the Times, (http://www.signs-of-the-times.org/articles/show/133831-
Exposing+Israel%27s+Blatant+Spying+and+Involvement+in+9-11, 6 June 2007)
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be dynamic in its recreation and repression of the alternatives. There are differences when it deals with 
a challenge from the fringe, however. The responses to the questions from the far constitutive outside 
occur much less frequently. This is due to the much smaller number of authors positioning themselves 
radically in the exteriority. If a response is necessary, it is usually implied that a brief dismissal would 
do, since the allegations are deemed to be irrational for placing themselves so far away from the 
'common sense'.
However, and in spite of the seemingly limited appeal of the debate, it appears to have had an effect on 
the perceptions of the population, thus presenting a genuine challenge to the dominant discourse. 
According to a poll by The New York Times and CBS News, 53% of US citizens think the Bush 
administration is hiding something about the September 11, 2001 attacks and 28% believe it is lying. 
Only 16% believe it is telling the truth about what it knew before the attacks.725
On November 10, 2001, George W. Bush used a first strategy, which we may again call 'preemptive', 
against speculation of conspiracies. Speaking to the UN General Assembly he remarked:
We must speak the truth about terror. Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories 
concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame 
away from the terrorists, themselves, away from the guilty.726
Thus, even before alternative explanations of the facts were proposed, it was already established that 
                                                
725 See ‘Americans Question Bush on 9/11 Intelligence’, Angus Reid Consultants, (http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewItem/itemID/13469, October 14, 2006)
726 ‘President Bush Speaks to United Nations’, White House, 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html, November 10, 2001)
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doing so would be “outrageous” and “malicious”. The fringe of the constitutive outside was being set, 
albeit vaguely at this point. The use of the word “malicious” is significant as it determined that 
questioning the basic facts would not only be irrational; it would also be ill-intended and therefore 
immoral. Immoral is an added element to 'madness', as the mad man is not by definition immoral since 
he is not responsible for his condition.
Some time later the 9/11 Commission published its report with “a full and complete account of the 
circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the 
immediate response to the attacks” that would leave no doubt about the accepted limits of the factual 
foundations of the discourse.727 This report achieved little in terms of discouraging the questions from 
the exteriority. In response, Griffin wrote a new book dedicated specifically to it.728
We find that when an official response is required the authorities produce reports assumed to be 
impartial, professional and scientific thanks to the reputation of the creators (the principle of the 
author), in this case the five Democrats and five Republicans headed by Thomas Kean, the former 
governor of New Jersey, and Philip D. Zelikow, who worked with Condoleezza Rice in the National 
Security Council in the George H. W. Bush administration and in the Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board under George W. Bush. It was indeed a response: the probe on the attacks was originally meant 
to be confined to the Congress; it was only after relatives of the victims pressed for an independent 
commission focused on intelligence failures that the 9/11 Commission was created.729
                                                
727 ‘National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’, (http://www.9-11commission.gov/)
728 David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions And Distortions, (Olive Branch Press, 2005)
729 ‘9-11 Relatives Grill Bush Administration’, CBS News, 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/20/national/main522682.shtml, September 19, 2002); ‘Bush Backs Independent 
9-11 Probe’, CBS News, (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/24/attack/main523156.shtml) 
305
As a general rule the network of power has not needed to respond in any way, since the implicit idea 
that extreme questions are 'conspiracy theories' or 'urban legends' works as an a priori refutation. There 
have been exceptions, though. We notice that replies come firstly and more often from the media than 
the authorities themselves, and even then they are only occasional.
On one of such occasions, professor of Islamic Studies Kevin Barrett of Wisconsin University was 
interviewed on Hanity & Colmes on Fox News. Barrett argues that there is enough physical evidence to 
sustain the idea that the attacks of September 11, 2001, were the product of an “inside job”. The 
interview took place because Barrett had the intention of dedicating a week of his university course to 
discussing these theories. It is revealing to compare the way both sides, the Fox News commentators 
and Barrett, attempt to argue in favor of their views. While Barrett contends that he has looked at 
“overwhelming evidence” for a controlled demolition of the Twin Towers and asks the viewers to look 
at it themselves730, Sean Hannity replies: 
The evidence is overwhelming to you because you are a conspiracy nut... The question is 
whether or not you are the most competent to teach (the students), and most people think you 
are a nut... Reasonable people see you as an extremist, and I don't think you are the most 
appropriate guy to teach that class.731
This is an interesting case because we find a university professor – who in different circumstances 
                                                
730 Barrett was making reference to Physics Professor Steven E. Jones's research on the three buildings of the WTC 
that collapsed that can be found in the website of ‘9/11 Scholars for Truth’, http://www.st911.org
731 ‘9/11 Scholars for Truth Professor Kevin Barrett on Hanity & Colmes’. TV interview. Fox News, (July 10, 2006). 
An online video of the interview may be watched at 
http://www.infowars.com/articles/sept11/kevin_barrett_st911_hanity_colmes.htm
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would be considered a reliable source and perhaps even an expert on his field – being portrayed in 
exactly opposite terms. What the contrast in value given to some university professors over others 
reveals is that reliable authors are only so as long as they speak from within the hegemonic discourse.
Another telling element is that Hannity calls Barrett an “extremist”. Extremism and radicalism, as 
opposed to wisdom and sensibility, carry a value of both madness and immorality, as is shown by the 
common use of the terms to refer to terrorists. Thus, Hannity is implying a moral link between 
discussions of conspiracies and terrorism itself. Once again the issue appears to be not just irrationality 
but immorality as well.
Wisconsin University has been under pressure for allowing Barrett to teach his course. According to its 
website, more than 1,000 e-mails and calls from citizens, as well as numerous news reports and 
editorials have been issued on the subject.732 State Representative Steve Nass proposed a Legislative 
resolution condemning Barrett's employment which was endorsed by 52 members of the Assembly and 
nine members of the Senate,733 while the Anti-Defamation League complained about Barrett's 
conspiracy theories “which often take on anti-Semitic and anti-American overtones” and a course 
which “ill-serves students”.734 The University allowed Barrett to continue with his course735; however 
                                                
732 ‘The Kevin Barrett case at UW-Madison’, Wisconsin University (http://www.news.wisc.edu/barrettissue/, 
December 8, 2006) 
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307
University Provost Patrick Farrell issued a letter warning Barrett that “if you continue to identify 
yourself with UW-Madison in your personal political messages” on the subject of the September 11, 
2001 attacks, “or illustrate an inability to control your interest in publicity for your ideas, I would lose 
confidence that your assurances with regard to the course can be believed.”736 I point to these 
developments around Barrett as evidence of the potential of the hegemonic discourse to produce 
disciplinary and material (i.e. practical) consequences on the proponents of alternative views, such as 
losing a job.
This possibility is also suggested by the case of Physics professor Steven E. Jones, who published a 
paper proposing that the WTC buildings collapsed as a result of a controlled demolition.737 In the fall of 
2006, Brigham Young University and Jones finalized a retirement package, six weeks after the school 
placed the physicist on paid leave to review his statements and research about the attacks. Jones 
declared that he elected to retire in order to “spend more time speaking and conducting research of my 
own choosing”.738
It is significant that Hannity's vehemence against proponents of conspiracies has been shared by some 
'left-wing' critics of the Bush administration, showing that some of their unstated core discursive 
assumptions overlap with those of the discourse of the war on terrorism. British columnist George 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(http://www.news.wisc.edu/12701.html, July 10, 2006)
736 ‘Letter from Provost Farrell to Kevin Barrett’, Wisconsin University, 
(http://www.news.wisc.edu/barrettissue/docs/0720farrellbarrett.pdf, 20 July, 2006) 
737 Steven E. Jones, ‘Why Indeed Did the WTC Buildings Completely Collapse?’, Journal of 9/11 Studies, 3 
(http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/200609/Why_Indeed_Did_the_WTC_Buildings_Completely_Collapse_Jones
_Thermite_World_Trade_Center.pdf, September 2006)
738 ‘BYU professor in dispute over 9/11 will retire’, Deseret Morning News
(http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,650200587,00.html, October 21, 2006)
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Monbiot calls the conspiracy film Loose Change739 a virus that “infects opponents of the Bush 
government, sucks their brains out through their eyes and turns them into gibbering idiots”.740 In a 
follow-up article he calls them “conspiracy idiots” and “morons”, and accuses them of destroying 
popular opposition campaigns; thus, both accusations of irrationality and immorality (albeit from the 
perspective of left-wing morality) appear here as well.741 What is noteworthy is not Monbiot's 
intellectual disagreement with conspiracy theories, but rather that his words are harsher than those used 
against his usual targets, such as transnational corporations or the US administration. In his words we 
find a confirmation of the far externality of discussions of conspiracies.
Mass media have at least once attempted to defend the hegemonic discourse from the challenge of the 
fringe constitutive outside by appealing to science; the principle of discipline, to use Foucault's 
terminology, which is common to all scientific discourse. The March 2005 issue of Popular Mechanics
featured a long article to counter “16 of the most prevalent claims made by conspiracy theorists”. 
According to the editors, the theories were debunked “with hard evidence and a healthy dose of 
common sense”. Thus, the emphasis lies on the notion that science solves the problem and validates the 
conclusions (a notion shared in principle by the scholars who oppose the basic facts of the accepted 
version of 9/11). However, the introduction of the article also identifies the alternative views as “wild”, 
“outlandish”, accepted by “extremists” and “curdled into paranoia”742, again in a reference to the 
reason/madness and moral/immoral divide, which suggests something other than a mere interest in 
                                                
739 ‘Loose Change’, http://www.loosechange911.com/index.htm  
740 George Monbiot, ‘A 9/11 conspiracy virus is sweeping the world, but it has no basis in fact’, The Guardian, 
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scientific truth, perhaps the will to power observed by Foucault as a constant of discourse.743
Apparently, the response to the article was so overwhelming that Popular Mechanics expanded the 
investigation and published it in a book.744
In some rare occasions representatives of the government have been forced to respond themselves. 
Reporters asked Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke about Meyssan's book in June, 2002. She 
replied:
(I)t's disgusting ...we're coming up on the anniversary of the day in which over 3,000 people 
were slaughtered. And there are over 3,000 families and countless friends who are still, you 
know, in shock and their lives in disarray because of what happened. There is no question, there 
is no doubt what happened that day. And I think it's appalling that anyone might try to put out 
that kind of myth. I think it's also appalling for anyone to continue to give those sorts of people 
any kind of publicity... It's much more than insulting.745
Clarke's response does not really address Meyssan's allegations, but rather describes them as an “insult” 
and a “myth”, implying their irrationality but again emphasizing their immorality (“disgusting”, 
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“appalling”), and therefore the lack of need for any further comment. It was not until later, in 2005, that 
a brief refutation against the allegations themselves appeared on the US Department of State 
information website citing mostly the 9/11 Commission Report and media articles.746 Presumably, this 
last quiet and semi-official response was necessary because the issue of the attack on the Pentagon is 
still actively discussed in web forums; yet it was not necessary to give a formal reply since the subject 
remains in the fringe of the constitutive outside, mass media already respond when needed and the 
debate is followed by only a limited number of people.
Again, with the discursive reactions to the fringe we confirm that the hegemonic discourse is capable of 
shifting its elements and positions in order to provide replies and negate the identity of the alternatives; 
in doing so it reinforces its 'common sense'. But when dealing with a challenge from the far constitutive 
outside, it adds new discursive elements: madness and immorality. This way it affirms itself as the 
locus of reason and morality. 
Slavoj Zizek's has elaborated the concept of social antagonism and his views have proven to be helpful 
in explaining its role as constitutive of social identity. 
The point is not that 'we' are nothing but the drive to annihilate the antagonistic force that 
prevents us from achieving our full identity. Rather, the antagonistic force is held responsible 
for the blockage of our constitutive lack as subjects to the negating Other, which thus becomes 
the positive embodiment of our self-blockage (1990a: 253). As a result our political actions will 
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311
tend to be guided by the illusion that the annihilation of the antagonistic force will permit us to 
become the fully constituted 'we' that we have always sought to be.”747
This explains why criticisms of the war on terrorism and conspiracy theories are accused not only of 
madness but also of immorality; it is in this way that the outside is held responsible for the lack of a 
fully constituted hegemony.
3. Freedom of Speech, Madness, Immorality and Historical Contingency
The link between 'mad' statements and immorality, as well as the responses in general to the 
constitutive outside, are constructions greatly determined by historical context. At previous times and 
in different societies the establishment of what was considered rational and moral has shifted. It is 
Foucault's work which helps us understand historical contingency, as he has observed that Greek 
classical texts offer a somehow different understanding to ours of 'freedom of speech' or parrhesia.748
The person who used parrhesia did so in a specific social situation of “difference of status between the 
speaker and his audience... the parrhesiastes says something which is dangerous to himself and thus 
involves a risk”.749 The word had most of the time a positive sense in the classical texts; the speaker 
was generally considered a truth-teller since putting himself in danger by making uncomfortable 
statements was a sign of his frankness. In this sense it contrasts with the modern Cartesian conception 
of evidence, for after Descartes “the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain 
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748 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech (L.A.: Semiotext(e), 2001): 11-16
749 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech: 11
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(mental) evidential experience. For the Greeks, however, the coincidence between belief and truth does 
not take place in a (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity, namely parrhesia.”750 Having the truth 
was determined by the possession of certain moral qualities, mostly the courage of the speaker.751
The examples above of accusations of immorality against people who present themselves as speakers 
of uncomfortable truths seem to suggest the convergence of the authority to speak the truth and 
morality; thus, speaking without authority would be immoral. This is similar to the pejorative sense of 
parrhesia which was less frequent in Greek texts and which consisted in saying any or everything 
without qualification and irresponsibly, in a sort of 'chattering'.752 The accusations examined in the 
examples above, though, go further in identifying 'irresponsible speech' with 'extremism', perhaps 
because alternative narratives violate a certain implied sanctity of the state and its authority.
In this chapter I have not been using the word 'madness' in a psychiatric sense. I examine political 
discourse and in political discourse the line dividing madness from rationality is established by the 
network of power producing the discourse and not by scientific method. Generally speaking those who 
make accusations of madness do so in a metaphorical sense – although their accusations are often 
vaguely defined allowing for a long stretch of the metaphor.
I have not intended to imply any criticism of psychiatric notions of madness either. It is, however, 
interesting to find more than one parallel between Foucault's observations on the history of madness 
and 'madness' within recent political discourse. The first parallel, already pointed out above, is the 
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historical contingency of the attitude towards the 'mad'. Foucault believes that madness as defined by 
psychiatry has no presocial essence and that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the strategies 
through which the mad are socially excluded in modern society.753 The same applies to the discourse of 
the war on terrorism; nothing natural or inevitable appears to determine what is 'mad' and what is not.
The second parallel is the link between irrationality and immorality observed above. If we are to obtain 
any guidance from Foucault's historical approach, then it is also specific to certain moments in time and 
not an essential link. Foucault observes that during its early days, the asylum assumed the moral 
enterprise of religion, becoming a
domain of pure morality, of ethical uniformity... The values of family and work, all the 
acknowledged virtues, now reign in the asylum... There is a primitive morality which is 
ordinarily not affected even by the worse dementia; it is this morality which both appears and 
functions in the cure... The asylum reduces differences, represses vices, eliminates irregularities. 
It denounces everything that opposes the essential virtues of society... The asylum sets itself the 
task of the homogeneous rule of morality, its rigorous extension to all those who tend to escape 
from it.754
Similarly, the link between madness and immorality (or its treatment as a moral duty) in political 
discourse may well be specific to the context of the current war on terrorism, although it may also be 
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reinforced by a US ideology that stretches deep into the country's historical foundations.755 Whether the 
link may indeed be traced further back in time or not is a matter for further research.
The final parallel springs from David Cooper's introduction to Foucault's Madness and Civilization. 
Cooper writes:
Foucault makes it quite clear that the invention of madness as a disease is in fact nothing less 
than a peculiar disease of our civilization. We choose to conjure up this disease in order to 
evade a certain moment of our existence – the moment of disturbance, of penetrating vision into 
the depths of ourselves, that we prefer to externalize into others. Others are elected to live the 
chaos that we refuse to confront in ourselves. By this means we escape a certain anxiety, but 
only at a price that is as immense as it is unrecognized.756 (Emphasis added.)
To disturb is what the claims from the constitutive outside do, particularly those from the fringe.  What 
appears to be disturbed in the case of the war on terrorism is American identity.
4. Conclusions
When approaching the problem of the limits of a discourse and what lies outside, we are forced to 
contemplate the existence of alternative discourses and discursive hegemony. For this task, the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe on hegemony and social antagonism proves to be enlightening and a useful 
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complement to Foucauldian theory. While the theory of social antagonism does not contradict Foucault,
limiting ourselves to a strictly Foucauldian framework is insufficient for a full understanding of the 
subject.
The exercise of examining the discourse of the war on terrorism in its social antagonism – that is at the 
points where it is forced to offer responses to both popular and fringe challenging narratives –  has 
highlighted the existence of strategies of power that shift, change and adapt according to the specificity 
of the criticisms. It seems that the potential of a challenge to spread throughout society is what 
determines the degree and manner of response, if any. Since allegations of conspiracy are not 
widespread throughout society and unlikely to ever become so, the response towards them is limited, 
albeit real and identifiable.
Although there is no process of open and direct censorship or prohibition, repression and negation 
occur discursively through different strategies that depend on the circumstances and the constitutive 
outside itself. Thus, challenging narratives play a role in the production of the hegemonic discourse, for 
they force it to constantly adapt and reinvent itself into newer and more convincing forms. In the case 
of narratives that lie on the far constitutive outside, what the hegemonic discourse produces in response 
is the accusation of irrationality and immorality, reinforcing by contrast its own rationality and 
morality.
That challenging the basic assumptions of the discourse of the war on terrorism would be regarded as 
'madness' could be expected before engaging in this research; what was less apparent was that 'mad 
men' are also constructed as immoral. The suggestion is that one requires authority to speak the truth 
(and authority is always in relation to power); not doing so is to be considered immoral.
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Foucault's contributions turn out to be valuable again as we learn from his discussion on parrhesia that 
the activity of freedom of speech against the powerful has been constructed in different ways 
throughout history. We also gain a sense of historical discursive contingency by making parallels with 
his observations on the construction of 'madness'. This should serve as a reminder that the discourse of 
the war on terrorism is embedded in socio-historic specificities.
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Conclusions
Foucauldian discourse analysis: one of a number of tools
Essentially, the work of Michel Foucault presents an alternative to the traditional Marxist and classical 
categories for understanding power, history and society. It favours the analysis of techniques and 
practices of power at the extremities of society, rather than class struggle or sovereignty.  His approach 
represents a valuable complement to previous theories; but his insistence that we should cut the king's 
head off, and retain capillary power as the only form worthy of analysis, cripples our ability to fully 
grasp what has taken place in the case of the United States and the war on terrorism.
There is a network of power that is most directly identifiable as the producer of the discourse on 
terrorism. It is not strictly a class, but it occupies a privileged position within American society. It is not 
rigid, monolithic or coherently defined. Its elements change and resonate with each other and the power 
it holds changes from hand to hand like a currency. While it is immersed and inserted within 
Foucauldian historical categories – such as overarching discourses of American identity and security, as 
well as religious and economic ethics and ideals – it can be reasonably traced to very specific names of 
people and institutions which articulate those grand discourses in a unique way. 
Some of the characteristics of a network such as this one do not appear to have been foreseen by 
Foucault, or were neglected for his preferred ways of understanding power. Such is the case of (a 
neoconservative) ideology, the use of the 'noble lie', 'spinning' or lies in general, the practice of 
lobbying, its relationship to a still important category of an economically privileged class with specific 
interests (e.g. oil), or religion as an element which strengthens geopolitical alliances (Israel – US). 
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Other elements indeed remain in accordance with Foucault, such as institutions of an academic or 
intellectual character as elements of power; but in general it can be said that the neoconservative 
network is not best identified and explained by a Foucauldian approach, while it strongly suggests itself 
as a central element of the war on terrorism.
Furthermore, Foucauldian discourse theory does not grant adequate importance to socio-historical 
specificities involving people in power, their interests and their particular use of language. These 
specificities reveal the weight of agents in the struggle for power and the production of discourse –
adding a complementary dimension to cultural and historic discourses of identity. For example, the 
interest of the network of power in an international agenda focused on the Middle East and with a 
relatively little attention to comparable cases, such as North Korea, reveals a specific intentionality that 
goes beyond the general discourse of American identity.
A Foucauldian approach is useful for revealing that a discursive object such as terrorism is produced as 
'truth'. However, it falls short in failing to recognize that basic facts and events can and should be 
considered as objective, even in discourse analysis, for the sake of determining the degree of 
disproportionality of the discourse, and the possibilities this opens for resistance to the abuse of power. 
The discourse of the war on terrorism as a case study asks for this recognition, as it provides several 
examples of a language disproportionate to the available facts: petty criminals with little chance to 
successfully do any significant damage to society are presented as dangerous terrorist cells that have 
been dismantled; Iraq is said to be in possession of weapons of mass destruction and in contact with Al 
Qaeda, and so on.
Foucauldian theory turns out to be helpful for showing that the process of the production of the 
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discourse is not limited to a series of statements, whether factually true or not, but is also related to 
underlying principles manifested in the authority of what is generally considered science, the art of 
government and the disciplines of intelligence and security; the resonance with historical discourses, 
such as the Cold War; and the symbols and rituals that accompany the messages. However, the 
discourse of the war on terrorism cannot be fully understood without analyzing the level of practice as 
part of the discourse itself. Language and practice together confer an additional meaning that neither 
does separately. In the respect that both are elements of the discourse, we find a departure from 
Foucault, who would prefer a clear division between the discursive and the extra-discursive. This does 
not mean that Foucault did not see any relationship between discourse and practice. On the contrary, he 
insists that the discourse of science and knowledge has been historically linked to practices of 
discipline, governmentality and biopolitics. 
With regard to the concept of biopolitics, it is a useful platform for understanding certain practices of 
the war on terrorism, and so are Foucault's observations on the Panoptical principle for explaining 
practices of surveillance. However, the work of Giorgio Agamben on bare life and the camp as a place 
of exception are more to the point and thus represents a better tool for the revelation of more elements 
for analysis. The reason appears to be that Foucault was mainly interested in modern Western liberal 
and democratic societies as objects of analysis and critique, which do not normally resort to 
authoritarian or draconian practices. Nevertheless, some practices of the war on terrorism, such as 
torture or humiliation, are closer to what we find only in exceptional situations or non-democratic 
societies. States of exception are precisely the main concern of Agamben.
Likewise, the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe on hegemony and social antagonism proves 
to be enlightening and a useful complement for Foucauldian theory when approaching the problem of 
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the limits of an hegemonic discourse, what lies outside and the existence of radical alternatives. While 
the theory of social antagonism does not contradict Foucault, limiting ourselves to a strictly 
Foucauldian framework proves insufficient for the purpose. This does not mean that Foucault has no 
interesting contributions to make on the subject of opposing discourses: his discussion on parrhesia
shows that the activity of freedom of speech against the powerful has been constructed in different 
ways throughout history. We also gain a sense of historical discursive contingency by making parallels 
with his observations on the construction of 'madness'.
Overall, it is important to understand that Foucault never intended to propose a general theory of 
history and society, nor a universal method for discourse analysis; rather, he expressed what he hoped 
for his work like this: “I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage 
through to find a tool...”757
Foucault was most of all interested in “historical enquiry, not so much into texts as into the mutually 
constitutive relations between texts, the human sciences, practices, institutions, bodies and 
subjectivities.”758 His different works reveal an interest in specific historical subjects: madness, 
sexuality, discipline, surveillance or the management of population, to name a few. He did not dedicate 
much space to explaining war, geopolitics or international relations, since these were not the focus of 
his personal interest. It is unlikely that he hoped for his work to be successfully applied to all of those 
areas.
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The discourse of the war on terrorism involves some aspects related to Foucault's interests, but also 
others which are not. Discipline or the management of human populations can be discerned in this case 
study; but we must not forget that the war on terrorism is also an inherently international issue, related 
to geopolitics as much as economics. Thus, Jan Selby may be correct in his critique of contemporary IR 
work that seeks to make use of Foucault. He identifies an 
inherently difficulty of internationalising Foucault. For as Kimberley Hutchings observed in an 
earlier review of Foucault's impact within IR, the 'traditional concerns of international relations 
theory (war, interstate relations, foreign policy, diplomacy, security) seem a long way from 
Foucault's preoccupation with the micro-politics of power relations and the constitution and 
limits of subjectivity'.759
The problem is exacerbated by the difficulties of ever reaching a general theory of IR, whether in 
accordance with Foucault or not, given that, in Colin Wight's words, “the international political system 
is a complex, chaotic and essentially open system that is causally overdetermined. This means that the 
patterns we observe are not reducible to, or explainable by, any one theory.”760
Selby observes that another problem is that “Foucauldian tools can be used to theorise the 'how of 
power', as Foucault put it, but they cannot help us in understanding the 'when', the 'where' or (most 
significantly) the 'why' of power.” I would add that they cannot help with the 'who' either. This is not to 
say that the 'how' is not important, nor that the tools provided by Foucault cannot be exactly the 
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appropriate ones for a number of social problems. The problem is, in short, that
while Foucauldian perspectives can be used to illuminate how new techniques of surveillance 
and organisation are transforming the practices of liberal warfare, they cannot tell us why the 
US state re-invaded Iraq in 2003, or why the British state participated in that invasion but the 
French state did not. Yet these are the sorts of phenomena, amongst others, that a theorisation of 
global power relations would need to provide resources to explain. Foucault, standing alone, 
cannot be convincingly internationalised to provide a theoretical account of the contemporary 
world order.761
Possibilities for eclecticism and its limits
In this thesis I have complemented Foucault’s work with authors like Agamben, Laclau and Mouffe for 
the specific purpose of exploring productive ways of analyzing the discourse of the war on terror. This 
was not an impossible task, given that these writers share similar traditions and epistemological 
assumptions. Their points of difference may be reasonably solved in favour of one position or the other 
depending on their applicability to the case study at hand without significantly altering the overall 
congruency of the theoretical principles. This is not to say that the works of these writers may be 
condensed into a single harmonious theory with unlimited explanatory power, but that their divergences 
will have varying degrees of usefulness as tools to highlight and understand aspects of different social 
phenomena.
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However, I have gone further by arguing that certain Foucauldian notions would benefit if we opened 
the door to other authors not so evidently compatible. This is the case of Erich Goode and Nachman 
Ben-Yehuda, who are interested in the validity of objective facts while maintaining a constructivist 
approach.762 This begs for the question of how far we can take eclecticism. The answer, I believe, lies 
in what constitutes a logical contradiction or not. As I noted in chapter 3, Foucault was not implying 
that there was no world external to thought or that all claims were of equal value. Such claim would 
have cancelled any possibility of dialogue with positions arguing in favour of the existence of objective 
facts, data or events. Rather, a careful reading of Foucault reveals that he was not interested in 
objective facts because he did not believe they could be made sense of without a discursive 
standpoint.763 This is true in the epistemological sense that objects and empirical data that capture 
human attention have more value for us than those we ignore. They become meaningful for a variety of 
reasons, from the trivial or personal, to the social, political or spiritual. Our perception of such facts is 
also subject to human error, interpretation and limitation. This is true even for hard science – something 
which is acknowledged by Goode and Ben Yehuda.764 Indeed, the various filters through which we 
perceive reality cancel the possibility of absolute certainty, except for purely abstract spheres, such as
mathematics. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is futile to acknowledge empirical facts and 
events in order to use them as referents for objectivity. As I have argued, they can and do have value, 
even for constructivist discourse analysis.765 The point here is that the recovery of an objective 
dimension as proposed by Goode and Ben Yehuda constitutes no logical contradiction with Foucault’s 
claim that we make sense of objects through discourse, or with his preference to analyse discourse 
without contrasting it with facts.
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It is clear then that the possibility of complementing two seemingly dissimilar positions depends on 
whether or not their specific claims and the logical implications of the claims contradict each other. 
Notice that it is possible to assess the compatibility of particular theoretical notions without the need of 
appealing to theories as a whole, as the specific claims of a certain theory or thinker do not 
automatically imply the rest of the theory. This is why disagreement is possible within Feminist theory, 
or within Marxist traditions, for two examples, while most of their basic principles are shared. It is, in 
fact, desirable to assess specific claims on their own and avoid the trap of accepting or rejecting 
theoretical frameworks as whole undividable units. The latter can lead to unproductive labelling.
The potential compatibility of specific theoretical claims allows for a wide range of possible inter-
theoretical dialogues so far largely unexplored. However, there is a limit to this endeavour, the one 
imposed by contradictory statements. A theory flatly denying the construction of discursive objects, for 
example, would not be able to stand side by side with Foucauldian discourse analysis. Similarly, if we 
were to (incorrectly) interpret Foucault as a radical relativist, there would be no possibility of 
introducing any objective dimension.
The discourse of the war on terrorism: resonance, contradictions and dynamism
The specific themes and discursive objects on the subject of terrorism since 2001 in the US can be 
traced – through their instances of production and characteristics – back to a certain network of power 
relations. We find at the centre of this network the special interest of neoconservatism. Their ideology 
and goals was established long before 2001, but it finds in the discourse a complement, an updated 
purpose and an extension. This group of power functions as a pivotal point between the Israel lobby –
with which they often overlap – the current US administration, and certain sectors of academia, 
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industry, religion and media. 
This is not to say that the discourse has been entirely masterminded by neoconservatives. Rather, since 
2001 and up to this point they have been at the centre of the resonating network of societies of 
discourse and doctrines from which the discourse has emerged. As this is a fluctuating network rather 
than a structure, it is possible that the range of their influence may change or diminish. It follows that 
the discourse must be understood in similar terms: as a set of variable discontinuities over which no 
single group has entire control. To the extent that the discourse resonates throughout society as it is 
reinterpreted and reproduced according to subjectivities, it has a life of its own; even if its different 
elements have been (re)generated from previous discourses by a number of identifiable individuals.
This explains in part that in the development of the themes of the discourse we find contradictions and 
discontinuities. For example, George W. Bush made a distinction between the ‘enemy’ and Islam 
during the first days after September 11, 2001, but he did not reinforce it afterwards. Simultaneously, 
several commentators were allowed to opine differently by identifying terrorism with Palestinians, 
Muslims or Arabs, thus linking the fear with these groups of people. At the same time, some practices 
have also sent a confrontational message by targeting mostly these groups.
Another example of contradictions is the central discursive object – terrorism – which does not allow 
for the possibility of Western states to be defined as such. It implies a status quo definition, but at the 
same time appeals to civil society through both language and practices: the fear of an unprecedented 
danger for society, combined with themes that reinforce the American/Western identity in its opposition 
to barbarism, incarnated here as Islam and the Arab world. 
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As the themes develop in their specificities, they are reinforced by rituals, authority and institutions 
(i.e. principles of exclusion).
Just as the discourse resonates within the network, it is itself to some extent the resonance of historic 
themes of identity and security. Some of these themes are generic and serve only as a template; this 
explains the similarities between the war on terrorism and the Cold War. Other instances of resonance 
are only related to the network of power and not to society in general; for example, the 'noble lie' is a 
Straussian specific concept, while the focus on the Middle East and Israel is pertinent to the Israel 
lobby but not to American (or Jewish) identity.
Much of the discourse of the war on terrorism is best understood by paying attention to its specificities 
in the use of language and practices, their relationship, and the gap between objective facts or events 
and the discourse itself. In some instances we find that the contradictions and distortions contrast 
starkly with what is available for verification (disproportionality), to the point that the discourse ceases 
to be exclusively a paradigm for understanding political phenomena, or a set of social assumptions for 
an American world view, and becomes also a tool of power for specific agents and their agendas.
If we further examine the content of the message appearing through the practices related to the state of 
exception – such as torture, humiliation, abuse, surveillance and authoritarian modifications of the law 
– we find an affirmation of the power of the sovereign to strip life of its political qualities and to turn it 
into bare life. That is, to turn citizens into a human being lacking rights to protect them from the 
sovereign, the holder of the monopoly of violence. This message often contradicts the message at the 
level of the spoken word, yet it is not cancelled by it. The message as a whole then becomes 
paradoxical and the paradoxes and contradictions manifest in different ways: exceptional circumstances 
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yet normal; outside society yet within; a threat from small groups yet measures for everyone.
The analysis can be taken further by carrying out an examination of the discourse of the war on 
terrorism in its social antagonism – that is, at the points where it is forced to offer responses to both 
common and fringe challenging narratives. This has highlighted the existence of strategies of power 
that shift, change and adapt in accordance to the specificity of the challenges. Just as the dynamism 
manifests in the process of resonance within the network of power mentioned above, it also occurs in 
the responses of the hegemonic discourse towards the alternatives. In the latter process, the constitutive 
outside performs a role in the production of the hegemonic discourse, in as much as it forces it to 
constantly adapt and reinvent itself into newer and more convincing forms.
It is worth asking if the choice of case study has made any difference on the observations about 
Foucault’s strength’s and limits. Would the thesis have born the same results had the object of analysis 
been, for example, the transformations in higher education in the UK under New Labour? The answer 
is no. The war on terror highlights issues of power that an examination of higher education would not. 
The existence of the neoconservative network, clearly at the centre of the production of the discourse 
demands a reflection on the nature of power at the top levels of society. The specific distortions of facts 
on their part beg for a reassessment of what we call ‘truth’ in discourse analysis. The material 
manifestations of the discourse, embodied in practices such as war, torture and surveillance, suggest the 
expansion of biopolitics into thanatopolitics. The confrontation of the discourse with alternatives on the 
fringe urges us to look into views that have ventured further than Foucault. On the other hand, we 
would expect a more traditional Foucauldian outcome when examining the workings of institutions of 
education or science. Once again this stresses the fact that Foucauldian notions should be best 
understood not as the components of a general theory of society, but as tools which are most 
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appropriate for certain types of cases – the ones that most interested Foucault – and not others.
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